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This thesis focuses on the changing dynamics in European Union (EU)-Thailand political and 
military relations within the context of the EU 2004 enlargement and the launch of 
European/Common Security and Defence Policy (E/CSDP) missions in 2003. The analysis 
involves a general examination of EU-Thailand relations at bilateral and regional levels through 
the prism of EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations. More specifically, 
it explores the nature of political and military relations between the EU and Thailand as well as 
examines political and security cooperation within ASEAN and between the EU and ASEAN. The 
period selected to test this research question is limited to within the first decade of the twenty-first 
century and reflects the period when the EU grew from 15 to 25 and then to 27 Member States.  
 
Using integration theory of multi-level governance (MLG), this thesis investigates how different 
actors can affect the policy-making process of the EU and the implications for Thailand. Multi-
level governance proposes that actors in various levels of political arena (supranational, national, 
and subnational) each play their role in the policy-making process of the EU, particularly where 
Member States gradually adapt their sovereignty. This theory is employed to explore the influence 
of Member States, EU institutions, and other actors in terms of policy-making of the EU. The 
concepts of actorness and presence are also employed to investigate the EU’s role in the 
international arena and the implications for EU-Thai relations. Values, Images, and Principles 
concept (VIP) is applied to conceptualise the role played by these factors in shaping EU relations 
with Thailand. The thesis also utilises Complex Interdependence theory to explore the relationship 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The main research question of this thesis focuses on the changing dynamics in EU-Thailand 
political and military relations within the context of the EU 2004 enlargement and the launch of 
European/Common Security and Defence Policy (E/CSDP) missions in 2003. The analysis is 
structured around three themes. First, involves a general examination of EU-Thailand relations at 
the bilateral and regional levels through the prism of EU-ASEAN relations. While enduring, this 
relationship has historically been marked by mutual complacency rather than innovation. 
Consequently this thesis examines the evolution of this relationship and questions the need for its 
revitalisation.  Second, and more specifically, the thesis explores the nature of political and military 
relations between the EU and Thailand as well as examines political and security cooperation 
within ASEAN and between the EU and ASEAN. The period selected to test this research question 
is limited to within the first decade of the twenty-first century and reflects the period when the EU 
grew from 15 to 25 and then to 27 Member States. And third, the unique example of a joint EU-
ASEAN E/CSDP mission is analaysed as a measure of the Thai-EU cooperation and a pointer to 
the future development of relations.   
 
Using integration theory of multi-level governance, this thesis investigates how different 
actors can affect the policy-making process of the EU and the implications for Thailand. Multi-
level governance proposes that actors in various levels of political arena (supranational, national, 
and subnational) each play their role in the policy-making process of the EU, particularly where 
Member States gradually adapt their sovereignty. This theory is employed to explore the influence 
of Member States, EU institutions, and other actors in terms of policy-making of the EU. The 
concepts of actorness and presence are also employed to investigate the EU’s role in the 
international arena and the implications for EU-Thai relations. A Values, Images, and Principles 
concept (VIPs) is also applied to conceptualise the role played by these factors in shaping EU 
relations with Thailand. The research method includes the analysis of both primary (official 
documents of the EU, the Thai government and ASEAN) and secondary data (academic literatures, 
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news articles, etc.), access to semi-confidential military data, semi-structured interviews with 
officials and academics (EU, Thai and ASEAN officials, together with academic staff from various 
universities), and a case study of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), including interviews with 
key participants.  
 
Background 
Prior to focusing on the political and military dynamics of EU-Thai relations, a brief pre-
enlargement context is required. Since the Treaty of Rome, Europe (as expressed through the 
European Community (EC) and then the EU after the Maastricht Treaty was implemented) has 
always been very important to Thailand both economically and politically. Firstly, the EU is a 
major trading partner of Thailand. Using the year 2000 as a typical example and reference point, 
the EU represented 15% of Thailand’s total trade (€129 billion)01. Thai exports to the EU had 
doubled in value terms since the mid-1990s and were worth more than €12 billion, whereas Thai 
imports of EU goods followed a less regular trend and valued somewhat lower at €6.9 billion. This 
trade imbalance accounted for 72% of Thailand’s overall trade surplus and helped to strengthen 
Thailand’s external accounts and assisted in the appreciation of the national currency. The main 
Thai exports to Europe included machinery, garments, motor vehicles and parts, and electronics. 
Imports consisted mainly of machinery, electrical items and parts. In terms of investment, by 2001 
the EU was the third most important source of foreign direct investment in Thailand (after Japan 
and the Asian Newly Industrialised Economies). Bilateral trade relations between the EU and 
Thailand were governed by the EU’s General System of Preferences (GSP). The EU adopted a 
revised GSP regime for 2002-4 which provided more benefits to developing countries in a more 
clear and predictable framework. Approximately 74% of Thai exports to the EU fell under the 
GSP while 7% fell under special arrangements, or were exempt from duties.   
 
                                                          




Significantly, although not uniquely, there is no bilateral co-operation agreement between 
the EU and Thailand. Consequently, the principal framework for EU co-operation with Thailand 
is the EC-ASEAN Agreement of 1980: the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) dialogue process 
provides a supplementary framework for bilateral exchanges covering three pillars - political, 
economic and financial, and cultural and intellectual issues. The focus of co-operation concerns: 
regional and global security, trade and investment, socioeconomic issues and regional macro-
economic co-operation, consumers’ dialogue between regions, and educational exchanges. At the 
bilateral level, dialogue also takes place in the framework of regular EU-Thai Senior Officials’ 
Meetings (SOM) led by the Commission on the EU side. The comprehensiveness of ASEAN-EU 
relations is no less than that between Thailand and the EU-cooperation projects covering fields 
ranging from forestry and agriculture, to science and technology cooperation are managed by the 
Joint Cooperation Committee on a bloc-to-bloc basis.  
 
By 2010, a significant number of EU-supported projects/programmes had been established 
in Thailand. Bilaterally, these were in the sectors of energy, public health, environment, rural 
development, narcotics, NGO co-financing, humanitarian assistance to refugees/displaced 
persons, (for a total EU grant of €59.3 million), as well as through regional programmes, such as 
ASEAN co-operation (budget of €82.2 million), Asia co-operation (€166.4 million), and ASEM 
co-operation (€18.25 million).  
 
At the start of the new millennium, the UK, Germany, Denmark, and Finland were the 
main EU Member State providers of co-operation assistance to Thailand (UK €2.5 million, 
Germany €11.3 million, Denmark €8 million, and Finland €1.7 million in 200/2001)(TICA, 2004). 
The main areas of co-operation assistance were environment, education, and economic reform. 
Denmark and Finland, (plus Sweden) also funded activities in the Mekong River region, while 




As Europe enlarged from 15 to 25 to 27 and now to 28 creating a larger and more integrated 
EU, the major concern for Thailand was how to negotiate with this colossus in order to sustain or 
increase the existing political and economic ties. Historically, the EU has given greater priority to 
the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) and her ex-colonies than to Asian 
counterparts. Just a decade ago the EU had at least 27 free trade or special customs agreements 
with countries in different continents while not a single one had been concluded with Asia. On the 
contrary, the EU has promoted its relations with Asian countries under ASEM, an informal non-
binding multilateral negotiation process that has throughout its history been criticized for 
producing only modest achievements.  
 
Thailand for the EU is of comparatively small significance, in contrast, for Thailand the 
EU has consistently been a significant partner. However, with the recent emergence of Asian giants 
like China, Korea and Japan, could Thailand possibly strengthen her presence in the international 
arena? China has voiced the prospect of a free trade area with ASEAN while ASEAN has formed 
the ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea) grouping. With these changing geopolitical 
structures, Thailand has sought to use her position as a channel for an Asian free trade area to 
multilaterally negotiate (in exchange of special treatment in tariffs and duties as well as other 
preferential measures) with the EU.  
 
In July 2003, the Commission adopted a Communication on a new partnership with South 
East Asia which proposed to revitalise the EU’s relations with ASEAN and its members. The 
Commission offered bilateral agreements to ASEAN countries to deepen cooperation in the areas 
of human rights, good governance, justice and home affairs issues, and the fight against terrorism. 
The highlight of this communication was the proposal to create a regional trade action plan called 
the “Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative” (TREATI). TREATI aims to promote closer 
cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on trade, investment, and regulatory issue. This initiative 
seeks the establishment of a closer economic relationship between the two regions and was 
anticipated to be the first step towards the conclusion of Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The creation 
of the 2015 ASEAN Community will, of course, again change this dynamic and the cautious 
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developments towards an EU-Thai FTA reflect the complexity of the bilateral and multilateral 
regional agendas.  
 
 
Research Questions and Literature Review 
This thesis addresses the following questions in analysing the changing dynamic of EU-Thailand 
political and military relations: 
1) What is the basis of EU-ASEAN political and security relations? 
2) What is the nature of EU-Thai relations? 
3) How robust is the EU-Thai political relationship? What are the developments and future 
implications? 
4) How robust is the EU-Thai military relationship? What are the developments and future 
implications? 
5) Who are the important actors? 
 
Implications of Enlargement 
Ginsberg states that “each enlargement causes a metamorphosis in the EU’s relationship with the 
outside world…… new members adjust to, and mould, the EU’s international relation” (Ginsberg, 
1998, p. 198). Each enlargement has led the EU to develop closer relations with border regions 
(the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe) and with countries that have special ties 
with the new members. New members play their part in shaping foreign policy of the EU to 
accommodate their own interests and expertise. Ginsberg examined the impact of previous EU 
enlargement (the UK, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973; Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; 
Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995) and of the then future enlargements (the CEECs and the 
Mediterranean countries) on the role of the EU in the world and asked three important questions. 
First, what is the relationship between enlargement and foreign policy? Second, what are the 
effects of enlargement on EU foreign policy decision-making? Third, what are the effects of 
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enlargement on the EU’s position in Europe and the world? These three questions directly inform 
this thesis  
In his analysis foreign policy refers to “the two related methods of EU foreign policy: the 
foreign economic, commercial, and diplomatic actions of the EC … and the political declarations, 
common positions, and joint actions of the CFSP” (Ginsberg, 1998, p.199).  Ginsberg argues that 
enlargement is both a cause and an effect of foreign policy. When the EU responds to the pressures 
of other countries to join the EU by accepting them, enlargement is an effect of foreign policy. The 
enlarged EU thus faces higher demands from outsiders to act as a coherent unit in the international 
arena which forces the EU to formulate and implement new foreign policies.  Apart from 
discussing the economic benefits of joining the EU for outsiders, the importance of “politics of 
scale” is stressed: when acting together as a bloc Member States possess more weight in the 
international arena with lower costs and risks than acting on their own.  
 
Ginsberg concludes that “enlargement has been a catalyst for the creation, or the reform of 
existing, foreign policy making procedures, mechanisms, meetings, and institutions…” (Ginsberg, 
1998, p. 202). He offers the example of UK accession that led to the creation of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), the European Council as well as intensified foreign minister level meetings to 
accommodate Britain’s formidable foreign policy interests and to assist foreign policy cooperation 
and coordination between Member States outside the original framework of Rome Treaty. 
Reflecting the Greek accession in 1981, the troika system was introduced, EPC was extended to 
cover security and crisis management plans and joint action procedures formalised. Similarly, the 
1986 enlargement coincided with the Single European Act (SEA) and involved significant 
implications for EU foreign policy such as linking the EU and EPC under the European Council 
and committing Member States to coordinate positions more closely on security issues.  
 
In 1993 the TEU was ratified just prior to the 1995 fourth enlargement and explicitly 
designed to deepen political cooperation by replacing EPC by the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and establishing the European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) by incorporating 
the Western European Union into the EU. These reforms were made in response to increasing 
demands for the EU to act effectively in the international arena and project greater influence and 
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power in the post-Soviet context. With the 2004 enlargement to the east, a similar pattern of EU 
foreign policy decision making reforms was anticipated as further enlargement was not tenable 
without institutional deepening. This process, however, proved contentious, somewhat elusive and 
inevitably based on compromise as witnessed by the fate of the Constitutional Treaty and its 
surrogate, the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
For Ginsberg, “enlargement has created a civilian superpower in international economic, 
commercial, financial development, and diplomatic terms…” (p. 205). His analysis suggests that 
previous enlargements have “generated substantial levels of foreign policy activity that would not 
otherwise have taken place” (p. 206). Consequently, it was hypothesised that any future fifth 
enlargement would be accompanied by foreign policy decision making reforms similar to those 
made prior to previous enlargements. Specifically, how the EU’s experience with the accession of 
Greece and the Iberian states in 1980’s was examined as a guide how to accommodate the accession 
of the CEECs. The most obvious difference between the two cases was the number of acceding 
states. The former governments of Greece and the Iberian states were authoritarian regimes, similar 
to the communist governments in the CEECs. EU membership led to democratisation processes in 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The EU applied the same logic and leverage with the CEECs by 
creating association dialogues with these countries and using the lure of membership to encourage 
transitions to democracy. Another similarity between the two was the security aspect of 
enlargement. The EU needed to stabilize the Mediterranean region so it accepted Greece and Spain. 
Security issues in Eastern Europe were an even more pressing concern for the EU.  
 
As for the impact on EU foreign policy, Ginsberg hypothesized several outcomes. The 
accession of Cyprus was optimistically expected to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus while the 
accession of Malta would provide, it was thought, the EU with a strategic location in the 
Mediterranean to monitor terrorism and drug trafficking – rather than the first point of entry for 
mass migration a decade later.  From an Eastern perspective, Ginsberg  anticipated that the EU 
and NATO would continue to develop a security framework with Russia and the Commonwealth 
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of Independent States (CIS) in the hope of avoiding creating division or tension. This perspective 
gave birth to several new programmes such as the EU-Russian and EU-Ukraine Partnership, 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and the Founding Act between NATO and Russia.  
 
While writing contemporaneously with Ginsberg, David Allen (1998) argues that the 
failure of the EU to produce a coherent foreign policy had little to do with previous enlargement. 
Rather, for him, the real problems were “more fundamental and apply to the present membership 
regardless of any future enlargement” (1998, p. 109). He argued that the Maastricht CFSP structure 
could accommodate more members without having any significant negative effect on EU foreign 
policy. Indeed, Allen saw enlargement to include the CEECs as potentially strengthening the CFSP 
through developing a more aggressive foreign policy in military and security aspects to 
complement the existing diplomatic arrangements. Allen did, however, identify one problem 
where enlargement could have a seriously negative affect EU – size and the different foreign policy 
interests between big and small Member States. He saw this problem potentially leading to the 
stagnation of the CFSP process unless reform of the decision making process could accommodate 
the larger number of small countries included in the 2004 enlargement. His proposed solutions 
were the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to the CFSP process, the introduction of 
constructive abstention, variable veto, and “consensus minus one, two, or three”.  
 
Reflecting on past practice and in general agreement with Ginsberg, Allen argues that 
“enlargement is, and always has been, a diplomatic/security matter, dominated by the collective 
view of the member states…” (Allen, 1998, p. 112). The UK was allowed to join the EU in 1973 in 
part because of the aspiration of the original six to act globally. Similarly, the decisions to accept 
Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 were made on the basis of security concerns. The 
EU wanted to encourage a transition to democracy and market economies in these three countries 
to thwart Soviet ambitions. The fourth enlargement of the EU to take on board Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden in 1995, however, presented one major problem for the Member States - these EFTA 
countries were neutral and could not easily meet the security obligations of the EU. Allen 
suggested that the next (2004/7) enlargement of EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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(NATO) could create a dangerous new division of Europe between the EU and Russia and the CIS. 
However, to avoid this, Allen alluded to the fact that the EU and NATO had been addressing this 
concern by associating themselves with these outsiders in many programmes such as the 
Partnership for Peace Programme and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia 
and the Ukraine.  
 
Allen considered the possible impact of the next enlargement on the CFSP in terms of 
institutional issues and policy issues. Because the pre-Lisbon CFSP system lacked proper central 
institutions and resources, the burden of representing the EU fell on the Presidency alone. While 
this may not have presented problems to the larger Member States, for the smaller states it can be 
difficult to carry out these tasks effectively. As noted already, the fifth enlargement brings many 
smaller members into the EU and without proper reforms to the existing system it was presumed 
that there would be difficulties for these states in coping with the role of the Presidency. Allen was 
also concerned about the balance between large and small states. In the existing CFSP 
arrangements every member has the right to veto, suggesting that any future enlargement will 
present the difficulty of reaching consensus between Member States. Thus, it was argued unless 
the voting system of the CFSP was modified to accommodate enlargement, there was a risk of 
larger Member States pursuing their own foreign policy towards issues where consensus could not 
be reached. However, for Allen, the real problem was not enlargement but the lack of CFSP central 
institutions.  
 
Since the 1993 Copenhagen Declaration, the foreign policy focus of the EU has become 
directed towards the CEECs and Russia. This created some concern for Mediterranean states like 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal fearing the loss of EU financial assistance. In response, these states 
began to push for a renewed foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region. While post-2004 
support from Cyprus and Malta developed, however, their accession also posed problems for EU 
foreign policy, such as the unresolved Cypriot internal conflict which could import this conflict 
into the Union.Additionally, Malta’s commitment to nonalignment could prove difficult in the face 
of CFSP obligations. Most of the acceding countries from the CEECs would not hesitate to support 
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a stronger defence mechanism/framework of the EU. However, these countries cannot contribute 
much to security and EU defence arrangements because they lack effective military resources and 
are comparatively poorer than the existing members. The problem that the 2004 enlargement 
brought into the EU was not the acceding states’ unwillingness to cooperate but the reluctance and 
division of the existing members to develop a more aggressive defence policy.  
 
Christopher Preston argues that the EU’s first four enlargements “expanded the range and 
complexity of political and economic interests…” and consequently “the EC has built up a range 
of policy instruments to manage is external economic and external relations” (Preston, 1997, p. 
157). He noted the four key effects of these enlargements on EU foreign policies were: that new 
members brought their interests into the EU; the priorities of EU foreign policy were reordered; 
there was an increase in EU’s presence in the world trading system; and the need to improve 
linkages between economic and political relations increased. 
 
Focusing on this first effect, Preston asserts new Member State interests have reshaped EU 
foreign policy to a certain degree. The second effect has seen the reordering of the EU’s external 
relations into a pyramid of privileges. At the top are EFTA countries which had FTAs with the EU 
and were later upgraded to the EEA. The second level of the pyramid is occupied by potential EU 
members (Association Agreements with potential members such as the CEECs were concluded). 
The third level comprises the EU’s neighbouring countries not eligible for membership in North 
Africa and the Middle East. The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) linked to 
the EU by the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement occupy the fourth level 
(Holland and Doidge, 2012).  
 
Turning to the third effect of EU enlargement, previously there has been an increased level 
of intra-EU trade as a proportion to world trade with three consequences. Firstly, as the EU 
enlarges, outsiders will want to negotiate preferential trade agreements to minimize any trade 
diversionary effects. Secondly, enlargement has encouraged other regions to form trading blocs 
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such as NAFTA and ASEAN. Thirdly, enlargement raises a debate on whether the EU has a trade 
protectionist stance or not: many countries have expressed fears of a “fortress Europe” with a high 
wall of trade barriers. Preston’s last effect of enlargement is that enlargement has led “to increase 
the pressure for linkage between economic and political relations and to strengthen the diplomatic 
profile of the EU” (1997, p. 162). The EU has to match its economic power by its political power. 
Thus previous enlargements have necessitated many foreign policy innovations such as the EPC 
and the CFSP. 
 
A final and influential approach is offered by Marise Cremona (2003): her analysis 
concerns both trade and economic policy and the CFSP. Her analysis informs and helps shape this 
thesis’s investigation of the impact of enlargement on Thailand.  Cremona addresses the impact of 
enlargement from a legal perspective. As a member of the Word Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
EU has to comply with the regulations concerning free trade areas and customs unions. Article 
XXIV of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was designed to minimize 
trade diversionary effects of a free trade area or customs union. Enlargement of the EU simply 
means that customs unions and free trade areas are extended and in the aligning process the tariff 
level or tariff quotas of new members may alter, but the same regulations still apply. Article 
XXIV(4) clearly states that “a customs union should facilitate trade within the customs union, but 
it should not do so in a way that raises barriers to trade with third countries”. In this regard, 
Cremona raises four issues concerning the impact of enlargement on EU trade policy: the overall 
balance; quotas and support; compensatory adjustments; and, trade defence measures. 
 
The EU institutions have concluded that the likely impact of enlargement will bring net 
positive effects, that is, trade creation, noting the clear benefits such as a bigger market, lower 
tariffs in new Member States, and economic development of new Member States. However, 
Cremona states that a study by the European Parliament in 1999 “failed to identify significant 
trade-diversionary effects affecting Latin American, South-east Asian, or Mediterranean exports 
to the EU in favour of the accession states as a result of Europe Agreement-based preferences” 
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(Cremona, 2003, p.188). The Commission also states in its 1999 Composite Report on progress 
towards accession that enlargement would benefit third countries in many areas including the 
benefits of a bigger single market and greater liberalization in world trade. However, the WTO 
Secretariat Report and other members raise two very important issues: trade diversion and shifts 
in trade. What they fear would happen is trade diversion from new members to the existing 
Member States which may harm trade relations between new Member States and their existing 
trading partners that are not the EU’s partners. Another issue is that new members would bring 
with them “special ties” with certain countries and hence shift trade patterns of the EU to favour 
these countries at the expense of other third countries.  
 
To a certain extent the claims of the Commission and the Parliament that enlargement 
would lead to lower tariff and other protective measures such as quotas in the acceding countries 
ring true. However, in the textile and agricultural industry, the EU trade policy is much more 
protective than in some of the acceding countries. For example, prior to 2004 Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Estonia did not have quota restrictions on any textile products but after accession 
they had to adopt the EU textile policy which requires impositions of quotas on textile imports. 
However, the most controversial issue of enlargement is the CAP. Although the tariff of the 
acceding states would fall, this positive effect would be absorbed by the increase in agricultural 
subsidies.  
 
  Article XXIV(6) of GATT 1994 allows other WTO members to make compensatory 
adjustments to their trade policy and measures when an enlargement of a customs union leads to 
an increase in tariffs in acceding members. The parties involved have to negotiate for a 
compensatory adjustment or compensation, something which may often prove to be difficult to 
reach agreement on. However, if the negotiations fail, the parties affected can withdraw equivalent 
concessions from the acceding members. 
 
Another important issue concerning enlargement is the trade defence measures of the EU 
and the acceding countries. On accession, new members will have to adopt EU trade measures, 
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meaning that they will have to terminate their own trade defence measures. The problem is whether 
the EU can impose defensive measures in these countries or not. The Agreement on Safeguards 
requires clear evidence of serious injury before the defence measures can be extended to new 
members. From past experience the automatic extension of trade defence measures to new 
members has seen third countries raise the issue at the WTO level. 
 
Enlargement should increase transparency and homogeneity within the new Member 
States’ markets thus benefiting trading partners of the EU as the Commission states “enlargement 
would increase the transparency of trade relations as well as (in most cases) reductions in barriers” 
(Cremona, 2003, p. 196). This should lead to increase trade and investment flows into the new 
Member States. However, in the medium term the EU will be less homogeneous in terms of 
economic development and trade environment. The real problem here is the diversity of interests 
of the EU-25/27, and reaching an agreement may prove to be to most difficult challenge. The 
implication of this trend for developing countries is the risk of trade and foreign direct investment 
diversion to the new Member States and EU’s new neighbours. 
 
Crucially for this thesis, Cremona also examines the impact of enlargement on EU foreign 
policy. Enlargement to the east has been part of the CFSP objectives to achieve security and 
stability in Europe with consequences for the institutional and policy aspects of the CFSP. The 
intergovernmental consensus characteristic of CFSP will be affected by an increase in number. 
The problem of a lack of coherence may worsen with 10/12 more members because the EU has 
chosen to severely limit the practice of QMV in the CFSP decision-making process. However, the 
introduction of constructive abstention and enhanced cooperation (since the Treaty of Amsterdam 
and the Treaty of Nice respectively) are designed to tackle this problem and to avoid CFSP 
stagnation. However, three challenges remain: coherence, coordination, and effective decision-
making. Another issue concerns the existing balance between “powerful” members and “small” 
members in the enlarged EU. This could weaken or strengthen the actorness and presence of the 
EU in the international scene but the outcome remains uncertain. The challenge for the new 
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Member States, which directly affects the international identity of the EU, is whether they can 
manage the role of Presidency – a problem of course that has been partly negated under the 
provisions of the subsequent Lisbon Treaty. 
 
To summarize, Cremona argues that the direction of CFSP will be influenced by 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean for several reasons. New 
Member States bring with them their special relationships with other countries in the region which 
they will want to keep. The objective of the CFSP is to promote peace and stability in Europe, 
enlargement of the EU redraws the borders of the EU, hence the most important issue for the EU 
is its relations with new neighbours. The presumption was that with the 2004/7 enlargement the 
EU would become preoccupied with its new neighbours. The EU has historically had good 
relations with these countries which can be divided into three groups: the Western Balkans, the 
eastern states, and the Mediterranean. Security is the major concern for the EU in the region. New 
Member States would mean a recomposition of the existing security institutions such as the 
Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, leading to a reduced chance of conflict in the region 
although there were “hot” areas that remain in the Balkans. Clearly, the EU has tried to maintain 
peace and stability in the region by adopting various frameworks with its neighbours: the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with the Western Balkans, the Barcelona Process with 
the Mediterranean, and Partnership and Cooperation with the eastern states. Consequently, EU 
foreign policy would likely to be focused on the countries in Europe with the objective to promote 
and preserve peace and economic prosperity, the EU’s fundamental principles. 
 
 
Multi-level Governance and Impact of Enlargement 
Without pre-empting a fuller discussion of integration theories covered in Chapter 2, multi-level 
governance needs to be considered in relation to CFSP and enlargement. Gary Marks, Liesbet 
Hooghe, and Kermit Blank offer their theory of “multi-level governance” to explain the policy-
making process of the EU and, in doing so, they challenge the state-centric view of 
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intergovernmentalism which proposes that decisions are shaped ultimately by the Member States 
(Marks; Hooghe; Blank, 1996). Similar to other integration theories, multi-level governance 
focuses on the issues of competence and sovereignty of the EU institutions and the Member States. 
The authors argue that “European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and 
policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government- subnational, national, 
and supranational” and that “control has slipped away from national governments to supranational 
institutions” (p. 275). 
 
Multi-level governance has three main hypotheses related to the decision-making process 
and the political arenas of the EU. The first hypothesis is that “decision-making competencies are 
shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state executives” (p. 276). The 
European Council, Commission, European Parliament and the European Court are all 
interdependent in the decision-making process and no institution has the sole competence in 
policy-making. The second hypothesis is that “collective decision-making among states involves 
a significant loss of control for individual state executives” (p. 277), while the third is that “political 
arenas are interconnected rather than nested” (p. 277) within states. The notion of separation of 
domestic and international politics is rejected by this model, subnational actors are able to move 
beyond the national boundary to pursue their objectives just like a state and these actors bring with 
them domestic issues to the European level.  Marks, Hooghe, and Blank test their hypotheses by 
applying them to the different functions of the EU institutions in policy-making process in four 
ways: policy initiation, decision-making, implementation, and adjudication.  
 
            Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty both the Council and the Parliament share 
competence in policy initiation with the Commission as they can request the Commission to draft 
a proposal. The Council can also pass “soft law” to limit the power of the Commission by ratifying 
common opinions, resolutions, agreements, and recommendations. Consequently, the power of 
policy initiation no longer belongs solely to the Commission, potentially leading to conflicts within 
the EU. Apart from the EU institutions, interest groups have been trying to exert influence: there 
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are an unparalleled number of interest groups lobbying the Commission and the Parliament to 
influence the policy-making process in Brussels. Subnational authorities are also present in 
Brussels to try to influence the policy-making process. Thus policy initiation power is now shared 
between the EU institutions which to some degree are influenced by various actors from all levels 
of political arenas. 
 
            Before the SEA the Council of Ministers was the sole legislative body of the EU, with 
exclusive power at the decision-making stage. In the quarter century since the SEA and the Lisbon 
Treaty the Council’s power has been moderated considerably by the increased legislative power of 
the European Parliament, the role of the Commission, and the influence of different interest groups 
in Brussels. The extension of QMV in many policy areas such as agriculture, trade, competition 
policy, transport after the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty modified the power of the Council in the 
decision-making stage although some of the vital policy areas such as budget, taxation, and 
movement of people remain under tight control of the Council. In certain areas the Council seems 
to have total decision-making power, but in reality a single state maybe outvoted by others. State-
centric perspectives, however, argue that the Council still retains the ultimate control of decision-
making power through the shadow of the Luxembourg Compromise and a veto culture. The 
Luxembourg Compromise allows a Member State to veto a decision made under QMV if they 
consider that their vital national interest is at risk. Between 1966 and 1981 vetoes by Member 
States under this provision occurred less than a dozen times and it has been used even less 
frequently since the SEA. Veto culture in the Council allows states to block the practice of QMV 
by raising serious objections (with hundreds of Commission proposals blocked in the 1970s). This 
practice of veto declined during the 1980’s because of the pressures brought about by both the 
Parliament and other Member States and states became more cautious in invoking or tolerating 
vetoes by other members (with Germany being the last country to succeed in invoking the use of 
the Luxembourg veto to block the decision made by the Council in 1985 on an agricultural matter). 
Several attempts by states such as Greece and France to use the Luxembourg veto in late 1980s 
and 1990’s were unsuccessfully attempted.  
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            The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty increased the role of both the European Parliament 
and the Commission in the legislative process which led to the reduction of the Council’s decision-
making power through the introduction of co-operation and co-decision procedures. The 
competencies once enjoyed solely by the Council have become increasingly shared with the 
Parliament and the Commission. The Council needs to have support from either one of the 
institutions in order to make a legislative decision unless it is unanimous. The Co-operation 
procedure gives the Commission power to accept or reject the legislature’s amendments by the 
Council or the Parliament, it acts as a middleman between the two institutions. Multi-level 
governance can be seen clearly in the co-decision procedures through the functions of the Council, 
the Commission and the Parliament. The position adopted by the Council or the Parliament must 
be approved by both institutions while the Parliament has power to an absolute veto. The 
Commission acts as a broker to draft a compromise between the two institutions if there were any 
disagreements by setting up and chairing a committee. The compromise needs QMV in the Council 
and an absolute majority in the Parliament. If the committee does not reach an agreement the 
Council has to make amendments which must be accepted by the Parliament before the decision 
can be made. It can be seen from this process that each institution influences the decision-making 
process in one way or another. The role of the Commission is more than just a broker because the 
Commission possesses greater expertise and detailed information on various issues so the Council 
often turns to the Commission for expert advice.  
 
            Thus the decision-making process of the EU can be seen as a system of multiple actors 
involving the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament. Each institution has certain functions 
which they can influence decision-making in the process. As already mentioned before a decision 
is adopted each institution is consulted and must agree on the position proposed either with no 
complication or through negotiations to draft out the compromise - therefore no single institution 
has sole power over decision-making process. 
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The Commission has the formal executive power to take decisions in the initiation stage 
while national governments are responsible for implementation. The Commission has competence 
to interpret legislation and issue administrative regulations on specific cases, but after the 
introduction of comitology in the 1980s decisions have been influenced by the Council and 
national governments. Many regulations have their own committee attached to them with the 
intention to limit the autonomy of the Commission. Some of these committees have power to 
prevent the Commission from carrying out certain policies they do not approve by QMV, but in 
areas where the Commission has full competence, comitology is not effective in controlling the 
Commission. The composition of comitology suggests that not only are they made up of civil 
servants, but subnational actors, representatives from interest groups, and members of non-
government organizations are also present by virtue of their expertise. This is where these actors 
from different political arenas can influence the implementation process especially in areas where 
the competence is shared among the central government and the subnational government. In 
practice comitology is not just an instrument for the Council and national governments to control 
the Commission, due to its composition it creates an opportunity for subnational actors to 
participate at European level.  
 
The increasing role of the Commission at the ground level of policy implementation where 
national governments used to have sole authority has become very apparent since the SEA which 
requires the involvement of actors from various levels. These actors are involved in all stages of 
the policy process selection of priorities, choice of programmes, allocation of funding, monitoring 
of operations, evaluation and adjustment of programmes. In order to perform these tasks, different 
levels of committees are created to oversee the implementation process. In these committees the 
Commission officials are present at every level and in direct contact with actors from different 
groups such as regional and local authorities and other local actors. This form of partnership shows 
that these subnational actors are not confined within their national boundary but are also able to 
play their part at the European level. The implementation stage of EU policy clearly demonstrates 




The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is viewed by state-centric models as an instrument of 
the Member States to monitor each member’s compliance to the aquís and to resolve any disputes 
between them. But the ECJ has done far more than suggested by the state-centric model: it has 
created a supranational legal order with the assistance of the Commission in promoting the 
integration process. The Treaty of Rome is a case in point: it created legal obligations directly 
binding on all Member States and citizens. The ECJ through the principle of direct effect and 
supremacy of European law has the sole power over national courts in legal matters irrespective 
of any objections from states. It changed the legal system that used to be nationally based to a 
system of multi-level supervision that is at the national and European levels. The ECJ influences 
the direction of the EU indirectly by creating opportunities for the supranational institutions, 
private interests, and national institutions, to influence the policy or increase their power. 
 
            In summary, Marks, Hooghe, and Blank’s (1996) multi-level governance argues that the 
EU has been transformed into a multi-level polity with actors from different levels of political 
arenas (supranational, national, and subnational) interacting to influence the policy-making 
process of the EU. States no longer exclusively control the connections between domestic and 
European political arenas. Subnational actors are free to mobilise between diverse political arenas 
representing their interests at the European level. The model argues that states can no longer act 
alone to protect their vital national interests or sovereignty. Most of the decision-making in the 
Council is by QMV and even with the power to invoke a veto, a state cannot do so without the 
agreement of other Member States. Apart from the constraint by other Member States, the reform 
in 1989 SEA and Maastricht Treaty has made the Commission and the Parliament more powerful, 
positions reinforced by the most recent Lisbon Treaty. The Council, representing the interests of 
states, no longer has full control of the process, the other EU institutions and actors each play their 
part to influence the policy-making process. The Commission has a hand in virtually everything 
because of its expertise and access to information, while the Parliament has more competence in 
decision-making process. The ECJ has created a favourable legal environment for the 
supranational institutions to interact. The model argues that “the character of the Euro-polity at 
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any particular point in time is the outcome of a tension between supranational and 
intergovernmental pressures” (1996, p. 292). These developments have reduced the control of 
states both at domestic and European levels.  
 
Multi-level governance can be used to investigate the impact of enlargement by looking at 
its effects on the policy-making process of the EU. The concept stresses the importance of the 
sharing of competences or power to influence EU policies between different actors from various 
levels of political arenas. Apart from the EU institutions, actors from national and subnational level 
all play a part in shaping EU policy outcomes. Enlargement brings more actors into the EU and 
they bring with them their “interests”. This concept can be used as a basis to investigate how and 
where these actors can influence the direction of EU policies. Enlargement will affect the EU at 
European level and international level, multi-level governance can be used to study the impact of 
enlargement at both levels. By focusing on the four stages of policy-making process (policy 
initiation, decision-making, implementation, and adjudication), the impact of enlargement on the 
EU can be investigated. Actors from new Member States will try to influence EU policies in these 
four stages and to a certain degree they may succeed in getting their demands across. These new 
actors not only affect EU internal policies but also EU foreign policies which affect the EU’s roles 
and identity in the world. It is here that the international relation theories of actorness and presence 
become useful in analysing the impact of enlargement on the EU’s capability to act and the 
perception of other actors in the international arena towards the EU. The impact of enlargement 
on the policy-making process will then be investigated for the implications on EU-Thai economic 
and political relations. Multi-level governance also helps to identify where and how the Thai 
government and other actors can influence the policy of the EU. 
 
 
Impact of Enlargement on the EU’s Role as a Global Actor  
Since the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 a new 
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international actor has been slowly emerging in the international arena. The following evolutions 
of the European international organization into the present day EU have seen the development of 
actorness and presence to some degree, the most profound area being in that of economics. Many 
political scientists have analysed the EU in terms of its actorness and presence in the international 
arena. The common objective of their research is to devise a framework to test whether and the 
extent to which the EU is an actor or not. This section will discuss the works of prominent political 
scientists on the subject of “actorness and presence” of the EU. Firstly, the concept of actorness is 
briefly discussed focusing on the early work of Gunnar Sjostedt. Secondly, the concept of presence 
articulated by Michael Smith and David Allen in 1991 is examined. The third part of this section 
addresses the work of Christopher Hill to conceptualize the overall picture of the EU actorness and 
presence in the international scene. 
 
The pioneer of the concept of “actorness” - or capability to act - is Gunnar Sjostedt (1977) 
who introduced the term in his publication, “The External Role of the European Community”. The 
objective of his work is to define whether the EU is a genuine actor in the international arena or 
not by measuring the EU against his “international actor” criteria. Sjostedt introduces the 
prerequisites of international actorness and attempts to measure the extent of the EU’s actor 
capability. According to his conceptual framework, an international actor must be delimited from 
others and from its environment, must have autonomy in the sense of making its own laws and 
decisions, must possess certain requirements for action on the international level such as legal 
personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with a third party 
(Sjostedt, 1977; Hill, 1993). If an entity does not fulfil these criteria, then it is not considered an 
international actor. His framework has laid the foundation for numerous subsequent studies of EU 
actorness, while his framework criteria have been transformed by many scholars to accommodate 
changing structures and international roles of the EU in the contemporary international scene. 
 
            Building on Sjostedt, David Allen and Michael Smith first introduced the concept of 
“presence” in their publication “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International 
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Arena” in 1991 to avoid the “states as actor” approach. Their work focuses on the status of Western 
Europe in the world by analysing the impact of European foreign policy, that is, its role in the 
world. Their central argument is “Western Europe is neither a fully-fledged state-like actor nor a 
purely dependent phenomenon in the contemporary arena. Rather, it is a variable and multi-
dimensional presence, which plays an active role in some areas of international interaction and 
less active in one another” (Allen and Smith, 1991, p. 96). Presence can be defined as the 
perceptions of other actors in the international arena of an entity which influences their actions and 
expectations - hence presence contributes to the environment of the international arena. Presence 
can be in tangible and intangible forms. Presence is characterized by a combination of these factors 
“credentials and legitimacy, the capacity to act and mobilize resources, the place it occupies in the 
perceptions and expectations of other actors” (p. 97). Presence can be divided into the dimensions 
of tangible/intangible and positive/negative and when combined they produce four forms of 
presence: initiator, barrier, shaper, and filter. Initiator form of presence is tangible and positive 
therefore provides stimulus to certain courses of action, and is associated with institutions. Shaper 
form of presence is intangible and positive, and it moulds the actions of other actors in the arena. 
 Barrier form is tangible and negative, it constitutes disincentives to actions and may impose 
punishments and costs to other actors. Filter form of presence is intangible and negative, it 
excludes certain actions and expectations.  
 
Allen and Smith discussed the development of the EU’s presence throughout the 1970s and 
1980s and concluded that “variation and fluctuation are key features of Western Europe’s 
international presence” (p. 104). For them, the EU’s presence in the international arena in 1980s 
can be divided into three spheres for analytical purposes: economics, politics, and military. In the 
economic sphere, the presence of the EU takes the most tangible form but the effect is rather 
negative (barrier and filter functions). In the political sphere, EU presence is intangible (shaper and 
filter functions) informing the expectations and actions of Western European countries and other 
actors, at the same time filtering out certain actions. In the military sphere, the presence of the EU 
is again intangible, through the shaping of ideas of European identity although the actual 
33 
 
institutional development was not considered significant.  
 
           Christopher Hill blends the concept of actorness and presence to further his conceptual 
framework in explaining the EU’s role in the international scene. Writing, some quarter century 
ago, Hill attempted to conceptualize the EU’s role in the international arena in his 1993 publication 
“The Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”. Hill discusses 
the functions that the EC then performed in the international arena and the perception of other 
actors towards the EU in the international system. He uses the concepts of actorness and presence 
to test that there is a gap between the capability of the EU to act (actorness) and the expectations 
of the EU from the other actors in the international arena (presence). Hill proposes that instead of 
analysing the EU as an international actor, it should be conceptualized as “a system of external 
relations” (Hill, 1993, p. 322). 
 
            Hill outlines four functions that the EU had typically performed prior to the Maastricht 
Treaty: that of stabilizing the region, management of world trade, the maintenance of relations 
with the poorer countries, and acting as a second western voice to the US.  In terms of stabilizing 
western Europe, since its first formation in 1951 (the European Coal and Steel Community) the 
EU has served to prevent war in Europe - the pooling of coal and steel industries of Member States 
made war impossible. Europe has successfully promoted peace in the region as seen by the 
domestic transitions of Greece Spain and Portugal. In relation to managing world trade, as the 
biggest trading bloc Europe has been a crucial actor in the negotiating process in the GATT and 
has produced numerous trade policies. The EU, along with the US and Japan, has been a major 
player in world trade politics. The EU has also been the principal voice of the developed world in 
relations with the South. Because of extensive European development assistance (such as the Lomé 
Conventions and trade preferences for the South) Europe devised special relations with these 
developing and least developed countries globally, especially those in Africa. Providing a second 
western voice in international diplomacy, the EU has played a secondary supporting role as a 
political actor to the US, and through the creation of EPC, Europe has developed its own foreign 
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policy positions which may be different from the US and in its functions, especially in mediating 
conflicts such as those in the Middle East.   
 
            Hill also suggested six possible functions that the EU could perform in the future (post-
Maastricht from 1993 onwards). Turning to each of these in turn, Hill made the following case 
(from his 1993 perspective): i) A replacement for the USSR in the global balance of power: With 
its economic strength, Europe could try to fill the position despite lacking the military strength to 
match the US. ii) Regional Pacifier:  Faced with the threat of war between neighbouring countries 
and different ethnic and religious groups, Hill saw the potential role of the EU to act as mediator 
when conflict occurred. The prospect of membership could also be used to promote peace in the 
region. iii) Global intervener: the EU could intervene in crises on a global basis similar to that of 
the US and the United Nations (UN) managing them either by military intervention or political 
and economic instruments.  iv) Mediator of conflicts: The EU’s identity was as a neutral broker. 
Future conflicts where the EU has existing special relations such as Africa or the Middle East, 
would allow Europe to use its special ties to bring the conflicting parties together and resolve 
differences. v) Bridge between rich and poor: European States have always been the biggest aid 
donor in the post-WWII world and had created the ACP framework. vi) Joint supervisor of the 
world economy: where the Member States can act coherently and consistently in international 
economic negotiations, Hill argued that EU influence should increase giving it leverage to manage 
world economy with the US and Japan.  
 
These functions which Hill expected the EU to perform pose a serious challenge to EU 
actorness. A “gap” was apparent between the high expectations of the EU and its actual capability 
to act in the international arena, a phenomenon that has become known as the “capability-
expectation gap”. The argument is a simple one: the EU does not have enough resources nor 
capabilities to perform the various tasks either aspired to by the EU or demanded by third parties. 
Hill attempts to measure the EU’s capability or actorness by describing the features of a single, 
effective European foreign policy and then comparing this against Europe’s record. His framework 
demonstrates what the EU lacked in order to be considered a full actor on the international scene. 
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He uses the example of military capability to demonstrate his capability-expectation gap, 
identifying three causes: absence of mutual obligation, insufficient operational capacity, and the 
lack of resources. However, he mentions that the EU can become a full actor without needing to 
achieve military capacity and any capability-expectations gap could be closed by either Europe 
increasing its capability or if expectations are lowered. However, this concept has been criticised 
for being static and an insufficient explanation of EU actorness in the long-run. However, as 
E/CSDP developments have subsequently shown, Hill’s analysis remains surprisingly robust some 
25 years after the original conceptualisation and can offer an appropriate mechanism for evaluating 
the case study of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. 
 
            Hill proposed that instead of considering the EU as an international actor, it should be 
conceptualized as “a system of external relations”. This concept analysed the EU as a sub-system 
of the international system, not as an actor. Member States interacted with each other and other 
actors in this sub-system and this sub-system generated international relations in many areas both 
individually and collectively. It was decentralized and had three kinds of decision-making: national 
foreign policies, European Political Cooperation (soon to become CFSP), and external relations of 
the then EC. It allowed for the analysis of “internal and external aspects, decision-making and the 
Community’s impact on the international system” (Hill, 1993, p. 322). The sub-system also 
differentiated between actions in different policy areas (political, military, and economic) taken 
individually or collectively by Member States. Hill concludes that “a truly European presence in 
the world would involve collective policies in all major issues areas…as well as rationalizing the 
decision making process” (p. 324). 
 
In summary, the international relations concepts of actorness and presence can be used to 
investigate the changing dynamics (including the impact of enlargement) on the EU’s role in the 
international arena and hence has implications for EU-Thai and EU-ASEAN relations. As seen in 
this Chapter, Allen and Smith divide EU presence into three spheres: economic, political, and 
military. This research addresses the impact of EU enlargement on the EU’s presence (particularly 
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in political and military contexts) and the implications for EU-Thai relations. Hill outlined four 
roles that the EU had already performed and suggested six additional roles that the EU was 
expected to perform. He used the idea of a “capability-expectation gap” to measure the difference 
between the EU’s actorness and presence. This research investigates the impact of enlargement on 
these roles of the EU to define the capability-expectation gap, to investigate whether enlargement 
can reduce or widen the gap. From the findings, the implications for EU-Thai-ASEAN political 





1. Collection and analysis of primary data sources 
Primary data sources used include official documents of the EU, EU Member States, the acceding 
states, the Thai government, ASEAN, the WTO, and the World Bank. By investigating these 
documents, the thesis attempts to explore the official policies regarding political co-operation, 
military co-operation, trade statistics, reports on various issues that reflect EU-Thai political and 
military relations. 
 
This research explores the EU-Thai political and military relations by analysing the 
policies and official documents of the EU and Thailand. It also explores the relationship between 
the EU and Thailand through regional co-operation such as ASEM, EU-ASEAN co-operations, 
and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It involves the analysis of related EU official documents such 
as foreign policies and security co-operation towards Thailand and ASEAN, the EU Member 
States’ official documents on related issues, and the acceding states (2004/7) official documents 
on the related issues. Data collection was conducted in two countries, Belgium and Thailand. In 
Thailand data was obtained from the EU Delegation to Thailand and the diplomatic missions of 
37 
 
EU Member States and the acceding states. In Belgium, data was collected from the Commission, 
the Parliament, and the Council as well as from the Thai diplomatic mission in Brussels. 
 
This research also investigates Thai foreign policies towards the EU and EU Member 
States by examining Thai foreign and security policies that have implications for EU-Thai political 
and military relations. The sources used are the official documents of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Defense. Apart from analysing the EU and Thai official documents, the 
research also analyses ASEAN official documents in the area of ASEAN political and security co-
operation and ASEAN-EU political and security co-operation. Official documents of other 
regional forums such as ASEM and ARF are also explored to fully understand the EU-Thai 
political and military relations. 
 
2. Stakeholder Interviews 
Interviews with the key officials of EU institutions and EU Member States were also conducted to 
ascertain their perceptions of EU-Thai political and military relations. These interviews can be 
used as a baseline to conduct further research to explore EU-Thai political and military relations. 
Interviews were held in Belgium and Thailand. On the EU side, the officials who directly dealt 
with the EU-Thai or EU-ASEAN relations were interviewed at the EU Delegation to Thailand in 
Bangkok. A common semi-structured interview technique was used. EU institution officials were 
also consulted, mainly the Commission staffs and the Council staffs in Brussels and interviews 
were also conducted with the EU Member State diplomatic missions in Thailand to ascertain their 
views on the EU-Thai political and military relations.  
 
On the Thai government side, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Defense were interviewed in Thailand and in Europe because these two 
ministries were responsible for supervising the EU-Thai relations. Officials in the Department of 
European Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the officials at the Royal Thai 
Embassy in Brussels were also interviewed. As for officials at the Ministry of Defense, officials 
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of the Office of Policy and Planning, Directorate of Intelligence (Royal Thai Army), and Defense 
Attachés in EU Member States were interviewed.  
 
3. Collection and analysis of secondary data sources 
This research analyzes academic literature, both conceptual and empirical, on EU-Thai political 
and military relations. The literature reviewed spans integration, regionalism, international 
relations, and security/military studies. Additionally, news articles and journals are also analyzed 
in relation to EU-Thai political and military relations.  Apart from using the library resources at 
the University of Canterbury, I have used resources at the Central Library at Chulalongkorn 
University and from the Center for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University as both hold 
significant materials on the EU-Thai relations. 
 
4. Conceptual framework 
As noted earlier, this research uses integration theory, primarily multi-level governance, to 
investigate the impact of EU enlargement on the EU internally and externally by focusing on the 
effects of new political actors on the policy-making process of the EU and the implications for 
EU-Thai political and military relations. Multi-level governance attempts to explain the policy-
making process of the EU that challenges the state-centric view of intergovernmentalism (which 
proposes that decisions are shaped ultimately by the Member States). Similar to other integration 
theories multi-level governance focuses on the issues of competence and sovereignty of the EU 
institutions and the Member States. They argue that actors in various levels of the political arena 
(supranational, national and subnational) each play their role in policy-making process of the EU 
as the Member States gradually find their sovereignty diminished.  
 
It is argued here that multi-level governance can be used to investigate the impact of EU 
enlargement on the policy-making process of the EU. The concept stresses the importance of 
sharing of competence or power to influence EU policies between different actors from various 
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levels of political arenas. Apart from the EU institutions (the Council, Commission, Parliament, 
and Court), actors from national and subnational level all play a part in shaping EU policies. 
Enlargement will bring more actors into the EU and they will bring with them their “interests”. 
This concept can be used as a basis to investigate how and where these actors can influence the 
direction of EU policies. Enlargement will affect the EU at the European level and the international 
level, and multi-level governance can be used to study the impact of enlargement at both levels. 
By focusing on the four stages of policy-making process (policy initiation, decision-making, 
implementation, and adjudication), the impact of enlargement on the EU is investigated. Actors 
from new Member States will try to influence EU policies at these four stages. These new actors 
will not only affect EU internal policies but also EU foreign policies which will affect the EU’s 
role and identity in the world. This is when the international relation theories of actorness and 
presence become useful in analysing the impact of enlargement on the EU’s capability to act and 
the perception of other actors in the international arena towards the EU. The impact of enlargement 
on the policy-making process is then investigated for the implications for EU-Thai political and 
military relations. Multi-level governance helps to show where and how the Thai government and 
other actors can influence the policy of the EU.  
 
This research also employs the international relation concepts of actorness, presence, and 
capability-expectation gap to analyse the EU’s role in the international arena. The international 
relations concepts of actorness and presence are used to investigate the impact of enlargement on 
the EU’s role in the international arena and hence the implications to the EU-Thai political and 
military relations and EU-ASEAN relations. Following Allen and Smith’s tripartite division 
(economic, political, and military) this research investigate the impact of EU enlargement on EU’s 
presence in two spheres namely political and military and the implications for EU-Thai relations. 
Hill uses the concept of a capability-expectation gap to measure the difference between the EU’s 
actorness and presence. This research considers the impact of enlargement on these roles of the 
EU to define the capability-expectation gap, and to investigate whether enlargement will reduce 
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or widen the gap. From these findings, the implications for EU-Thai political and military relations 
can be analysed and the opportunities and risks for Thailand identified.  
 
5. E/CSDP Missions:  an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) case-study 
Finally, the thesis undertakes an analysis of the EU’s early experimentation with E/CSDP Missions 
- including a case study of the AMM - in order to examine EU-Thailand political and military 
relations through EU-ASEAN framework. The AMM was the first – and to date only -EU-ASEAN 
cooperation in the crisis-management field in the five decades of EU-ASEAN relations. It 
demonstrated the EU’s and ASEAN’s serious commitment to security cooperation. Thailand, as 
one of the founding members of ASEAN, collaborated with the EU in crisis-management 
cooperation that required military participation. The mission was in reality an unarmed semi-
military operation because almost half of the personnel involved were military or had a military 
background and the activities involved necessitated military expertise. Peter Feith, Head of 
Mission, was previously in the Dutch Marine Corps and had worked for NATO prior to his AMM 
appointment. Five ASEAN countries sent their top military officers to participate in the mission. 
Thailand sent 20 military officers under the command of LTG Nipat Thonglek, a personal friend 
and a classmate of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia. The AMM, apart from 
successfully ending the conflict in Aceh, had the potential, albeit as yet unrealised, to launch an 





The thesis Chapters are structured in the following way. This general Introduction has outlined the 
thesis research question, discussed methodologies and given a theoretical and empirical 
contextualisation of the topic of EU-Thai political and military relations. Building on this, Chapter 
2 engages in an in-depth examination of Integration theories – both traditional functional, 
intergovernmental and neo-functional approaches as well as the more contemporary perspectives 
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offered by Multi-Level Governance, Complex Interdependence, Values, Images, and Principles 
and Actorness. This theoretical focus is necessary to better define what drives EU foreign policy 
at a macro-level and provide a tableau against which the micro-level case study of the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission can be placed. It would be inappropriate, as well as ridiculously ambitious, to 
apply these high-level integration theories directly to such a micro-level of empiricism. But 
equally, it would be ill-advised to engage in empirical case-study analysis in a complete theoretical 
vacuum. Thus Integration theory sets the parameters and the expectations within which EU 
E/CSDP decision-making is located.  
 
The enlarged Chapter 3 brings ASEAN into the discussion. The first section (i) of Chapter 
3 focuses on EU-ASEAN political and security relations involving both ASEAN-EU Ministerial 
meetings as well as a discussion of ASEM. Section (ii) considers EU policy towards ASEAN 
during the 1994-2008 period and traces the policy evolution witnessed by consecutive Strategy 
Papers and the introduction of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). (Appendix C provides a history 
of the key ASEAN political and security meetings and agreements).  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 specifically address EU-Thai political relations and EU-Thai military 
relations respectively. The history, structure, policies and areas of political cooperation are 
examined, including the impact on the political level relationship of the 2006 coup d’état. A 
separate history of Thai-European military relations (with a closer examination of key bilateral 
relations with EU Member States) is undertaken in Chapter 5 together with an analysis of European 
weapons-holding by the Thai military. Chapter 6 presents the micro-case study of EU-ASEAN 
cooperation within the framework of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. This still unique experiment 
is examined within the broader context of the EU’s record of 35 E/CSDP Missions that have been 
undertaken globally since 2003 and employs original interview data from AMM participants. 
 
The thesis is consequently wide-ranging and structured more as a mosaic than a linear 
examination. A valuable characteristic of this structure is that while ach chapter can be read and 
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understood in isolation, for a fuller understanding of the nature and context of these various aspects 
of the political and military relations between the EU and Thailand, these different perspectives 






















Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework  
  
I. Introduction 
In its 2004 enlargement, 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean 
joined the EU. This was by far the largest enlargement in EU history adding over 100 million 
people to the Union and expanding the number of Member States to 25. What has been the impact 
of this fundamental shift in the Union’s structure on the EU’s relationships with its foreign partners, 
specifically EU-Thai political and military relations? Before this can be addressed, the nature of 
EU–Thailand political and military relations has to be established. Only by understanding the 
characteristics of the relationship, can the investigation of the impact of enlargement be realised.  
 
In the Thailand–European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013, the EU 
observes that “the nature of Thai-EC relations has fundamentally changed from a traditional donor-
recipient relationship towards a veritable partnership for development” (p.3). The EU and Thailand 
have been negotiating a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) which is amongst the 
first in ASEAN and it is anticipated that the agreement will eventually be signed albeit delayed by 
a series of military coups in Thailand over the last decade. Once signed, the agreement will 
represent the first bilateral co-operation agreement between the EU and Thailand and would 
strengthen EU-Thai relations. As noted already in Chapter 1, at a regional level, EU-Thailand 
relations are guided by the 1980 EU-ASEAN Agreement. EU-ASEAN relations have become 
more dynamic since the Commission issued the “New Partnership with South East Asia” 
Communication in 2003. New developments such as TREATI (Trans Regional EU-ASEAN Trade 
Initiative) and READI (Regional EC ASEAN Dialogue Instrument) were created by the EU to 
strengthen many aspects of the relationship. Further, ASEM, despite the initial Burmese problem, 
has promoted and given impetus to EU-ASEAN relations and has the potential to continue to do 
so in the future. The ASEM dialogue process since 2012 has involved a meeting between an 
expanding range of “Asian” countries (ASEAN members + China, Japan, South Korea, India, 
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Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Russia, Australia and New Zealand), the EU Member States plus 
Switzerland and Norway every two years, at which members discuss various issues in four areas 
– economics, politics, cultural relations, and people-to-people links2.  
  
In terms of the security dimension, at the regional level, the EU and ASEAN together with 
another 13 countries discuss security issues at the ARF. The ARF has been remarkably successful, 
and has led to unprecedented security cooperation between ASEAN, the high point of which was 
the joint AMM in Indonesia. The mission has typically been considered a notable success and it 
was hoped that it would herald new opportunities in the area of security cooperation between the 
two regions. As shown through the comparative examination of other CSDP missions in Chapter 
6, this Aceh mission fully achieved its mandate and set a high benchmark for all subsequent EU 
missions. It remains, however, the only example of EU-ASEAN cooperation within the CSDP 
framework. 
 
As stated in the opening Chapter, the objective of this thesis is to examine EU-Thailand 
political and military relations tracing the effects of the EU 2004 enlargement on this relationship. 
In order to carry out this task, we must understand the integration process and the policy making 
process of the EU, the role played by values and principles in EU policies toward the rest of the 
world as well as the characteristics of EU-Thai relations. In this chapter, a broad theoretical context 
informing the thesis is discussed reflecting integration theory, International Relations theory, and 
the concept of values, images, and principles to contextualise and conceptualise the impact of EU 
enlargement on EU-Thai political and military relations.  
 
The theoretical framework presents a combination of three components – the EU policy-
making process, the role of values, and the characteristics of the EU-Thailand relationship. Multi-
                                                          





level governance theory (as discussed earlier) is utilised to conceptualise EU policy-making 
process while the concept of values, images, and principles is applied to explain the role of values 
underpinning EU foreign policies. Complex interdependence theory is employed to conceptualise 
the nature and characteristics of the relations between the EU and Thailand. Each of these three 
approaches is briefly outlined and contextualised below. 
 
First, an understanding of the policy-making process of the EU is a necessary prerequisite 
to any analysis of EU politics and its relationship with the rest of the world. Multi-level governance 
“presents a depiction of contemporary structures in EU Europe as consisting of overlapping 
authorities and competing competencies” (Alberts, 2004, p.23). It posits that “European integration 
is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influences are shared across 
multiple levels of government – subnational, national, and supranational” (Marks et al., 1996a, 
p.342). Multi-level governance not only argues that actors other than national governments – the 
most influential being EU supranational institutions - play an important role in determining EU 
policy agenda but it also posits that different levels of political arenas are interconnected and actors 
from different levels are able to participate in the EU policy-making process, thus bringing their 
interests that shape EU politics.  
 
Second, Manners and Lucarelli argue that “the EU’s relations with the wider world are self-
evidently informed by a series of values, images, and principles (VIPs) which are not unimportant” 
(Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p.19). The authors identify five European perspectives and nine 
European values in EU politics and use them to define the EU as a hybrid polity and to construct 
its co-existing and competing self-images in the international arena. This model helps inform the 
framework for this thesis by conceptualising the roles that values, images, and principles play in 
shaping EU-Thailand relations through EU policies. 
 
The third part of the framework examines the characteristics of the relationship between 
the EU and Thailand – what is the nature of the relationship that exists between the two? Complex 
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interdependence theory is applied to conceptualise these relations. Complex interdependence 
theory argues that states are connected through multiple channels. State executives can no longer 
act as the sole gatekeeper between the international and domestic political arenas, other actors 
from different levels of society are able to operate beyond national boundaries and become 
involved in world politics. Complex interdependence theory also posits that there are a range of 
issues on the international agenda with no clear hierarchy established among them. Military and 
security issues no longer dominate international politics while the use of military force has become 
an ineffective means of achieving an actor’s objectives.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents a literature review on 
integration, international relations theories, and the concept of values and principles of the EU. In 
the second section, the theoretical framework is constructed by combining multi-level governance, 
complex interdependence, and VIPs to conceptualise EU-Thailand relations. The final section of 
the chapter summarises the framework and sets out the structure and direction of the remainder of 
the thesis. 
 
II. Literature Review  
I. Integration Theories 
Integration theories seek to answer the question of ‘who’ holds power in the EU policy-making 
process. Crudely, integration theories can be divided into three groups - intergovernmentalism, 
neofunctionalism, and the theories that draw on and combine the two concepts. This section 
examines three prominent integration theories – liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, 
and multi-level governance. Liberal intergovermentalism, which at its simplest contends that the 
EU is ultimately driven by the interests of powerful Member States, is discussed and critiqued with 
respect to the EU decision-making process. Secondly, the concept of neo-functionalism, which is 
generally seen as antagonistic towards liberal intergovernmentalism, is explored and critiqued. 
Neo-functionalism stresses the importance of supranational institutions and the “spillover” process 
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which leads to further integration. Lastly, the concept of multi-level governance, which provides 
a bridge between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, is examined. In relation to the EU 
policymaking process it argues that power is not only shared between EU institutions and the 
Member States, but also other influential actors, such as regional bodies, are involved in the 
process. These concepts each attempt to provide an explanation for the political process of the EU, 
which is essential in constructing the theoretical framework to investigate the impact of EU 
enlargement on EU-Thailand political and military relations. While each conceptual framework 
has its strengths, this thesis considers multi-level governance the most relevant for conceptualising 
the EU decision-making process and investigating EU-Thailand relations. 
 
Neofunctionalism 
Ernst Haas developed the concept of ‘neo-functionalism’ in the 1950s to account for and predict 
the process of integration in Western Europe. The model became highly influential among political 
scientists in the 1960s and early 1970s. Haas conceptualised the integration process of Western 
Europe as: 
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national state. The end result of a process of political 
integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones (1958, p.16). 
 
Haas argued that for political unification to take place there must be certain preconditions between 
the participating states, aside from the mutual benefits to be gained from unification. He identified 
these preconditions as “a tradition, however vague, of mutual consultation and of rudimentary 
value sharing” (1958, p.141) and the existence of common external threats. Haas stressed the role 
of central institutions as the driving force behind integration process through federal policies. 
Interest groups, Haas claimed, would unite beyond national boundaries to try to influence policy 
at the federal level. He argued that integration in one sector of the economy will inevitably ‘spill 
over’ to other related sectors of the economy and would unavoidably lead to further integration 
more generally. Haas believed that this process would continue until a fully integrated political 
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community would emerge. National governments might initially have conflicts with the central 
integration institutions, but in the long run, Haas believed they would yield because of the 
advantages gained.  
 
Leon Lindberg elaborated on Haas’s model of neo-functionalism to further dissect the 
integration process of Western Europe. The focus of his research was the central roles of the key 
political actors as the impetus for the integration process and the political consequences of 
economic integration. In contrast to Haas, Lindberg did not envisage the final form of Western 
Europe to be a “United Europe”, which is the ideal federal-type political community. Lindberg, 
following Haas’s work, proposed several essential factors which he felt determined the integration 
process. The first factor was the presence of central institutions to “represent common interests” 
and “accommodate conflict of interests” that might occur between participating states. Lindberg 
claimed that the central institutions could influence the integration process through their ability to 
reduce and mediate the conflicts between Member States. The power of the central institutions to 
influence the integration process, however, depended on the roles and competencies given to them. 
These institutions could then push integration further through their competencies, brokerage skills, 
and how they influence the behavioural pattern of the system. The second factor identified by 
Lindberg, was that the tasks given to the central institutions must be vital to the operation and the 
existence of ‘political actors’, thus raising their expectations and relocating the political activities 
to a higher level. Lindberg stressed the important roles of every political actor, not just the 
governments, because, he argued, if there is political integration there must be “a change in the 
behavior of the participants” (1963, p.152). The restructuring of the activities of these political 
actors may then create conditions that require further integration. Lindberg’s third factor extended 
Haas’s original idea - the tasks given to central institutions must be ‘inherently expansive tasks’ 
which will create a ‘spillover’ effect. Lindberg defined ‘spillover’ as “a situation in which a given 
action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only 
by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and need for a more action, and 
so forth” (1963, p.153). Neo-functionalism, in this way, argued that the spillover effect would lead 
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to further economic and political integration. The last factor that Lindberg identified was the 
commitment of Member States to the principle of the community. The key issues here were how 
the decisions are made and how conflicts are settled. Lindberg identified three ways conflicts could 
be resolved - minimum common denominator, splitting the difference, and upgrading common 
interest.   
 
Neofunctionalism was criticised for failing to provide an explanation for the stagnation and 
reverse of European integration in the 1960s and 1970s. During these decades, the process of 
spillover did not appear to take place, the integration process was interrupted by the conflicting 
national interests of the Member States, and the oil crisis and the recession in the 1970s caused 
economic crises. Neofunctionalism was heavily criticised by Stanley Hoffmann, one of the early 
intergovernmentalists, for failing to adequately conceptualise the integration process. Hoffmann 
(1966) stressed the importance of international politics and the power of governments by arguing 
that regional politics, including the integration process, are determined by the international 
environment and by the Member States. Hoffmann asserted that in areas of vital national interests, 
Member States would maintain tight control because they will not be willing to be compensated 
for their losses by gains in other areas.  
 
Peterson and Bomberg also critiqued neofunctionalism, arguing that “[its] most glaring 
weakness is its implicit assumption that the EU is a uniquely efficient solution to a set of functional 
problems” and that the model “tends to ignore the fundamentally political (as opposed to 
technocratic) rationality of history-making decisions” (1999, p.15). However, the authors agreed 
that neofunctionalism is still a useful concept that provides a distinct perspective on the European 
integration process. The model does stress the important roles of EU institutions and other actors 
in driving the integration forward by generating a spillover process, but perhaps neofunctionalism 
places too much importance on spillover. As Holland has asserted, spillover “merely acknowledges 
the inter-related nature of policy development within the EU – which can have both positive and 




Aside from these critiques, which claim neofunctionalism to be insufficient in explaining 
the integration process, the model also indirectly implies that EU supranational institutions play a 
central role in the EU policy making process and therefore have greater influence on EU foreign 
policies than Member States. This indirectly implies that EU-Thai relations are governed by EU 
supranational institutions not the Member States. In the EU policy making process, power is shared 
between EU supranational institutions, the Member States, and various interest groups (non-
governmental and government) from different levels of the political arena. Each political actor has 
a different level of power on different issues, but generally power is shared between supranational 
institutions, interest groups, and the Member States. Regarding EU-Thailand relations, EU 
Member States, EU supranational institutions, and interest groups play an important role in shaping 
the relationship. This argument will be presented in further details by drawing on the assumptions 
of multi-level governance in a later section of this chapter. 
 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism  
Andrew Moravcsik (1991) proposed the concept of ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’ to explain 
the logic behind the negotiation process of the Single European Act (SEA). His approach has had 
implications for the conceptualisation of the entire integration process of the EU. In contrast to the 
assumptions of neofunctionalism, Moravcsik argued that the outcome of the SEA was the result 
of bargaining between the ‘big three’ Member States – France, Germany, and the UK. Other actors 
such as interest groups and international organisations were not seen as influential in the 
bargaining process as had been claimed by neofunctionalists. The SEA negotiation process was, 
according to Moravcsik, conducted based on a lowest common denominator approach and national 
sovereignty was under the heavy protection of the Member States. Moravcsik stressed the central 
importance of power and national interests, with the latter traced back to domestic politics. 
Ultimately, intergovernmental institutionalism posited that Member States control the outcomes 




Moravcsik directly challenged the neofunctionalist argument that the integration process, 
in this case the SEA, was driven by cooperation between the EU institutions and pan-European 
business interest groups. He instead agreed with the modified structural realist concept that “states 
are the principal actors in the international system… interstate bargains reflect national interests 
and relative power” (1991, p.224). The leading principle of liberal intergovernmentalism is the 
importance of interstate bargaining based on the lowest common denominator and the protection 
of national sovereignty. The model contends that the integration process was driven by bargaining 
between key Member States - France, Germany, and the UK - through the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers. These countries have their own national interests and strive to realise 
them in the bargaining process. Moravcsik argued that “EC politics is the continuation of domestic 
policies by other means” (1991, p.223). Thus to understand the position of each Member State in 
the negotiation process, Moravcsik argued that one must examine each country’s domestic politics.  
 
Moravcsik asserted that during the interstate bargaining process, small Member States are 
not very influential because the leading Member States can offer them side-payment to ensure 
their agreement with the decisions. However, in the history-making negotiations, Moravcsik 
claimed that the only factor which could pressure a state into accepting the decisions of others was 
the threat of exclusion. Moravcsik noted that during the SEA negotiation process, France and 
Germany used this tactic to get the UK to accept their decisions.  
 
Moravcsik contended that ‘domestic politics’ determine the Member States’ positions in 
the negotiation process, and that domestic politics is the root of national interests. To understand 
why the national policy preferences of the Member States converge, one must examine the 
domestic politics of the Member States. In the SEA negotiation process, the domestic politics of 
France, Germany, and the UK favoured the reform process. In addition, Moravcsik also identified 
four factors that caused national policy preferences to converge: the autonomy of political leaders, 
the role of technocracy, the role of centrist coalitions, and the role of policy failure. The leaders of 
the three big Member States had considerable autonomy and they supported the integration process 
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that resulted in the reforms introduced in the SEA. Technocrats also played an important role in 
domestic politics, Moravcsik believed. They could either encourage or discourage integration 
through their influence and channels in either the Council or the Member State governments. In 
this case, the technocrats favoured economic integration so they supported the reform. Another 
factor that, according to Moravcsik, explains the convergence of national interests is the support 
of political parties in the Member States. The ruling centrist coalitions in the mid-1980s in France, 
Germany, and the UK were “ideologically committed to relatively liberal domestic economic 
policies [and] were also committed…to liberalization of the European market” (1991, p.237).  
 
In 1993, Moravcsik introduced the concept of ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ to further 
explain the process behind historical EU decision-making. The model built on his earlier model, 
intergovernmental institutionalism, with an integration of international political economy (IPE) 
theories. Moravcsik posited that “the EC is best seen as an international regime for policy co-
ordination, the substantive and institutional development of which may be explained through the 
sequential analysis of national preference formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction” 
(1993, p.480). The model adopted a two-stage approach to explain major EU decisions – the 
demand and supply stages. The demand stage is when the national preferences of the Member 
States are influenced by domestic actors under the condition of economic interdependence, whilst 
the supply stage represents the outcomes of the international bargaining process between Member 
States. The model then used regime theory to account for the reasons behind Member States 
delegating power to the EU institutions.  
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism has three essential elements – the assumption of rational 
state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist 
analysis of interstate negotiation. The model assumes that states act rationally, that is, to serve their 
own domestic interests which are influenced by many societal actors. This rational action, the 
model argues, may lead to either cooperation or international conflict between states. The model 
then employs the concept of national preference formation to conceptualise national preferences 
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which constitute the interests of an individual state. Economic interdependence is strongly 
emphasised by the model as a precondition leading to policy coordination between states due to 
international policy externalities; in particular, ‘negative’ international policy externalities. 
National preferences under the conditions of economic interdependence comprise the demand side 
of the model. Liberal intergovernmentalism applies interstate bargaining theory to elucidate the 
bargaining process between EU Member States. Moravcsik has asserted that “EC negotiations can 
be viewed as a co-operative game in which the level of co-operation reflects patterns in the 
preferences of national governments” (1993, p.499). He identified three factors that would 
determine the outcome of international negotiations – unilateral policy alternatives, alternative 
coalitions, and the potential of compromise and linkage.  
 
Moravcsik applied functional regime theory (Keohane, 1984) to clarify the role and power 
of EU institutions, and argued that strong EU institutions are not “the antithesis of 
intergovernmentalism”, but rather that Member States would support the EU institutions only if 
they “strengthen , rather than weaken, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain 
goals otherwise unachievable” (Moravcsik, 1993, p.507). Thus, in this view, EU institutions 
increase the power of national governments by increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining 
and creating a two-level game structure. To account for day-to-day EU politics, Moravcsik 
extended conventional regime theory which traditionally only views EU institutions as playing a 
‘passive role’ in assisting in international state bargaining process during ‘historical decision-
making’. He argued that Member States would only pool or delegate sovereignty to common 
institutions after careful consideration of three conditions - the potential gain to be had from 
cooperation, the level of uncertainty regarding the details of the decision, and the level of political 
risk.  
 
Moravcsik subsequently tested his liberal intergovernmentalism model against five major 
EU history-making negotiations– the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the customs union and CAP in the 
1960s, the European Monetary System between 1978 and 1979, the Single European Act from 
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1985-86, and the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. His central argument was that “a tripartite explanation 
of integration – economic interest, relative power, credible commitments – accounts for the form, 
substance and timing of major steps toward European integration” (Moravcsik, 1998, p.4). His 
work revealed that “national preferences are best explained by economic interests; that the outcome 
of interstate bargains is best explained by relative power of the states involved; and, finally, that 
the decision to delegate powers to EU institutions is taken because it is the most effective way of 
ensuring the credibility of commitments from other Member States” (Cram, 1999, p.64). 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism then, is effective in explaining the historical decision making 
in the EU integration process as it was created to serve that very purpose. It is useful in the sense 
that it stresses the importance of the Member States’ preferences through national domestic 
preferences and interstate bargaining in the EU policy making process. However, in the case of 
EU-Thailand relations, which are not the result of an historical EU decision-making process, the 
liberal intergovernmentalist model is not the optimal choice for evaluating the relationship. EU-
Thailand relations mainly concern wide-ranging cooperation which involves EU institutions, EU 
Member States, the Thai government, and various interest groups. Consequently, Liberal 
intergovernmentalism is therefore insufficient for explaining EU-Thailand relations.  
 
Multi-level Governance 
Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank postulated the theory of multi-level governance 
(MLG) which conceptually challenged the state-centric view of intergovernmentalism. As with 
other integration theories, multi-level governance focuses on the issues of competence and 
sovereignty between EU institutions and the Member States. As already quoted in the Introduction 
to this thesis, the model posits that “European integration is a polity creating process in which 
authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government - 
subnational, national, and supranational” where “control has slipped away from national 




MLG has three main hypotheses related to the decision-making process and the political 
arenas of the EU. The first is that “decision -making competencies are shared by actors at different 
levels rather than monopolized by state executives” (Marks et al, 1996a, p.276). The European 
Council, Commission, European Parliament and the European Court are all interdependent in the 
decision-making process and no institution has the sole competence in policy-making. The second 
hypothesis is that “collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss of control 
for individual state executive” (p.277), and thirdly, that “political arenas are interconnected rather 
than nested” (p.277) within states. The intergovernmentalist notion that the domestic and 
international political arenas are separated is rejected in this model. MLG argues that subnational 
actors are able to move beyond national boundaries to pursue their objectives, just like states, and 
that these actors bring domestic issues with them to the European level. Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 
tested their hypotheses by applying them to the different functions of EU institutions in the policy-
making process in four stages: policy initiation, decision-making, implementation, and 
adjudication. The authors’ goal was to investigate “who” determines “what” in the EU policy-
making process. 
 
In the policy initiation stage, the Commission has competence to initiate and draft 
legislation and has the power to amend or withdraw the proposals at any stage of the process. The 
role of the European Council here is limited to providing general policy guidelines which are broad 
objectives and are flexible for the Commission to work with. Since the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty both the Council of Ministers and the Parliament share competence in policy initiation with 
the Commission and they can request the Commission drafts a proposal. The Council can also pass 
soft law to limit the power of the Commission by ratifying common opinions, resolutions, 
agreements, and recommendations. That the power of policy initiation no longer belongs solely to 
the Commission had led to many conflicts within the Union. Apart from the EU institutions, 
interest groups and subnational actors have sought to get their demands on the agenda as well. 
These interest groups are national and regional organisations of various kinds, ranging from 
European peak organisations to individual companies from across Europe. Subnational authorities 
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are also present in Brussels, trying to influence the policy-making process. What this whole 
process implies is that the policy initiation power is now shared between EU institutions and is, to 
some extent, influenced by various actors from all levels of the political arena. 
 
Prior to the adoption of the SEA, the Council of Ministers was the sole legislative body of 
the EU. The SEA reduced the Council’s power considerably by increasing the legislative power of 
the European Parliament, the role of the Commission, and the influence of different interest groups 
in Brussels. The extension of QMV to many policy areas such as agriculture, trade, and 
competition policy, after the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, moderated the power of the Council 
in the decision-making stage, however, some of the vital policy areas such as budget, taxation, and 
movement of people remain under the tight control of the Council.  
 
Intergovernmentalists argue that the Council still retains ultimate control of decision-
making power through the shadow of the Luxembourg Compromise and by a veto culture which 
allows a state to prevent the practice of QMV by raising serious objections. The practice of veto 
by an individual Member State was reduced during the 1980s because of the disapproval of both 
the Parliament and other Member States (Marks et al., 1996a, p.284). Now Member States must 
have support of other members in order to successfully invoke a veto and they can no longer 
independently decide to block a policy to protect their vital national interests or national 
sovereignty.  
  
               The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty increased the role of both the European Parliament 
and the Commission in the legislative process which led to a further reduction in the Council’s 
decision-making power through the introduction of the cooperation and co-decision procedures. 
MLG can be seen clearly in the co-decision procedures of the Council, the Commission and the 
Parliament. The position adopted by the Council or the Parliament must be approved by both 
institutions and the Parliament has power to an absolute veto. The role of the Commission is more 
than just a broker because it possesses such a level of expertise and information on various issues 
that the Council often turns to the Commission for expert advice. Additionally, in some areas, the 
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Commission also performs the role of negotiator. It can be seen from this process that each 
institution influences the decision-making process in one way or another. The 2004 Constitutional 
Treaty foreshadowed codecision as the dominant decision-making process in the future, a feature 
that has been retained and implemented in the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
The Commission has the formal executive powers in the implementation stage of policy 
while national governments are responsible for the actual implementation; however, in reality the 
powers are shared between EU institutions and other actors. The Commission has competence to 
interpret legislation and issue administrative regulations on specific cases but after the creation of 
comitology in the 1980s the decisions have been influenced by the Council and national 
governments. The comitology system comprises of civil servants, subnational actors, 
representatives from interest groups, and members of non-government organisations, all due to 
their expertise. In practice, comitology is not just an instrument used by the Council and national 
governments to control the Commission, but rather due to its composition, the system creates 
opportunities for subnational actors to participate at the European level.  
 
The increasing role of the Commission at the ground level of policy implementation – 
where national governments used to have sole authority – has been apparent since the SEA which 
legitimised the involvement of actors from various levels and at all stages of the policy process, 
selection of priorities, choice of programmes, allocation of funding, monitoring of operations, and 
the evaluation and adjustment of programmes. In order to perform these tasks, different levels of 
committees have been created to oversee the implementation process. In these committees 
Commission officials are present and in direct contact with actors from different groups such as 
regional and local authorities and other local actors. This form of partnership shows that these 
subnational actors are not confined within their national boundaries but are able to play their part 
at the European level.  
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is viewed by the state-centric model as an instrument 
of the Member States for monitor each member’s compliance to the aquis and for ironing out 
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disputes between Member States. MLG, however, argues that the ECJ has done far more than 
suggested by the state-centric model. MLG claims that, with the assistance of the Commission, the 
Court has created a supranational legal order which has promoted the integration process. The ECJ, 
through the principle of direct effect and supremacy of European law, has sole power over national 
courts in legal matters despite objections from states. It has changed European legal systems from 
being nationally based to a multi-level system that is both national and European. The ECJ 
indirectly influences the direction of the EU by the creation of opportunities for the supranational 
institutions, private interests, and national institutions, to influence EU policy or increase their 
power.  
 
  In summary, as Holland and Doidge noted in relation to EU Development Policy, the 
theoretical point is a simple one: “theories that are typically used to explain the internal processes 
of European integration – and even polity-making decisions – may be used with equal validity and 
relevance for understanding Europe’s external relations.” (Holland and Doidge, 2012, p.36) Thus 
integration theories do offer appropriate conceptual frameworks for thinking about the EU-Thai 
relations. Decisions, non-decisions, policies and programmes are informed by this wider 
integration context. However, the purpose of theorizing about European integration should not be 
limited to finding a single macro-theory, but rather to identify those theories best suited to the 
nature of the actual empirical case. Consequently, while a range of theories are engaged in this 
analysis – intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, multi-level governance and so on - on 
balance MLG presents the greatest insights for understanding EU-Thai relations.   
 
 
II. International Relations Theories 
For decades, International relations (IR) scholars have attempted to solve the mystery of the pattern 
of interactions among nations in the international system. Various competing theoretical 
perspectives have been constructed to explain the nature and characteristics of the international 
system. Different perspectives focus on different actors, issues, and the actual nature of the 
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international system. In this section three leading IR perspectives - neo-realism, complex 
interdependence and dependency theory, are explored to develop a clearer picture of the 
international system. The pertinent question here is which of these perspectives best conceptualises 
the EU-Thai relationship?  
 
Realism 
After the two world wars IR theorists were discontent with the idealistic principles of liberalism, 
particularly the notion of collective security and “moralistic assumptions about the possibility of 
peace and progress through human aspiration” (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997, p.22). Early realists 
like E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau attacked liberal internationalists, calling them ‘utopians’, and 
criticising liberalism for being incapable of creating a lasting peace in the international system. In 
contrast to liberalism, realism or realpolitik, “seeks to describe and explain the world of 
international politics as it is” (Burchill, 2001, p.70. Emphasis added).  
 
Carr refuted the principles of liberalism - particularly the doctrine of the harmony of 
interests - by arguing that they represent the specific interests of the ‘satisfied power’ or the relevant 
powerful states during a particular period. He argued that the key to understanding the international 
system was to accept the notion of the ‘realities of power’. It is natural for states to pursue power, 
sometimes masqueraded as national interests, in order to protect themselves or to dominate other 
states in the international system. This pursuit of power results in clashes of national interests 
between states because realism contends that there is no overarching authority to supervise the 
interactions between states and thus the conflicts between states create the anarchical nature of the 
international system. In order for the international system to be stable, there must be a ‘balance of 
power’ between states “lubricated by fluid alliance systems” (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997, p.24).  
 
Similarly to Carr, in 1948 Morgenthau proposed his version of realism in ‘Politics Among 
Nations’ (1948). Morgenthau’s work influenced both academics and the foreign policies of the 
United States in the post-World War II period. He argued that the key to understanding 
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international politics was “the concept of interests defined in terms of power” and he asserted that 
international politics was a struggle for power between states, which he believed to be the most 
important actors in world politics. Realism assumes human nature to be the basis of an analysis of 
state behaviour. Morgenthau asserted that the behaviour of the state is guided by their rational 
pursuit of national interests, which is the acquisition of power to influence other states, not by any 
moral principles as in the beliefs of liberal utopianism. The result of this struggle for power 
between states is the anarchical characteristic of the international system. Realism stresses the idea 
of ‘self-help’; each state has to rely on itself for protection from aggressors. States may cooperate 
to achieve their national interests but this cooperation will only last as long as each state benefits 
from it. Ultimately, the state has to maximise its power in order to survive or retain its status in the 
international system. To minimise the intensity of conflict in an international system where every 
state seeks to maximise its power, a balance of power must be achieved. Put simply, realism 
contends that “the game of international politics revolves around the pursuit of power: acquiring 




Neo-realism offers a critique and a modified version of realism which emerged in response to the 
challenges of interdependency theory. It stresses the importance of power politics and systemic 
factors in international politics on the eve of the Second Cold War. The pioneer of neo-realism or 
‘structural realism’ was Kenneth Waltz who wrote the seminal text, “Theory of International 
Politics” in 1979. The key question which Waltz’s thesis investigated was why the behaviour of 
states follows the same pattern regardless of their different political system and political ideologies. 
Waltz argued that “a good theory of international politics must be systemic, since how relationships 
among states are organized strongly affects governments’ behaviour toward one another” (cited in 




Unlike traditional realism, neo-realism focuses on the systemic forces of the international 
system, not the nation-states, and argues that these forces shape the behaviour of states and define 
the structure of the international system. The same pattern of states’ behaviour can be expected 
“whenever a system is characterised by the same conditions – the reality of self-help world in an 
anarchical environment” (Burchill, 2001, p.89). Neo-realism argues that the international system 
has a defined structure comprising of three important factors: the ordering principle of the system, 
the character of the units in the system, and the relative capabilities of the units in the system 
(Waltz, 1979). Waltz, like traditional realists, believed that the ordering principle of the 
international system was anarchic because, unlike the domestic system, there is no central 
international institution to supervise states’ behaviour. States must acquire power, which is military 
power, in order to exist in the ‘self-help’ system. Because of the anarchic nature of the international 
system all states, regardless of their political system, are forced to follow the same pattern of 
behaviour; that is, accumulating as much power as possible to survive in the international system 
where every state is self-centred. Security is the most important issue determining states’ behaviour 
in international politics. Although states perform similar functions, they possess different 
capabilities which, according to Waltz, cannot be ignored in an analysis of the international system. 
They “are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. The 
differences are of capability, not function” (Waltz, 1979, p.96). Waltz argued that capabilities 
define a state’s position in the anarchical international system and therefore states are “sensitive to 
their relative position in the distribution of power” (cited in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997, p.29). The 
distribution of power in the international system is unequal and continuously changing, defining 
the structure of the system. To understand international politics one must observe the “changes in 
the distribution of capabilities across units” (Keohane, 1986, p.15). From these assumptions Waltz 
argued that the balance of power naturally emerges regardless of whether states seek to achieve a 
balance or not.  
 
One of many critiques of realism has been the fact that it has become irrelevant to the 
contemporary international system. Predating Waltz, Rothstein noted that “traditional security is 
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no longer likely to be the dominant consideration in world politics” (1972, p.396) and that “security 
will be only one of the issues of world politics, albeit a crucial one, for it will have to share 
prominence with a range of issues heretofore left to technicians or to the play of domestic politics” 
(p.396). Rothstein used the issue of interdependence as the basis of this argument. He asserted that 
the autonomy and sovereignty of states has been eroded by economic, social, and cultural 
interdependence and as such, states must cooperate in order to effectively manage these 
interdependences in the international system. He also suggested that even in the field of security, 
interdependence is becoming visible as witnessed by the various arms-control treaties of the 1970s 
and general international cooperation on security issues. Rothstein concluded that “[w]ith its overly 
narrow conception of politics, and with its antiquated notions of sovereignty, Great Power 
dominance and the autonomy of foreign policy, the Realist response is bound to create conflict 
and destroy the possibility of working out new forms of cooperation” (p.396).  
 
Writing a quarter century ago, Keohane and Nye similarly noted that realists “find it very 
difficult accurately to interpret today’s multidimensional economic, social, and ecological 
interdependence” (1989, p.4) where “security, in traditional terms, is not likely to be the principal 
issue facing governments” (p.8). Governments face issues beyond security and must use other 
resources to deal with them; therefore the focus on the concept of power alone does not apply to 
these issues. Keohane and Nye argued that “the assumptions about world politics can be seen as 
defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal type” (p.23). They then constructed a model called 
“complex interdependence” to challenge the principles of realism, arguing that their model more 
aptly portrayed the reality of world politics. The model argued that  there are actors other than 
states in the international system and these actors come from different levels of society, that 
security is not the most important issue in world politics, and that military force is not the most 
effective approach for achieving one’s goal. This thesis argues that the complex interdependence 





Hocking and Smith raised several critiques of realism. They argued that the state does not 
act as a coherent unit as suggested by realism. The growth of national governments in the 
contemporary international system has produced fragmentation, a loss of control, and internal 
competition amongst governments. Hocking and Smith noted that states are facing “a fundamental 
loss of control…both over their actions in the national and international arenas and over the very 
mechanisms of policy-making themselves” (1990, p.67). According to the two authors, there are 
other powerful forces emerging in societies that are not under the full control of the state such as 
interests groups and multinational corporations. These actors have their own objectives and goals 
which may or may not coincide with those of their governments and therefore the assumption that 
the state acts as a coherent unit is once again challenged. Hocking and Smith asserted that states 
do not form the only link between the domestic and the international arena but rather that there are 
other links at different levels that also connect the two together. These links come through different 
types of networks and actors: subnational, transnational, governmental, intergovernmental, and 
supranational networks. Hocking and Smith concluded by suggesting that the models that best 
represent the contemporary system are the ‘mixed-actor system’ and ‘complex interdependence’ 
where both state and non-state actors coexist, and these actors interact through different levels of 
networks where the issues have no hierarchy (reflecting many of the assumptions later developed 
by multi-level governance scholars).  
 
Zacher further argued that the contemporary international system is changing from a 
system where states are highly autonomous to a system where states are connected through various 
kinds of interdependencies and regimes. He claimed that “traditional realist theories of 
international relations cannot account for the changes that are occurring” in the contemporary 
international system because “they are too tied to the idea that states will not trade-off their 
autonomy to achieve other values and to the idea that all important changes are rooted in changes 
in power distributions” (1992, p.98). He identified various factors that he felt had contributed to 
the changes in the contemporary international system, and these are discussed in greater detail later 




III. Dependency Theory vs. Interdependence 
 
The Politics of Dominance and Dependence 
The central theme of dependency theory is that a structural relationship exists between states 
within the international system. The international system consists of dominant states – or the centre 
– and the dependent states – or the periphery – in which the former exploits the latter to achieve 
its economic and political goals while the periphery is dependent upon the centre for capital, 
technology, finance and trade. The periphery “achieves less autonomy as an actor in world politics, 
since in many ways it is merely the recruit or the representative of other, more fundamental 
interests” (Smith et al., 1981, p.18). This concept argues that the centre-periphery relationship is 
the cause of underdevelopment in the periphery. The model asserts that the structural relationship 
will continue because “it has been in the interests of dominant capitalist forces to maintain the 
status quo” (Dent, 1999, p.13). In short, dependency theory attempts to explain the present 
underdeveloped state of many nations in the world by examining the patterns of interactions 
between nations and by arguing that inequality among nations is an intrinsic part of those 
interactions. 
 
Dependency, as defined by dos Santos, constitutes:  
a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the 
development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more 
economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent 
relationship when some countries can expand only as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant 
countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development. (1970, 
p.231).  
 
In a similar fashion, Galtung introduced the concept of imperialism to explain sustained 
inequality within and between developed and developing countries. His model proposed that the 
international system consisted of two groups of countries - Centre and Periphery countries and 
they also have their own centre and periphery within themselves. Centre countries are the rich, 
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industrialised, developed countries while Periphery countries are the poor, developing or 
underdeveloped countries. The model argued that sustained inequality in periphery countries is the 
result of vertical interaction relationship and the feudal interaction structure between centre and 
periphery countries. The characteristics of the relationship between the centre and periphery create 
a situation where the latter is ‘dependent’ on the former.  
 
The model posited three basic assumptions regarding the centre-periphery relationship:  
(1) there is harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre nation and the centre in the 
Periphery nation, 
(2) there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Centre 
nations, 
(3) there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Centre nation and the periphery 
in the Periphery nation (Galtung, 1971, p.303).  
 
These assumptions have several implications concerning the relationship between and 
within the centre and periphery countries. First, the model implied that the centre in the Centre 
nation “has a bridgehead in the Periphery nation… the center in the Periphery nation” (p.303) and 
that “they are linked so that they go up together and down, even under, together” (p.303). The 
centre of the Periphery, or the elites of the population, “serves as a transmission belt for value 
forwarded to the Centre nation” (p.304) and in return for their services, the centre of the Periphery 
nation receives both economic and political benefits which widen inequality within the Periphery 
country even further. Galtung called this mechanism “penetration” which, he argued, is a 
mechanism that sustains the dependency of the Periphery nation (Galtung, 1973). 
 
Secondly, Galtung claimed that there was “more disharmony in the Periphery nation than 
in the Center nation” (Galtung, 1971, p.303). In the Centre nation, although there is inequality, due 
to the redistribution system of the state, the effect of this is minimal if compared to the Periphery 
nation. Thirdly, the periphery of the two countries can never form an alliance because there in a 
disharmony of interest between them. The periphery of the Centre nation “see themselves more as 
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the partners of the center of the Center than as the partners of the periphery in the Periphery” 
(p.304). 
 
For Galtung, imperialism identifies two mechanisms which create and sustain the 
inequality between Centre and Periphery countries. The first, vertical interaction relations, is the 
relationship where the Centre nation trades capital-intensive products in exchange for labour-
intensive or primary products from the Periphery nation. The important point here is the gap in the 
processing levels between the products of these countries. The value of capital-intensive products 
is much higher than the products of Periphery nation, and consequently inequality is created as 
this relationship continues. This mechanism clearly demonstrates the process of “exploitation” 
where “the balance of benefits from international processes of exchange is biased towards the 
centre” (Smith et al., 1981, p.19).  
 
The second mechanism which sustains the inequality between Centre and Periphery nations 
is the feudal interaction structure. This particular type of structure is the one where the Centre 
nation has full control of its Periphery nation(s). In this structure, a Periphery nation can only 
interact with the outside world through its Centre nation, which effectively means that a Periphery 
nation cannot interact directly with other Centres and Peripheries. This structure also prevents the 
Centre nation from interacting with other Centre nations’ Periphery nations. This structure, the 
model argues, is what sustains inequality in the international system. Galtung calls this strategy 
“fragmentation” because it represents “the age-old adage of all empire-builders, divide et impera, 
divide and rule” (1973, p.42).  
 
Galtung identified two implied economic consequences of these two mechanisms: the 
concentration of trade partners and commodity concentration. The Periphery country can only 
trade with its Centre country, as can be seen through the high levels of import and export 
concentration. The Centre nation, on the other hand, is free to trade with any other Centre countries. 
A Periphery country commonly has one or very few primary or labour-intensive products as a 
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result of the historical exploitation by its Centre nation. These industries have been developed in 
the interests of the Centre and therefore although it represents the core industry of the Periphery, 
it can only be relied on as a national export. Imperialism argues that these consequences create the 
condition of dependency of the Periphery country on the Centre country as “the Periphery becomes 
particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in demand and prices” (Galtung, 1971, p.308). The economy 
of the Periphery nation is thus wholly dependent on the economy of the Centre nation. 
 
Along similar lines to Galtung, Frank earlier attempted to explain the condition of 
underdevelopment in the Third World by proposing that the world capitalist system consisted of 
the metropolitan (developed) and satellite (underdeveloped) countries. He argued that 
“contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing 
economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed 
metropolitan countries” (1966, p.291) and that this metropolis-satellite relationship is what sustains 
the world capitalist system. Frank’s work focused on the underdevelopment of Latin America; a 
region that has been a satellite to many metropolitan countries throughout its long history.  
 
Frank asserted that the metropolitan countries exploit their satellites by extracting capital 
and economic surplus to promote their own development and ruling class status. This exploitative 
metropolis-satellite relationship, he believed, is also present within the underdeveloped countries 
where cities are the metropoles of the regional and local satellite areas. The metropoles of the 
satellite countries extract capital and economic surplus from their satellites and transfer some of 
this to their metropolis at the international level. According to Frank, this whole process, which 
occurs at the international, national, regional, and local level, is what sustains the expansion of the 
world capitalist system and is the reason why the satellite countries remain underdeveloped.   
 
O’Connor examined the concept of neo-imperialism which represented efforts by Marxist 
theorists to conceptualise the roles of the US and ex-colonies in the world capitalist system in the 
post-colonial era. Neo-colonialism is considered to be a new form of colonialism: without the 
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“formal” political and economic control of imperialist countries over their satellite countries, it still 
“prevents the newly independent countries from consolidating their political independence and 
thus to keep them economically dependent and securely in the world capitalist system” (O’Connor, 
1970, p.283).  
 
O’Connor explored the concept of neo-imperialism and its explanatory power of the 
relationships between industrialised and developing countries in the contemporary international 
system. He argued that the “neo-colonialist policy is first and foremost designed to prevent the 
newly independent countries from consolidating their political independence and thus to keep them 
economically dependent and securely in the world capitalist system” (O’Connor, 1970, p.283). 
O’Connor regarded the theory of economic imperialism to be the most important branch of neo-
colonialism. He defined the theory as “the economic domination of one region or country over 
another – specifically, the formal or informal control over local economic resources in a manner 
advantageous to the metropolitan power, at the expense of the local economy” (p.283). The 
economic domination of imperialist countries included the control over liquid and real economic 
resources of their satellite countries. Liquid economic resources included “foreign exchange and 
public and private savings” (p.283) while real economic resources were “agricultural, mineral, 
transportation, communication, manufacturing and commercial facilities and other assets” (p.284). 
Neo-imperialism posited that the imperialist state “attempts to substitute informal for formal 
modes of political control of countries in the backwash of capitalism” (p.286). They implement 
foreign policies that allow them “informal” control over their satellites, for instance, the use of old 
economic and political ties such as the Commonwealth ties and the provision of economic aid with 
conditionality clauses.  
 
However, Gilpin raised what he saw to be two fundamental flaws regarding the 
assumptions of dependency model, and which suggest that this model is less suitable for 
conceptualising EU-Thai relations. The first issue raised by Gilpin is the fact that the dependency 
model “treats the peripheral states… solely as objects of international economics and political 
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relations” (Gilpin, 1975, p.251). He believed this assumption did not accurately reflect reality 
because the Periphery states would no longer simply give in to the demands of the Centre states. 
Many Periphery states have grown in terms of their economic and political strength while the 
Centre states often have clashes over their common objectives and hence weaken their bargaining 
strength. The model ignores the fact that Periphery states can form coalitions (such as ASEAN) 
and increase their bargaining power with the Centre states and it also fails to accept the fact that a 
Periphery state can experience economic growth and even cross the Centre-Periphery boundary 
(particularly in times of changing global economics represented by the rise of China and the 
European decline linked to their sovereign debt crisis, for example).  
 
The second issue raised by Gilpin concerned the assumption that “a quasi-Marxist theory 
of capitalist capitalism is applicable to the relationship of developed and lesser-developed 
economies today” (p.251). Gilpin supported his argument by examining the functions of 
multinational corporations in the Centre-Periphery relationships. He argued that foreign direct 
investment in the Periphery countries does not always have exploitative impacts on those states. 
By investing in developing countries, multinational corporations bring technology, capital, and 
access to world markets to these countries which can provide a strong basis for economic growth 
and development. Gilpin noted that “foreign direct investment benefits both corporation and the 
host economy at a cost to other factors of production in the home economy” (p.252) and he 
concludes that “[w]hether foreign direct investment is exploitative or beneficial depends on the 
type of investment, its terms, and the policies of the recipient economy itself” (p.252).  
 
 
The Politics of Interdependence and Transnational Relations 
Interdependence and transnational relations offer a more appropriate conceptual tool than the 
previous two perspectives for exploring EU-Thailand relations. The main theme of this perspective 
is that states are interdependent because they are connected through a variety of networks. 
According to the two approaches, there are other actors apart from the state in world politics who 
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come from different levels of societies and which operate through various networks of 
relationships. Military and security issues no longer dominate states’ agendas in international 
politics as other issues have captured international concern and must be managed at the 
international level. Interdependence theory also stresses the role of non-state actors in the agenda 
formation process. 
 
Keohane and Nye have described the concept of interdependence in the following terms: 
In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by 
external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. 
Interdependence in world politics refers to situation characterized by reciprocal effects among 
countries or among actors in different countries. These effects often result from international 
transactions – flows of money, goods, and messages across international boundaries (1989, p.8).  
 
The two authors believe that international relations in terms of interdependence consist of two 
extremes; pure dependence and pure interdependence. Keohane and Nye (1989, p.10-11) asserted 
that interdependence does not always have to reflect the conditions of “evenly balanced mutual 
dependence” between actors in consideration. They instead used the term “asymmetries in 
dependence” to conceptualise the relationship between actors where one actor is more dependent 
on another, and the latter use this advantage as a source of power to dominate the political 
bargaining process. Keohane and Nye believe that this situation of asymmetrical dependence or 
asymmetrical interdependence is typically the case in international politics.  
 
The two scholars subsequently explored the relationship between interdependence and 
power and how actors may use asymmetric interdependence to their advantage in the political 
bargaining process. The factors that are essential in understanding the relationship between power 
and interdependence are sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity interdependence “involves 
degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework – how quickly do changes in one country 
bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?” (p. 12), and actors with 
lower sensitivity can use this as sources of power. Vulnerability interdependence refers to “the 
relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face” (p. 12), and in this 
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case the actor with lower vulnerability can change its policies to dominate the other actors. The 
authors concluded that vulnerability interdependence is a more important factor than sensitivity 
interdependence in determining which actor has more power. However, Keohane and Nye 
accepted the fact that “asymmetrical interdependence by itself cannot explain bargaining 
outcomes…we must also look at the ‘translation’ in the political bargaining process” (p.18).  
 
The most important aspect of Keohane and Nye’s work on interdependence, however, was 
the “complex interdependence” model. The two authors constructed the model to analyse and to 
conceptualise the politics of interdependence in contemporary international relations. The complex 
interdependence model argues that the international system is the system in which “actors other 
than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, 
and which force is an ineffective instrument of policy” (1977, p.120). Keohane and Nye proposed 
the model to challenge the view of realism that states, as coherent units, are the only  significant 
actors in world politics and interact in an international system that is dominated by military and 
security issues where force is an effective means to obtain goals. Instead, Keohane and Ney 
believed that the conditions of complex interdependence have created unique political processes 
including linkage strategies, agenda setting, and coalition building in the contemporary 
international system. Such a perspective lends itself quite naturally to the application of the EU’s 
foreign relations mechanisms and how these, in turn, interact with third countries, such as 
Thailand. 
 
Complex interdependence has three main assumptions: there are various channels that 
connect different societies; there is no hierarchy among issues in international politics; and military 
force has become obsolete in achieving a state’s objectives, assumptions that are effectively the 
antithesis of a realist conception of world politics.  
 
The model argues that various types of networks connect countries in the international 
system and that these networks can be divided into interstate, transgovernmental, and 
transnational. Interstate networks are the official method for governmental interaction in the 
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international system. Transgovernmental networks refer to the interactions of bureaucrats from 
different governments, while transnational networks refer to the interactions of actors other than 
states such as multinational companies and interest groups. The interaction of these state and non-
state actors from different societies creates a ‘complex interdependence’ of relationships. Non-
state actors, the model argues, can develop their own interests regardless of the state agenda. These 
actors function as transmission belts making the domestic policies of different countries impinge 
on one another more and more… foreign economic policies touch more domestic economic activity 
than in the past, blurring the lines between domestic and foreign policy and increasing the number 
of issues relevant to foreign policy (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.26).  
 
The complex interdependence model assumes that there is no clear hierarchy established 
among issues in world politics. The model argues that “the distinction between domestic and 
foreign issues becomes blurred” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.122) as a growing interdependence 
between them becomes visible. The issues that were traditionally considered ‘domestic’ have now 
become ‘foreign’ issues; governments are facing a growing number of issues beyond traditional 
power and security issues which range from trade to environmental issues. Military and security 
issues no longer dominate the agenda of interstate interaction in the international system, the 
traditional distinction between the so called ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics has become questionable.  
 
The last assumption of complex interdependence is the decline in the use of military force 
to achieve state objectives in the international system. The model argues that the threat of an attack 
by other states, especially those that have a complex interdependence relationship, have declined 
and force is not seen as the best mean of achieving state goals such as economics and trade. 
Keohane and Nye suggested that “intense relationships of mutual influence exist between these 
countries, but in most of them force is irrelevant or unimportant as an instrument of policy” (1989, 
p.27). The use of military force has been increasingly substituted by “new methods of asserting 





The characteristics of complex interdependence have significant implications for the 
political processes in world politics. The translation of asymmetries in interdependence into power 
is the key issue here. The model asserts that there are variations in state goals depending on the 
issues and that these goals are influenced by state actors and non-state as well as subnational 
authorities. It also argues that political processes and the distribution of power will be different on 
a variety of issues compared with the conceptions of realism. Keohane and Nye identified three 
distinctive political processes: linkage strategies; agenda setting; and transnational and 
transgovernmental relations.  
 
In a complex interdependence world, states are faced with a variety of issues which directly 
affect the political bargaining process. The model stresses the importance of the distribution of 
power resources between states as the source of bargaining power, and that this will be the 
determining factor in the results and characteristics of the political processes. States will, according 
to this model, find it more difficult to use their strength on one issue to influence the outcome of 
other issues where they are weak: for example, a militarily powerful state will find it difficult to 
use its military strength to influence the outcomes of economic issues. The model asserts that 
because the distribution of power resources are different on different issues the “patterns of 
outcomes and distinctive political processes are likely to vary from one set of issues to another” 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.30). Furthermore, the linkage strategies will face resistance from 
domestic, transgovernmental, and transnational actors who might be affected by the strategies. 
Therefore, the model asserts that use of linkage strategies by states will become less effective in 
the world of complex interdependence.  
 
Complex interdependence stresses the importance of the politics of agenda formation and 
control. In the realist view, agenda setting will be influenced by the balance of power in world 
politics. The assumption of complex interdependence that there is no issue hierarchy implies that 
different issues, both security and non-security, will be on the agenda at different times. The latter 
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model focuses on ‘how’ the issues come to be on the agenda, and argues that the agenda will be 
“affected by the international and domestic problems created by economic growth and increasing 
sensitivity interdependence…” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.128). Keohane and Nye explored 
several factors that might influence the politics of agenda setting under complex interdependence.  
 
Multiple networks between different societies allow transgovernmental and transnational 
actors to move freely between the domestic and international political arenas. Transnational actors 
such as multinational companies and interest groups can form coalitions between those with the 
same interests in other states and influence the policy-making process across different states to 
pursue their joint interests. Their actions and interests are likely to be influenced by their coalitions 
in other states. This situation would make it more difficult for governments to predict and control 
the outcomes of their policies. Multiple channels of contact also allow government agencies in 
different states to form coalitions on various policy agendas to pursue their shared objectives. 
Complex interdependence argues that these transgovernmental actors have their own ‘interests’ 
that might be different from their leaders’ national interests and that these ‘interests’ are influenced 
by the transgovernmental policy networks. State leaders will find it increasingly difficult to control 
their bureaucrats and ensure they act coherently on the same policy because “national interests will 
be defined differently on different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units” 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.130). 
 
In the complex interdependence world, international organisations play a very influential 
role and are considered as important actors. Keohane and Nye (1989, p.35) asserted that 
international organisations “help set the international agenda, and act as catalysts for coalition-
formation and as arenas for political initiatives and linkage by weak states”. They serve, according 
to the authors, as political arenas where different actors, both state and non-state, from different 
types of networks can interact and form coalitions to pursue their interests. International 
organisations, the model argues, help in promoting cooperation between states because states 




As early as 1970, Morse asserted that “foreign policy has been radically transformed by the 
revolutionary processes of modernization”, and that “internationally, modernization is 
accompanied by increased levels and types of interdependencies among national societies” (p.146). 
He argued that the process of modernization has led to the development of three conditions in the 
domestic and international scenes: the traditional distinction between domestic and international 
affairs has disappeared, there has been an increase in the importance of low politics, and the 
abilities of states to control domestic and international activities have decreased because of a 
growing interdependence between states.  
 
Morse argued that the modernization process blurred the traditional distinction between 
foreign and domestic politics because “both predominantly political and predominantly non-
political interactions take place across societies at high levels, and because transnational 
phenomena are so significant that either territorial and political or jurisdictional boundaries are 
extremely difficult to define” (p.148). In modernised societies, domestic and foreign politics are 
linked because of a growing interdependence in the international system, and this condition 
effectively breaks down the barrier between domestic and foreign politics.  
 
Morse asserted that the modernisation process has shifted the policy goals of governments 
from the traditional high politics to low politics because of “the increased salience of low policies 
and the merging of goals of power and goals of plenty” (p.149). Two factors are the causes of this 
shift, according to the author: the effects of nuclear weapons and rapid domestic economic growth. 
Nuclear weapons made territorial disputes between nuclear-armed countries virtually unthinkable 
because of the potential destruction of nuclear weapons. Territorial accretion became too costly 
for modernised states and thus security issues became less important. The rapid economic growth 
which accompanies modernisation has shifted policymakers’ attention from high policies to the 
domestic social wellbeing of their citizens. Governments, in the modernised world, increasingly 
focus on policies that generate wealth and welfare in their societies by encouraging investment, 
education, and science and technology developments. Morse claimed that this shift also occurs 
76 
 
because of international interdependencies where people as well as governments interact across 
borders. 
 
Morse argued that the changing nature of foreign policies brought about by modernisation 
process created a problem of control for governments both domestically and internationally 
because of a lack of an international governing authority and the presence of interdependencies 
among modernised states. Interdependence, Morse contended, “…erodes the autonomy of a 
government to act both externally and internally” (p.154). He also asserted that the increase in 
nongovernmental interactions among states, particularly by multinational corporations and other 
non-state actors, is one of the reasons that states lose control of their domestic and international 
affairs. These actors have considerable autonomy and their goals may be different to those of their 
governments, thus potentially leading to conflicts of interest.  
 
Hocking and Smith believed that “states and their actions represent only one network – 
albeit a highly significant one – in the international political scene” and that “there are many other 
groups, organizations and networks that could also be included in a definition of ‘world politics’…” 
(1990, p.63). They applied the ‘mixed actor system’ of Young and the concept of ‘complex 
interdependence’ to conceptualise the contemporary international system. In order to assess new 
actors in the international system, Hocking and Smith identified four qualities of international 
actors: their aims; the extent of actor participation; the structures and resources of actors; and the 
levels of actor participation. Of particular importance here is the level of actor participation in the 
international system: the two authors identified five levels of actor participations. The first is the 
subnational level. Actors operating at subnational level are those that operate only at a domestic 
level where they are mainly concerned with domestic issues. The second is the transnational level. 
Actors at this level are those that operate in two countries or more but are not controlled by any 
state. The third is the governmental level. Governmental actors are those that are staff or agents of 
national governments and who operate mainly under the supervision of the government. The fourth 
is the intergovernmental level. Intergovernmental actors are those which operate within 
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intergovernmental institutions and organisations (such as the United Nations). The last is the 
supranational level, the level above states. Supranational actors have more power than national 
governments in supranational organisations and are independent of states’ control.  
 
Hocking and Smith (1990) used the identified levels of participation of international actors 
to propose five corresponding networks of relationships in international relations. These networks 
are: subnational networks, transnational networks, governmental networks, intergovernmental 
networks, and supranational networks. Subnational networks represent the activities of subnational 
or domestic actors that aim to influence domestic affairs either by lobbying their governments or 
through other means. Their activities will sometimes have an effect on international politics. 
Transnational networks are the networks of transnational actors which may exist in the forms of 
organisations or multinational corporations that operate across many states. Specific national 
governments do not control these networks because they can shift operations to another state if 
necessary. Governmental networks involve the activities of governmental actors within a 
government which aim at influencing policies. When these networks represent the relationships 
between government agencies or units of different national governments, they are referred to as 
transgovernmental networks. Transgovernmental networks are the informal links between 
governments through which government agencies may form coalitions to influence their 
governments.  
 
Intergovernmental networks represent the formal interstate relationships between national 
governments, they are the traditional form of interstate relations. States are represented by their 
leaders or agencies in dealing with different issues in world politics with the ultimate goal of 
securing their national interests. Supranational networks can best be represented by the 
relationships between EU institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament. However, it is 
important to note that these actors do not always operate within their networks, for example, a 
transnational actor may interact with a subnational actor to pursue common goals (mixed pairings). 
Another point is that these networks of relationships are dynamic, actors will come and go which 
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results in a situation where “an awkward, untidy and unpredictable patchwork of actors and their 
mutual linkages” (Hocking and Smith, 1990, p.76).  
 
Zacher, in his 1992 article, “The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications 
for International Order and Governance” asserted that the international system is changing from 
the traditional Westphalian system towards a system where states have less autonomy because of 
the emergence of various international regimes. He argued that states “are becoming increasingly 
enmeshed in a network of interdependencies and regulatory/collaborative arrangements from 
which exit is generally not a feasible option” (1992, p.60). His views coincide with liberalism in 
the sense that international cooperation is determined by factors other than the distribution of 
power; states are seen to sacrifice their autonomy for their national interests, and anarchy is 
replaced by interstate cooperation through various international regimes. Regarding the 
contemporary international system, Zacher wrote that:  
what is occurring in the world is not a serious demise of states as the central actors in the system 
(although certain transnational actors are achieving greater prominence) but rather their acceptance 
that they have to work together in controlling a variety of interdependencies (p.67).  
 
He identified six conditions that transformed the traditional international system to the present 
system where states are constrained by international regimes and interdependencies. The first 
condition is the higher cost of war in the contemporary international system due to the exponential 
increase in the destructiveness of weaponry (particularly the destructive force of nuclear bombs). 
The distribution of nuclear weapons among states, both the great powers and lesser powers, acts 
as mutual deterrent which prevents the actors from going to war against one another. Mearsheimer 
commented that nuclear weapons “are a powerful force for peace” (1990, p.37) while Waltz noted 
that “in a nuclear world any state will be deterred by another state’s second strike capability” (1990, 
p.737). Apart from the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, there are other factors which are created 
by the modernisation process and which contribute to the high cost of war. Zacher claimed that 
modern societies are more fragile than in the past, and as such, the destructiveness of war would 
have a more negative impact on the public. The modernisation process has also transformed the 
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values of people to be anti-war as they are more concerned about their economic wellbeing and 
moral ethics. Democratisation and economic interdependencies among states also make it more 
difficult and more costly for state leaders to adopt militarily aggressive policies toward other states. 
Zacher commented that “in important ways international competition really has shifted from the 
battle field to the economic front” (1992, p.82). These factors have created a condition where states, 
both developed and developing, need to establish collective security to protect their common 
interests.  
 
According to Mathews, “[e]nvironmental strains that transcend national borders are already 
beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty” (1989, p.162). An increase 
in international physical externalities such as pollution, the depleting ozone layer, the global 
warming problem and the world-wide spread of diseases is the second condition which impacts 
state autonomy. Environmental damage is seen as the most serious form of externalities, 
particularly the decrease in the ozone layer and the effects of global warming. These physical 
externalities have led to the establishment of various international regimes and international 
organisations such as the Montreal Protocol and the UN Environment Program. This condition is 
referred to as environmental interdependencies, a situation in which every state is obligated to 
cooperate in various international regimes to control the environmental damage by “greater 
coordination of national economic policies and a greater sense of global interconnectedness” 
(Zacher, 1992, p.78).  
 
The third condition posited by Zacher is the increase in international economic 
interdependence including trade, foreign investment, and finance between states, together with the 
growth in the number of various international regimes to regulate these interdependencies. Zacher 
noted that “[o]ne impact of these trends is that states are losing their degree of autonomy in 
managing their domestic and international economic policies because of both intensity of the 
interdependencies and the development of explicit and implicit regimes” (p.81). Cox (1990) also 
asserted that globalization has reduced the authorities of states because authority is shared by many 
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international regimes at different levels of international interactions. Increased international trade 
is one of the key elements that has promoted economic interdependence between states. States 
accepted the benefits of comparative advantage and have encouraged the practice of free trade 
which, according to Zacher, led to an increase in the volume of international trade by more than 
fourfold between 1960 and 1987 (Zacher, 1992). During this period, the levels of tariff and non-
tariff barriers (NTB) were reduced according to the rules of General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) although these rules were – and remain – occasionally violated by certain states. 
Zacher argued that the interstate management of trade and the increasing role of multinational 
corporations is the key element in the promotion of free trade.  
 
In the financial markets, economic interdependence has increased more than other sectors. 
This trend can be seen through the absolute and relative increases in the level of foreign lending 
and the convergence of interest rates in financial markets. For example, the amount of foreign 
lending by banks increased from $134.7 billion in 1963 to $4,821.5 billion in 1988 (Zacher, 1992). 
Economic interdependence has also increased in foreign investment, particularly in the form of 
multinational corporations. The international volume of direct investment abroad increased nearly 
tenfold between 1970 and 1988 while the international volume of portfolio investment abroad 
increased from SDR 2,646 in 1980 to SDR 156,816 in 1988 (Zacher, 1992). It can be seen from 
these figures that multinational corporations have emerged as important actors in international 
politics as a direct result of the huge amount of resources they control across nations, and because 
of the competition they make for states when protecting those interests. A high volume of foreign 
investment plays an important role in establishing and sustaining the high levels of economic 
interdependence between states. States are more concerned and sensitive about each other’s 
wellbeing because they are tied by a high volume of investment. To manage these 
interdependencies, states have collaborated in various international regimes such as the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite the growing importance of other 
actors in international politics such as these mentioned international regimes and multinational 
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corporations, Zacher believed that states would remain the most important political actors even 
though they had lost some control of international economic transactions. 
 
The fourth condition is the increase in information flows between states because of 
advanced communication technology. This factor has several consequences which significantly 
affect international relations. One of these is that states are less suspicious of other states’ military 
activities, therefore, arguably better communication has promoted international stability and 
cooperation in many areas. The second consequence is that advanced communication promotes 
international trade through globalisation. Firms are able to operate in different countries, capital 
can be transferred easily between different capital markets and demands for products in different 
countries can more easily be met through better communications. The third impact is that 
communication has several effects on state autonomy. States penetrated by modern 
communications are unable to isolate their people from the outside world and at the same time, 
communications have also facilitated economic interdependencies between states. Yet another 
impact of communication is cultural diffusion, mainly the diffusion of the Western culture to other 
parts of the world.  
 
The fifth condition which according to Zacher has transformed the international system is 
the global spread of democracy in the second half of the 20th century. The increase in the level of 
democratisation in many regions of the world has had several impacts on the nature of international 
relations. Firstly, democratic regimes have accepted the principles of liberal capitalism and are, 
therefore, in favour of free trade which increases the economic interdependence between states. 
Secondly, democracies promote the free movement of people and information which has led to the 
creation of international organisations and the further spread of democratic values. Thirdly, 
democratic regimes value human freedom as their greatest goal; therefore, they support human 
rights movements in various forms. And lastly it is argued that democratic states do not go to war 
with each other, but instead prefer to resolve their conflicts through diplomatic means. To go to 
war with each other would destroy the economic interdependencies and thus the costs would be 
too high. Democracies thus “are affecting the quality of international interactions and these 
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changes in interactions that are inspired by transformations in the state are likely to expand in the 
future” (Zacher, 1992, p.95). 
 
Many authors have supported the view that Western values have been spreading to non-
Western states, initiating a process of cultural homogenisation. The economic dependency of 
developing countries on the ‘West’ is argued to be one of the chief causes of this process, while 
the globalisation of production has also been purported by many writers as a major force behind 
the convergence of cultural values. Cox has claimed that the globalization process “continues a 
process of cultural homogenization – emanating from the centers of the world power, spread by 
the world media, and sustained by a convergence in modes of thought and practices among 
business and political elites” (1990, p.2. sic.). Western values have also formed the basis of 
international law and have influenced the legal systems of non-Western states. This process of 
cultural homogenisation is one of the causes of economic interdependence and international 
cooperation in the international system.  
 
Russell asserted that the one of the principal characteristics of international trade and 
monetary issues is interdependence and that the trend is increasing in contemporary international 
relations. He described interdependence as a situation in which “economies, societies and 
governments are affected by events beyond national borders of other countries” and “such effects 
travel both ways…” (1997, p.47). Interdependence, according to Russell, also refers to the 
connections between states that include: 
economic links of all kinds; the movement of people across borders; cultural linkages; almost all 
forms of communication; shared international concerns for issues like the environment, human 
rights, technological advance and health improvement; and the number rapid growth in the number 
and range of  international organizations” ( p.46).  
 
Several factors have facilitated the inter-state economic interdependence, including 
technological advance, the deregulation of financial markets, the promotion of free trade, and the 
encouragement of investments across states. Interdependence in the contemporary international 
system has created several important issues worth considering here. The first issue concerns the 
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nature of interdependence between states, whether it is equally reciprocal or asymmetrical. The 
second issue concerns the relationship between interdependence and the process of globalisation. 
The global financial markets have become connected and interdependent through advanced 
technology and financial deregulations. Leading economies which have a strong impact on other 
economies in the world have to coordinate their economic policies in order to stabilise their own 
economies and the global market-place. Another issue created by the process of globalisation is 
the changing nature of production. This factor mainly concerns the operations of various 
multinational corporations. Since the end of World War II, large firms have established branches 
operating in different countries, so as to lower their production costs and to be closer to the foreign 
markets. A fourth issue concerns the relationship between interdependence and regionalism. Many 
authors have argued that the growing global interdependence has also been the major motivator of 
regionalism (Taylor: 1993, Haas: 1975). In order to cope with interdependence, many countries 
have created regional trading blocs such as the EU, the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA) and most recently, the proposed 2015 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).  
Russell discussed several problems created by interdependence: trade problems, 
international monetary problems, and global production problems. Interdependence in trade has 
caused many trade-related problems which include enforcing free trade practices according to the 
WTO rules, trade disputes between states because of the implementation of trade barriers (tariff 
and non-tariff), and the protection of sensitive sectors of the economy such as the agricultural 
sector. Trade conflicts between states have become a regular feature of the contemporary 
interdependent world. According to Russell, the problems created by international monetary 
interdependence involve establishing the procedures to manage and regulate the international 
monetary system and choosing between the conflicting models of floating and fixed exchange rate 
systems. The problem is to what extent states can manage the international monetary system and 
who should be responsible for it. The problems created by the globalisation of production involve 
blurring the borders of firms and the borders of countries. The enormous increase in intra-firm and 
intra-industry trade makes it very difficult for states to control the level of economic activities 
within their borders; some authors have even argued that interdependence has created a borderless 
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world (Dicken, 1992). Russell has added that, “[g]overnments attempting to achieve economic and 
political objectives (domestically and internationally) have to give more attention to the activities 
and objectives of other agents: other governments; international organizations; transnational 
companies; banks; finance houses; and the behaviour of individual aggregated through markets” 
(1997, p.67). 
 
Gilpin has analysed the “sovereignty-at-bay” model in terms of its explanatory power 
regarding the conditions of economic interdependence in the contemporary international system. 
The main argument of this model is that nation states can no longer control economic activities 
within their national boundaries because of economic interdependence and the technological 
advances in communication and transportation. Non-state actors such as multinational 
corporations and international organizations pose serious challenges to national states’ power in 
controlling their economic affairs. These trends, it has been argued, have seriously affected the 
independence and sovereignty of nation states in the contemporary international system. However, 
the important element of the ‘sovereignty-at-bay’ model is the argument that “national economies 
have become enmeshed in a web of economic interdependence from which they cannot easily 
escape, and from which they derive great benefits” (Gilpin, 1975, p.239). Nation states are 
connected through trade, financial markets, and foreign investments which would make it very 
costly for any individual state to pursue wholly nationalist policies. The model particularly 
emphasises, in Gilpin’s opinion, the role of multinational corporations as “the embodiment par 
excellence of the liberal ideal of an interdependent world economy” (p.239). Because of their vast 
resources and mobility, multinational corporations are able to challenge a state’s control of their 
activities by shifting operations somewhere else.  
 
Another important argument of the ‘sovereignty-at-bay’ model is the shift in the 
relationships between developed and developing countries. The redistribution of global production 
has occurred as multinational corporations shifted their operations from developed countries to 
developing countries due to various factors such as cheap labour, abundant raw materials, and new 
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markets. The result of this shift in production has been an increase in the development of the host 
countries through capital and technology transfer from the developed economies, with the 
multinational corporations serving as the transmission belt between the two worlds.  
 
This section has reviewed many of the dominant works that attempt to provide a global 
context to the underlying structure of international relations through the prism of dominance and 
dependency. Within this useful dichotomy, each theoretical variation has been explored in an 
attempt to provide a broader canvass on which to locate the case of EU-Thai relations. While these 
macro-theories are not directly utilised to explain the EU-Thai political and military case-study, 
they do help inform the international context within which these relations take place: to have 
ignored their conceptual relevance would detract from the contextual credibility of the thesis. In 
addition, the macro-level context of these theories do not offer sufficent micro-level utility needed 
for a focus on EU-Thai military relations. 
 
 
IV. Values, Images, Principles and European Union Identity 
The conceptual approach involving values, images, and principles (VIPs) – briefly introduced 
already in Chapter 1 - posits that these three elements shape the EU’s relations with the rest of the 
world through its foreign policy. The work of Lucarelli and Manners represents the core of this 
approach (notwithstanding the contributions from Whitman and others) and their contribution is 
discussed as a starting point before the approach is then adapted to the thesis’s theoretical 
framework. VIPs are utilized to examine how these elements shape and influence the EU-Thailand 
relationship. 
 
Writing more than a decade ago, Lucarelli and Manners claimed that:  
the EU is increasingly presented as an international actor with a principled behaviour in foreign 
policy….Furthermore, this image is reinforced by examples of foreign policy that seem to point in 
the direction of a novel international actor that behaves according to a set of dynamic, yet 




The authors argued that values, images, and principles determine the EU’s role in world politics. 
Their studies focus on the relationship between European values and EU foreign policy and they 
have proposed that the analysis of EU foreign policy should not be divided between the different 
pillars of the EU and between the EU and Member States’ foreign policy, but rather it should be 
conducted in a more holistic approach. In other words, EU foreign policy should be analysed as 
“the political actions that are regarded by external actors as ‘EU’ actions and that can be considered 
the output of the Union’s multilevel system of governance in foreign policy – EU FP” (p.9). 
 
The authors defined VIPs in the following ways. Values are the:  
notions laden with an absolute (i.e. non-instrumental) positive significance for the overall order 
and meaning we try to give our world…An understanding of the relationship between different 
values, the interpretation which is given to them and their actual translation into principles of 
action, is crucial to the analysis of common identification around  a certain set of values (p.10). 
 
Images of the world are:  
the pictures we have, based on our experiences and cultural traditions between the physical and 
social worlds…Images of the world provide the cognitive frame within which values are defined 
and translated into principles and political action (p.10). 
 
Finally, principles are the:  
 “normative prepositions that translate values into general ‘constitutional’ standards for policy 
actions…Our focus on principles allows us to understand how constructed EU values are turned 
into principles of action (p.10). 
 
Lucarelli and Manners posited that values are not directly transformed into principles and 
then principles directly into policy. The key thing, they stress, is to examine the relationship 
between values, images and principles, and EU foreign policy. They went on to define political 
identity as “the set of social and political values and principles that Europeans recognise as theirs 
and give sense to their feeling to the same political identity” (p.13). However, they argued that 
these values and principles do not by themselves shape identity but must be interpreted by the 
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framework of culture, history, legal practices and institutions. Importantly, “through EU foreign 
policy, the existence of an EU political community – with its values and principles – is made 
clearer to EU citizens and to the rest of the world” (p.13).  
 
 Indeed, they have contended that “the EU’s relations with the rest of the ‘wider world’ are 
self-evidently informed by a series of values, images and principles which are not unimportant” 
(p.19) and that these values and principles “constitute the EU as ‘hybrid polity’” (p.19). They 
identified five general European perspectives which distinguish Europe from the rest of the world: 
economic solidarity; social solidarity; sustainable development; sustainable peace; and 
cosmopolitan supranationality. They asserted that these perspectives have provided the cultural 
context in which European values and principles can be identified. From these they then proposed 
nine distinctly European values and principles: sustainable peace, social liberty, consensual 
democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social 
solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance. The authors, using the values and 
principles that they had identified, then discussed how different EU images are created and how 
they constitute the EU as a hybrid polity. However, Lucarelli and Manners warn that “it maybe 
that any claims to the uniqueness (and potential superiority) of European values run the risk of 
ending up as a vacuous and meaningless as the ‘Asian values’ debate” (p.20). 
 
In their article, the two authors argued that ‘solidarity’ could be viewed in both economic 
and political terms.  Economic solidarity was premised on “the belief in a social market economy 
characterised by income redistribution, government intervention, and stakeholder capitalism”, 
from which they concluded “Europeans relate their high levels of development to the achievement 
of economic solidarity; they value their low levels of inequality because they believe them integral 
to their high levels of development…” (p.21).  Social solidarity was reflected in the European social 
system which has “high level of spending, broad social programmes, and considerable employment 
protection” as well as “a solidaristic wage policy, detailed social security provisions, and good 
social investment in human and social infrastructure capital” (p.23). They argued that “this sharing 
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of beliefs about education, health, and social welfare contributes to Europe seemingly noticeably 
different to much of the world” (p.23).  
 
Sustainability was also viewed in two ways: environmental and peace. Environmentally, 
Lucarelli and Manners argued that Europeans are committed to ‘sustainable development’, which 
they described as “an attempt to reconcile economic growth with protection of the environments 
in both the short and long term” (p.24). This process includes for the EU “the mainstreaming of 
environmental issues into economic, development, and social policies as well as legal 
commitments to the precautionary principle” (p.24).  ‘Sustainable peace’ characterises the security 
perspective of the EU and involves “addressing the structural causes of conflict through extensive 
development aid policies and support for bottom-up, local, development programmes that tackle 
the roots of inequality such as health, education, and infrastructure” (p.26). However, the EU also 
spends a considerable amount of its budget on more traditional defence activities such as military 
research, technology, peace keeping missions through CSDP, UN and NATO activities. The 
authors contend that:  
Europeans believe in contributing to extensive development aid programmes and maintaining 
relatively high levels of military preparedness at the same time because of historical experiences 
of addressing the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict; they value participating in 
UN peace keeping missions as integral to their internationalist commitment (p.28). 
 
Finally, turning to cosmopolitical supranationality - “the belief in multi-layered politics 
shaped by a vibrant international civil society, more equal rights for women, the pooling of 
sovereignty, and supranational law” (p.28). The authors asserted that:  
Europeans enjoy dense and active international civil societies partially because of their relatively 
internationalised public spheres; they value higher levels of women’s empowerment integral to 
their higher levels of development…and they believe in actively participating in cosmopolitan 
international law (p.30). 
 
Having identified these five European perspectives, which according to the authors “constitute 
the cultural context within which EU relations with the rest of the world are conducted” (p.31), 
89 
 
they then identified nine European values and principles which they argued “are constitutive of 
the EU as a hybrid polity and as part of its international identity in world politics” (p.32).  
 
Sustainable Peace - The EU has promoted this value by “addressing the roots or causes 
of the conflict”: EU policies that promote sustainable peace include “interregional cooperation, 
political dialogue, and enlargement” (p.33) as well as civilian and military peacekeeping missions. 
 
Liberty - This value of “freedom within a social context” is an EU founding principle as 
“liberty within the EU operates within a distinctive socio-legal context” (p.33), meaning that 
liberty has to coincide with other European values such as, inter alia, human rights and democracy.  
 
    Democracy - The EU has always been a strong advocate of democracy and has made it a 
prerequisite in its external relations, such as conditionality clauses in membership applications and 
development aid. Such a consensual democracy “is the operating principle within the majority of 
EU Member States and includes proportional representation electoral systems, coalition 
governments, and power sharing amongst parties” (p.34).  
 
Human Rights - The importance of human rights for the EU can be seen in a series of 
international agreements since 1973 and the conditionality clauses on enlargement and 
development policies. The EU advocates associative human rights which “emphasise the 
interdependence between individual rights such as freedom of expression and collective rights 
such as the right of association” (p.35).  
 
Rule of Law - This value underpins “the stability and success of the other liberal-
democratic values of liberty, democracy, and human rights” (p. 35). Lucarelli and Manners argued 




Equality – Defined as “the legal prohibition of discrimination together with proactive 
policies to promote equality” (p.35), Manners and Lucarelli asserted that “the particular EU 
interpretation of this value is the principle of a more inclusive, open ended and uninhibited 
understanding of which groups are particularly subject to discrimination” (p.36). 
 
Social Solidarity - For Manners and Lucarelli this means “the promotion of social 
economy, the social partnership, and social justice within the EU, and in relations with the 
developing world” (p.36).  
 
Sustainable Development - Manners and Lucarelli argued that the EU faces the dual 
problems of “a balance between uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis” 
(p.37) while at the same time integrating the principle of sustainable development into EU policies. 
The EU promotes this value to the outside world through its enlargement, development, trade, 
environment, and foreign policies. 
 
Good Governance – For Lucarelli and Manners this refers to “the provision of open, 
participatory and democratic governance without creating hierarchical, exclusionary and 
centralised government” and asserted that the EU promotes “transparency and accountability” 
(p.37) through the participation of civil society and strengthening of multilateral cooperation.  
 
Of course, these VIP assumptions have not gone unchallenged, largely on the basis that 
they constitute little more than Euro-centric perspectives. Whether these criticisms are valid or not 
is not the central concern of this thesis, but rather how these self-identified European attributes 
influence external relations is. To what extent are they reflected in EU-Thai relations? 
 
III. Applying the Theoretical Framework  
From the above discussion, EU-Thai relations can be conceptualised as described in the Figure 2.1 
and presented through the elements of the three conceptual perspectives of Multilevel governance 
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(MLG), complex interdependence (CI) and Values, Images and Principles (VIPs) as outlined in 
Table 2.1.  
 
In addressing the main objective of this thesis - to investigate the impact of EU 2004/7 
enlargement on EU-Thailand political and military relations - in this section, a theoretical 
framework is constructed by combining three specific models which have been discussed above: 
multi-level governance, the concept of values, and complex interdependence. Multi-level 
governance provides an understanding of the policy-making process of the EU and its principle 
claim is that decision-making power at European level is shared between Member States and EU 
institutions – the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court – as well as other 
non-state actors like interest and lobby groups and regional political bodies. The concept of values 
is utilised in the theoretical framework to explain the roles of values and principles in shaping EU 
policies, especially its foreign policies. Finally, complex interdependence is applied in the 
framework to conceptualise the characteristics of EU-Thailand relations. The model posits that 
states are connected through a number of channels and that various actors from these channels 
participate in international politics and it also stresses the importance of international organisations 
in international political arena. This thesis contends that these models represent the essential 
elements of EU-Thai relations and by examining these elements, the impacts of the Union’s 2004 


























EU Policy-Making Process and Multi-level Governance 
The framework utilises “multi-level governance” to conceptualise the policy-making process of 
the EU. The core argument of the model is that “authority and policy-making influence are shared 
across multiple levels of government – subnational, national, and supranational” (Marks et al, 
1996a, 342). States lose some degree of authority in the EU policy-making process because of 
their collective decisions and the independent roles of EU institutions. The practice of the qualified 
majority voting system over a range of issues in the Council, Marks argues, has led to a loss of the 
individual state executive’s control in EU decision-making. The independent role of EU 
institutions – the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court in 
policy-making is also stressed by the model. The MLG model also argues that political arenas are 
interconnected, thus allowing actors from different levels of political arenas – subnational, 
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The important question here is, assuming that MLG does in fact characterise the EU policy-
making process, how then would enlargement affect both that process itself, and the EU’s policies 
toward Thailand? Using the assumptions put forward by the model, enlargement would arguably 
affect the EU policy-making process by introducing actors from the national and subnational levels 
from the new Member States. In addition to these additional national governments participating in 
the Council of Ministers, there are actors from these new members in the Commission, the 
Parliament, and the Court. Subnational actors such as domestic interest groups from the new 
members will participate in European politics, attempting to get their demands heard. However, 
because of the independent role of EU institutions and collective decision-making of the EU, the 
new Member States will be unlikely to get their interests fully realised in EU politics. Instead it 
will be a “win some and lose some” situation, a not unfamiliar tendency in interstate bargaining 
and inter-institutional negotiation. The European Commission plays a very important role in the 
day-to-day function of the EU, however enlargement would be unlikely to affect the general 
function of the Commission apart from adding to its ranks additional staff from the new members 
and perhaps the Commission initiatives towards the new Member States. The MLG model argues 
that “the growing diversity of issues on the Council’s agenda, the sheer number of state executive 
principals and the mistrust that exists among them, and the increased specialization of policy-
making” (Marks et al, 1996a, 342) have made the Commission dominant over the Council (at least 
prior to the Lisbon Treaty), especially when it comes to agenda setting, making compromises, and 
supervise compliance between Member States. 
 
MLG examines each stage of the policy-making process of the EU and identifies the actors 
involved in the four stages. Regarding enlargement, it tells us how and where the new actors from 
new Member States can participate in the four stages of the EU policy-making process: policy 
initiation, decision-making, implementation, and adjudication.  
 
In the policy initiation stage, enlargement would bring more actors – subnational, national, 
and supranational – and more agendas into the process. First, the EU institutions – the European 
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Council, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament – would have greater numbers of actors/officials, 
all trying to influence the initiatives and get their demands realised. Similarly, the range of interest 
groups and subnational government authorities would increase in number after enlargement. These 
actors would also bring their priorities and demands with them and would try to favourably 
influence policy initiatives through lobbying. However, MLG effectively asserts that the 
Commission is the key actor influencing the policy initiation phase, accordingly, the general 
direction of the EU policy agenda should not be affected by enlargement. 
 
In the decision-making stage, although the Council of Ministers is the main legislative 
body in the EU, MLG argues that “state executive dominance is eroded in the decision-making 
process by the legislative power of the European Parliament, the role of the European Commission 
in overcoming transaction problems, and the efforts of interest groups outcomes in the European 
arena” (Marks et al, 1996a, 361). The model asserts that the practice of QMV in the Council in 
many policy areas has significantly reduced state sovereignty, even more so since Lisbon. 
Collective state control has been compromised by the co-operation and co-decision procedure, 
where the Commission and the Parliament share decision-making power with the Council. Again 
the model stresses the important role of the Commission in providing its expertise therefore 
influencing the outcome of the decision. Enlargement would once again introduce new actors from 
the new members into EU institutions – there will be more ministers in the Council, more MPs in 
the Parliament, and more officials in the Commission. MLG tells us that the new ministers in the 
Council would have reduced control over EU policies because of collective decision making and 
specifically because of the use of QMV in many policy areas. The new Members States’ authority 
would be further diluted by the co-operation and co-decision procedures. New MEPs from the 
new Member States would increase the diversity within the EP and these actors would want to 
influence EU decision-making to their advantage. There will be more officials from the new 
members in the Commission but due to the independent role of the Commission, it would be 
unlikely to affect the objectives of the institution. The overall impact of enlargement on the 
direction of EU policies should then, according to the model of MLG, be insignificant. 
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In the implementation stage, MLG argues that the formal executive power of the 
Commission is shared with national governments and interest groups through the practice of 
comitology – committees composed of national officials, technical experts from interest groups, 
and academics. However, the Commission has more power when it comes to areas in which it has 
formal competencies e.g. “competition policy, state aids, agriculture, commercial policy and the 
internal market” (Marks et al, 1996a, p.367). The Commission has also been increasingly involved 
in the day-to-day policy implementation thus increasing its contact with national and subnational 
actors. Enlargement would inject new actors into implementation stage via comitology. These 
actors may influence the implementation process to a certain degree. 
 
Multi-level governance is highly insightful in the investigation of the impact of EU 
enlargement on EU-Thai relations because it identifies the important actors involved in EU policy-
making process – national government executives, the Commission, the Parliament, the Court, 
interest groups, and subnational actors. Above all the model stresses the important role of Member 
States and EU institutions – especially the Commission and the Parliament – in EU policy-making. 
It also elucidates the four stages of policy-making and identifies which actors are involved in each 
stage and how they are involved. To investigate the impact of enlargement on EU-Thai relations 
the actions of these actors must be examined in greater detail. 
 
European Values and EU Foreign Policy 
The theoretical framework of the thesis also applies the concept of values, images, and principles 
(VIPs) to examine the relationship between European values and EU foreign policies toward 
Thailand. As discussed above, the VIP concepts elucidate “the way in which the EU is constituted 
as a political entity by the values, images, and principles which shape the discourse and practice 
of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world” (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p.1). The work of 
Lucarelli and Manners is utilised in this thesis to investigate the role that VIPs play in shaping EU-
Thailand relations by examining EU foreign policies. VIPs can be useful in the investigation of 
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the impact of EU enlargement on EU-Thai relations by examining the effect of enlargement on 
European values and principles and the extent to which this might transform EU foreign policies.  
 
The five European perspectives and nine European values and principles identified by 
Lucarelli and Manners (2006) are utilised to conceptualise the relationship between EU values and 
principles and EU foreign policy which have a direct or indirect impact on EU-Thai relations. 
These perspectives and values provide us with a distinctive picture of the EU, what it believes in, 
and what it promotes. The EU’s relations with Thailand can be better understood when these EU 
perspectives are taken into account.  
 
When one looks at EU-Thailand relationship, these values and principles are visible 
throughout the history of EU-Thai relations. For example, the legal framework of the EU’s 
relations with Thailand comprises Article 177 of the Treaty establishing the EC, the EU’s Asia and 
Latin America (ALA) Regulation and the 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement. The 
objectives for Community development co-operation under Article 177 include the “fostering of 
sustainable economic and social development, smooth and gradual integration of the developing 
countries into the world economy, and fight against poverty” (The EC-Thailand Country Strategy 
Paper 2002-2006, p.4). The article also states that EU policies should “contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and encouraging the 
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (p.4). The ALA Regulation focuses on 
“strengthening co-operation framework and on making an effective contribution, through 
institutional dialogue, economic and financial co-operation, to sustainable development, social and 
economic stability and democracy” (p.4), while the 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement 
focuses on three areas of co-operation – commercial, economic, and development co-operation – 
with the objectives of promoting free trade, investment and technological progress, as well as 




The values and principles of the EU can also be seen in the objectives of the core pillars of 
the ASEM process which are: “regional and global security, trade and investment, socioeconomic 
issues and regional macro-economic co-operation, consumers dialogue between regions, and 
educational exchanges” (p.5).  
 
       The focus of EU-Thai co-operation in the Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper 
(2007-2013, p.3) is as follows:  
- deepening EU-Thai relations in various areas of strategic importance and mutual interest 
to both partners, with a particular focus on economic relations, scientific and technology 
co-operations as well as higher education and culture exchange; 
- addressing specific capacity constraints crucial to advancing Thailand’s national 
development agenda; 
- advancing co-operation on a more modern agenda including good governance, justice and 
home affairs issues, human rights and mine action; and,  
- increasing mutual awareness between Europe and Thailand.                                                                                                                       
        The four key themes of the EU-Thailand co-operation demonstrate both directly and 
indirectly the promotion of EU values and principles – sustainable peace, sustainable development, 
social solidarity, good governance, rule of law, and human rights. The cross-cutting issues section 
of the strategy paper also have the objective of promoting gender equality by “increasing the 
participation of women in economic decision-making at local levels, as well as in regional and 
international conferences, workshops, and exchange programmes…”(p.19). The paper calls for the 
strengthening of the “social dimension of globalisation…and the promotion of employment and 
decent work for all…When promoting trade and investment, due consideration will be given to 
their impact on employment and social cohesion” (p.19). Environment and natural resources 
management is also stressed by the EU as another important issue in EU-Thai co-operation which 
clearly demonstrates the EU principle of “sustainable development”. In addition, the paper calls 
for the improvement of “the understanding and raising awareness of European best practice with 
regard to good governance and human rights among government officials and decision-makers…” 
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(p.19). This, once again, clearly demonstrates the articulation and promotion of the principles of 
good governance and human rights by the EU.  
 
The Strategy Paper also clearly states that the Commission intends to pursue “thematic 
interventions” in its Thai relations, in the following areas: democracy and human rights, human 
and social development, migration and asylum, the environment and sustainable management of 
natural resources including energy, and non-state actors development. Regarding the EU’s 
development policy, the paper insists that EU-Thai development co-operation should focus on 
“developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and encouraging respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms” (p.21).  
 
The 2003 New Partnership for South East Asia Communication  seeks to enhance co-
operation with ASEAN member countries by offering a bilateral partnership and co-operation 
agreement with the objectives of deepening co-operation on “the fight against international 
organised crime and terrorism, good governance, justice home affairs issues and human rights” 
(p.21). The EU and Thailand have been negotiating the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
but due to the Thai coup in September 2006, the process was suspended until a new democratically 
elected government resumed office – an EU action that clearly demonstrates its ardent belief in 
democracy, social liberty, human rights, good governance, and rule of law. 
 
Thus, it can clearly be seen that values and principles play a vital role in shaping the EU’s 
policies toward Thailand which, in turn, shape the broader EU-Thai relationship. The EU 
incorporates its core values and principles into nearly every aspect of its foreign policies, as 
demonstrated above in the Thai case. Values and principles concept can therefore be useful in the 
investigation of the impact of the 2004 enlargement on EU-Thai relations by providing a context 
in which the impact of enlargement on EU values and principles can be carried out. Consequently, 
this thesis questions how enlargement has affected EU values and principles and the implications 




Characteristics of EU-Thai relations: Complex Interdependence 
The final part of this thesis’ conceptual framework applies the complex interdependence model to 
conceptualise the characteristics of EU-Thailand relations because the model provides a useful 
insight into the relationship in the context of the contemporary international system. As discussed 
earlier in the chapter, complex interdependence has three main characteristics for the international 
system: multiple channels connecting societies; an absence of hierarchy among issues; and the 
minor role of military force. These characteristics have certain implications for the political 
processes in world politics which include linkage strategies, agenda control, and coalition building.  
 
The assumption of complex interdependence that multiple channels connect societies 
provides a useful basis for understanding the EU-Thai relations. The EU and Thailand are 
connected through various networks and in these networks a range of state and non-state actors. 
As has been seen, based on the work of Hocking and Smith (1990), there are five basic types of 
networks in world politics: subnational networks; transnational networks; governmental networks; 
intergovernmental networks; and supranational networks. This thesis demonstrates that these 
networks operate in the EU-Thai relations and are important in determining the nature of the 
relationship. The model asserts that actors can form coalitions with other actors from different 
states thus making them more influential in the global political bargaining process. These actors 
also function as transmission belts between different states which make states more interdependent 
on one another.  
 
Complex interdependence asserts that there is no hierarchy of issues in world politics, and 
that military and security issues no longer dominate the international agenda. Other issues that 
were traditionally classified as “low politics” such as economic and environmental issues, have 
become vital to world politics. Again, this characteristic of complex interdependence is clearly 
visible in EU-Thai relations. The EU-Thailand relationship is dominated by trade and economic 
issues: the EU is one of Thailand’s biggest trading partners together with the USA, ASEAN, and 
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Japan. Trade with the EU represented 15 % of Thailand’s total trade in the year 2000, where 74 % 
of Thai exports to the EU receive benefits from the GS) scheme. The EU-Thailand Country 
Strategy Paper noted that “[t]he period of 1994 to 1999 has shown Thailand rapidly evolving from 
the status of aid recipient to that of economic partner” (2002, p.15). The framework of the EC-Thai 
co-operation has shifted:  
from development aid to economic co-operation, and increasingly to specific sectors such as 
environment and fisheries, as well as to projects in the areas of social policies, promotion of small 
and medium sized enterprises and human resource development (p.15).  
 
The third characteristic of complex interdependence is the minor role of military force as 
an instrument of policy. The model argues that “force is often not an appropriate way of achieving 
other goals (such as economic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more important” 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.32). This characteristic of complex interdependence is clearly visible 
in EU-Thai relations. There is no place for the use of military force between the two parties and 
other factors in lieu of military power have to be utilised to assert influence in the political 
bargaining process. However, this approach does not preclude military cooperation as an aspect of 
the complex relationship and here the AMM joint initiative is particularly illuminating.  
 
Complex interdependence contends that the use of linkage strategies in world politics will 
become increasingly difficult because the distribution of power, the political processes, and the 
actors involved are different on different issues. A state that is strong in one issue may be weak in 
other issues and therefore will find it problematic to use its strength on one issue to control the 
outcome of the issue in which it is weak. Complex interdependence focuses on the process of 
agenda formation in international politics and the model argues that this agenda will be “affected 
by the international and domestic problems created by economic growth and increasing sensitivity 
interdependence” (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.32). The agenda will be influenced by actors, both 
state and non-state, from different types of networks both at home and abroad. The implication of 
this process for the EU-Thai relationship is the fact that both state and non-state actors from 
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different types of networks will influence the EU-Thai agenda. It also implies that the agenda will 
reflect the domestic and international issues of both the EU and Thailand.  
 
Another important issue that the complex interdependence model raises is the impact of 
transnational and transgovernmental relations on international relations. Complex interdependence 
argues that actors from various networks can form coalitions beyond national boundaries and try 
to influence the political bargaining process in various political arenas. The relevance of this 
process to EU-Thai relations is that transnational and transgovernmental relations do influence the 
nature of the relationship between the EU and Thailand. Transnational and transgovernmental 
actors of the EU and Thailand may form coalitions and try to influence the policy making process 
to achieve their common goals. In order to fully understand EU-Thai relations, complex 
interdependence asserts that different types of networks and actors cannot be neglected. 
 
Finally, complex interdependence also emphasises the important functions of international 
organisations in international politics. They play many important roles in international relations 
including promoting international cooperation, assisting in setting international agenda, and serve 
as political arenas for actors to interact. In particularly, it can be argued that EU-Thai relations 
have been influenced by international organisations such as the WTO and the UN. The Doha 
Development Agenda has influenced the EC cooperation strategy with Thailand with the focal 
areas of cooperation including technical assistance and capacities building activities in trade, 
investment, related areas for sustained cooperation, and public health and health services.  
 
Having established a clear theoretical foundation within which the thesis can be located, 
the following chapter turns attention to the empirical aspects of the research questions by first 






Chapter 3: The ASEAN Context 
 
In order to fully explore EU-Thailand political and military relations, it is also necessary to 
understand the broader political and security cooperation with ASEAN. As one of the oldest 
regional organizations in the world ASEAN has progressively grown in membership and in areas 
of cooperation. A detailed descriptive account of four decades of ASEAN political and security 
cooeration building can be found in Appendix C. By way of introduction a short examination is 
given on the origins of ASEAN in relation to the political and security dimensions before this 
chapter focuses extensively on the evolution, implications and the prospects for political and 
security cooperation specifically  in EU-ASEAN relations. This review of developments within 
ASEAN up to the time of the EU E/CSDP mission in Aceh can be viewed as being rich on rhetoric 
and aspirations, yet perhaps frustratingly modest when it came to effective implementation and the 
shaping of ASEAN identity. However, this contextualisation is important for the focus of the 
thesis: in parallel to EU enlargement and the foreign policy innovations found in the Single Act, 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, ASEAN was also tentatively building its political and 
military capacity. These endeavours helped to support the first and to date only EU-ASEAN 
collaboration, the AMM mission. This optimism was underlined by the 2004 enlargement process 
which gave support to this innovative EU CSDP approach. Timing is often a crucial factor in 
explaining policy implementation: 2004 set the perfect scenario for this expansion of EU foreign 
policy to SE Asia. Both ASEAN and the EU were ripe for experimentation. 
 
On 8 August 1967, Adam Malik (the Foreign Affairs Minister of Indonesia), Narciso R. Ramos 
(the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines), Tun Abdul Razak (the Deputy Prime Minister 
of Malaysia), S. Rajaratnam (the Foreign Affairs Minister of Singapore), and Thanat Khoman (the 
Foreign Affairs Minister of Thailand) met in Bangkok and signed the ASEAN Declaration (also 
known as the Bangkok Declaration) which gave birth to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). The motivation behind this radical idea was perhaps best captured by the 




We the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia must get together and form by ourselves a new 
perspective and a new framework for our region. It is important that individually and jointly we 
should create a deep awareness that we cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples 
unless we also think and act together by ties of friendship and goodwill and imbued with our own 
ideas and aspirations and determined to shape our own destiny…with the establishment of ASEAN, 
we have taken a firm and a bold step on that road 
 
           Speech given by His Excellency Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, at 
the inaugural session of ASEAN in Bangkok, Thailand, August 1967. 
 
 The Declaration was only two pages long and contained five articles which established the 
foundations of ASEAN. Article 1 declared the establishment of an “Association for Regional 
Cooperation” between the countries of Southeast Asia to be known as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations. Articles 2 stipulated the aims and purposes of ASEAN as follows: 
- to accelerate economic growth, social progress, cultural development through joint 
endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership; 
- to promote regional peace and stability through the respect of justice, the rule of law and 
the UN Charter; 
- to promote cooperation and assistance in the fields of economic, social, cultural, technical, 
scientific and administration; 
- to promote cooperation in agriculture and industries, trade expansion, transportation and 
communication, and the raising of the living standards of their citizens; 
- to promote South-East Asian studies; and,   
- to maintain and enhance cooperation with international and regional organisations with 
similar aims and purposes. 
 
Article 3 of the ASEAN foundation treaty outlined the machinery to be created in order to 
carry out the aims and purposes mentioned above and this included: the annual meeting of ASEAN 
foreign ministers - the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM – note the unintended confusion with 
the subsequent acronym for the Aceh Monitoring Mission); a standing committee to carry on the 
work of ASEAN between AMMs; ad-hoc committees and permanent committees of specialists 




Article 4 stipulated that ASEAN was to be “open for participation to all States in the South-
East Asian Region” that believe in the aims and purposes of the Association, while Article 5 stated 
that ASEAN “represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves 
together in friendship and cooperation and through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their 
peoples and for posterity the blessing of peace, freedom and prosperity”. 
 
Thanat Khoman, one of the architects of ASEAN, argued that the creation of ASEAN 
represented “the culmination of the decolonization process that had started after World War II” 
(1992, p.1). Europeans began their colonisation of Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century 
to expand their territory and further their strategic and trading interests. The European colonial 
powers “sought to gain taxes, and to impose legal, educational and local authority structures in line 
with their national interests” (Gilson, 2002, p.33). The first to engage in the region were Spain and 
Portugal who were followed by Britain, France and the Netherlands. Britain through the East India 
Company colonised India, Singapore, Burma, Malaysia and coastal parts of China. The 
Netherlands, through the Dutch East India Company, gained control over Indonesia while France 
seized large parts of Indochina including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Philippines was 
colonised twice; first by Spain and then by the United States. Siam, or Thailand, remained the only 
independent country in Southeast Asia although it had to bear a considerable loss of land and 
capital to the British and the French. At the end of the nineteenth century, Japan began its own 
path of colonisation in Asia by invading China in 1895 and occupying Taiwan (then known as the 
island of Formosa), and annexing Korea in 1910. However, it was not until 1941 that Japan began 
to advance its colonial influence into East Asia and the Pacific. After the end of World War II and 
Japan’s surrender in 1945, the fate of Asian countries was left to the superpowers – China, the US, 
and the Soviet Union. This period marked the beginning of the Cold War, the ending of European 




The decolonisation process in Asia began as soon as World War II came to an end. The 
Europeans began almost immediately to lose control over their Asian colonies. The Japanese, in 
their defeat, granted autonomy or independence to the countries in the region that they had invaded, 
which seriously undermined the attempts by the European powers to retain control over their own 
colonies. The decolonisation process “advanced at a fast pace and led to the emergence of a number 
of independent and sovereign nations...this created an entirely novel situation which necessitated 
new measures and structures” (Khoman, 1992, p.1). At this time, the region needed to promote 
regional co-operation and Khoman has identified several reasons for this:  power vacuum, 
proximity, political of scale, and common interests. He argued that the most important factor 
prompting regional cooperation was the emergence of a power vacuum in the region, directly 
resulting from the decolonisation process. Southeast Asian countries feared that other foreign 
powers would step in and take advantage of their situation which would leave them in an even 
weaker position. The proximity of the future members of ASEAN was another reason identified 
by Khoman. Having learnt from the failure of SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation), 
the Southeast Asian nations realised that an organisation is more effective and has a greater chance 
of survival when members are geographically closer to one another and share similar interests. 
Another reason that facilitated regional cooperation for Khoman was that the Southeast Asian 
countries wanted to strengthen their positions in the international arena and protect themselves 
against foreign influence.  Finally, Khoman asserted that “it is common knowledge that co-
operation and ultimately integration serve the interests of all – something that individual efforts 
can never achieve” (1992, p.2).  
 
Decolonisation in Southeast Asia also prompted territorial disputes between the countries 
in the region. When Britain withdrew from its colonies in Southeast Asia in 1962, it granted the 
jurisdiction of North Boneo (later known as Sabah) and Sarawak to the federation of Malaya which 
became modern day Malaysia (Khoman, 1992). This event initiated the legacy of the “Sabah 
Dispute” and Konfrontasi between Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Indonesia, under the 
leadership of President Sukarno, was strongly opposed Malaysia having this territorial power 
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because he viewed it as a British attempt to sustain its domination in the region through Malaysia, 
which the President believed would threaten Indonesia’s independence (Jones, 2002). In 1963, 
Sukarno launched Konfrontasi against Malaysia which involved sending troops into Sabah and 
Sarawak. The Philippines, using an historical justification, claimed that Sabah was part of their 
country and demanded the right to its jurisdiction. The Philippines then broke off all diplomatic 
relations with Malaysia thus inflaming the already critical situation between the three countries 
and in the region as a whole. Britain and Australia were drawn into the conflict through a request 
from Malaysia. The violence spread to the newly independent Singapore and only after a coup in 
Indonesia in 1965 during which President Sukarno was replaced by General Suharto did the 
Konfrontasi campaign end. In August 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace treaty and the 
conflict between the two states officially ended. 
 
Strong leadership during this period played an important role in driving forward 
cooperation between the countries that would become ASEAN members. During this period, 
national leaders “launched a simultaneous, if not consciously, attack on everything that colonialism 
had represented” (Gilson, 2002, p.38). Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Prime Minister in the early 
1970s, began to move away from Britain by forging security ties with other countries like 
Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. He believed regional cooperation to be the key to 
lessening external influences in the region. Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Razak’s successor, 
followed the same path by promoting regional cooperation, a treaty of non-aggression, and a non-
intervention policy (Gilson, 2002).  
 
Rajaratnam, one of the founding fathers of ASEAN, asserted that “ASEAN was born on 8 
August 1967 out of fear rather than idealistic convictions about regionalism” (1992, p.3). 
Phatharodom argued that “the creation of ASEAN was a political act born out of the desire of the 
Member States to reduce intra-regional tensions and to demonstrate determination against 
Communist infiltration, and out of fear of superpower intentions in the region” (1998, p.237). 
During the 1960s, intra-regional tension in Southeast Asia was heightened due to the spread of 
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Communism and territorial disputes between countries in the region resulting from decolonisation. 
After the first Indochina War ended in 1954 and the French had finally left Indochina, 
independence was granted to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Vietnam was divided into the 
communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) under the leadership of Ho Chi 
Minh and the anti-communist Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) under the control of Ngo 
Dihn Diem. Unsurprisingly, the situation between the two countries replicated the characteristics 
of the Cold War in Europe. North Vietnam was backed by China and the Soviet Union while South 
Vietnam was supported by the USA. In 1956 tensions between the two countries escalated as Ho 
Chi Minh infiltrated South Vietnam, starting an “armed propaganda” campaign which included 
kidnappings and terrorist attacks on government officials. In 1960, Ho Chi Minh established the 
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) with the goal of overthrowing the 
government of the south. The Vietnam War officially began when the North Vietnamese attacked 
two US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin on 2 August 1964. The US retaliated with air strikes on North 
Vietnam and on 8 March 1965, deployed 3500 marines to South Vietnam. The cornerstone of the 
American intervention in Vietnam was the “domino theory” which claimed that if South Vietnam 
fell to Communism, the whole of Southeast Asia would follow. This justification led to a decade 
of US engagement in Vietnam. 
 
It was against this historical and political background that ASEAN was created. Chirativat 
has argued that:  
ASEAN was not designed at its origin to launch any exercises for regional integration 
among the member countries, it evolved with the process of the Cold War in Southeast 
Asia…the first major aim of the ASEAN group was then to bring peace and prosperity to 
the region (1997, p.208).  
 
The culmination of the Cold War was the catalyst for cooperation between ASEAN members to 
secure peace and democracy against Communism and other outside influences in the region (see 




(i) EU-ASEAN Political and Security Relations 
 
“We can be proud of the way the EU-ASEAN relationship has developed in the 
last twenty five years. Our cooperation is not simply a political or economic 
arrangement – it has an important human dimension. Last year’s tragic Tsunami 
served to demonstrate an instinctive feeling of solidarity between our people. 
Cooperation in the humanitarian and reconstruction work between the EU and 
ASEAN states as well as in the Aceh peace process shows how much potential 
this partnership has. In the next 25 years we can much more together.” 
(European Commissioner for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 9 December 2007) 
 
“We reiterated that the dynamic and diverse cooperation with our Dialogue 
Partners have played a crucial role in facilitating our integration efforts and the 
narrowing of development gaps. We welcomed our Dialogue Partners’ vigorous 
engagement with ASEAN and encourage them to further deepen and broaden 
cooperation to achieve a stable, prosperous and outward-looking region.”  
(Chairman’s Statement of the 13th ASEAN Summit, Singapore, 20 November 
2007, p.4). 
 
Official statements can be reliable indicators of the state of relations: in this context it would 
appear that the EU-ASEAN partnership has been valued by both sides and expected to continue 
to deliver effective policy initiatives.  This section builds on the ASEAN theme addressed already 
in this Chapter, but with a narrowed focus: the nature of the specific EU-ASEAN relationship in 
political and security spheres. The section also considers the historical evolution of EU-ASEAN 
relations and the contemporary issues vital to both regions. 
 
One of the primary reasons for ASEAN’s establishment of formal relations in the late 1970s 
with the EU was because of growing trade protectionist policies of the EU. An important milestone 
in EU-ASEAN relations occurred when the then German Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
proposed to his ASEAN counterpart, Dr Upadit Panchariyangkun establishing a regular ministerial 
meeting between the EU and ASEAN. This initiative meant that in 1972 Europe became “the first 
dialogue partner to establish informal relations with ASEAN … through the Special Coordinating 
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Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN).” (ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN-European Union Dialogue). By 
May 1975, an ASEAN-EEC Joint Study Group (JSG) had been formed to explore collaborative 
endeavours between the two regions and in September 1978 an inaugural ASEAN-EEC 
Ministerial Meeting was convened in Brussels. 
 
Prior to the 1990s the EU had few formalised relations in Asia; its main focus instead was 
on the ACP. During the 1950s, Asia was viewed by the EU as a “less appealing partner than Africa 
or Latin America. It was geographically remote, generally poor, comparatively diverse, and 
regarded as a less reliable source of supplies for raw materials needed by Europe (if largely because 
of the Cold-War context of Soviet and Chinese regional influence)” (Holland, 2002, p.59-60). 
British dominance in the region during this period, through the Commonwealth, was another strong 
factor that discouraged the EU from including Asia as a major part of its international network. 
With limited resources and limited scope of foreign policy the EU could really only afford to 
maintain ties with Africa. By the time of UK membership in 1973, Asia had developed sufficiently 
to become a competitor to Europe. As a result, no country in the region was allowed to join the 
Lomé Convention, and “this missed opportunity essentially confined Asian-EU relations to the 
lowest of priorities for the next two decades” (p.60).  
 
1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement  
Building on what had previously been rather haphazard interactions, the EU-ASEAN economic 
relationship was formalised in 1980 when the two parties signed the EC-ASEAN Cooperation 
Agreement during the 2nd ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The 1980 
agreement:  
put an emphasis on commercial co-operation, granting the most-favoured nation treatment 
to parties on a reciprocal basis and setting out their commitment to overcome trade barriers; 
economic co-operation, encouraging closer links through investment and technological 
progress; and development co-operation, contributing to economic resilience and social 




The agreement also established a Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) to monitor EU-
ASEAN cooperation. Despite the relatively strong rhetoric of the Agreement, it has been argued 
that it in fact brought little change to EU-ASEAN cooperation. It is interesting to note the fact that 
there was no parallel EU-ASEAN political cooperation established at this stage in relations.  
 
Perhaps this absence was a result of ASEAN lacking the “maturity” in the early years of its 
inception to function as an organisation, and so consequently, EU-ASEAN relations were not as 
extensive as they might have been. As the previous chapter noted, ASEAN was formed for political 
and security reasons, Communism was spreading in the region whilst territorial disputes between 
neighbouring countries were plaguing Southeast Asia in particular. ASEAN members were 
preoccupied with solving these problems, and developing relations with the EU – itself still very 
much only a burgeoning political power – was not viewed as a priority. Regarding trade, ASEAN 
countries were more dependent on markets in the USA, the UK and Japan than on the common 
European market (Vimolvan, 1999). Because of these factors, it was argued that ASEAN did not 
have an official EU policy from 1967-1972 (Vimolvan, 1999). During the same period, the EU 
was more concerned with the Cold War and the ACP (as discussed above) and saw little urgency 
to strengthen its ties with ASEAN. The colonial ties between Members States and ASEAN 
countries were disrupted in the decades following the end of World War II leaving the region 
largely under the influence of the USA, Russia, and China.  However, the entry of the UK into the 
Community in 1973 saw a beginning of formal EU-ASEAN relations - ASEAN members who 
were part of the Commonwealth were particularly concerned with the possibility of losing trade 
preferences and market access to the UK market after its accession. As a result, in 1972 ASEAN 
created SCCAN to deal with access for ASEAN exports into the EU and to apply for the GSP 
scheme. The ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC) was created by ASEAN to assist SCCAN on 
EU-ASEAN matters. Although SCCAN and the ABC did not achieve any substantial results, these 
mechanisms, “…allowed for the beginning of an institutionalized dialogue between ASEAN and 




The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 led to enhanced cooperation among ASEAN members 
due to a fear of the spread of Communism. ASEAN leaders, during the Kuala Lumpur Summit in 
1977, declared that they would increase cooperation in foreign policies and enhance cooperation 
with foreign partners including the EU (Vimolvan, 1999). ASEAN leaders believed that by 
enhancing relations with the EU, it would establish ASEAN’s status as an international actor and 
that the EU could become another power in the region to counter balance other actors.  
 
Economic progress in the ASEAN countries has been argued by Vimolvan to be another 
factor that drove EU-ASEAN relations forward. In the 1970s, ASEAN countries became more 
industrialised and export-oriented, the European market was attractive and served as an alternative 
destination to the USA and Japan for ASEAN products. The granting of GSP to ASEAN members 
encouraged more exports into the EU and further strengthened EU-ASEAN trade relations. More 
generally, the EU supported the idea of regionalism as manifested in ASEAN, believing that it 
would end intra-regional conflicts and create economic prosperity in the Asian region. By 
establishing EU-ASEAN relations, the EU hoped to strengthen cooperation in ASEAN and across 
Southeast Asia. At the same time, the EU wanted to establish its role as an effective international 
actor and to increase its presence in the region in order to compete with the USA and Japan.  
 
The EC-ASEAN JSG, comprising Commission and ASEAN government officials, was 
established in 1975 with the objective of enhancing cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. 
During the third JSG meeting in Brussels in 1977, both parties agreed to establish regular meetings 
between COREPER and ABC to enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation. In 1978, the ASEAN-EU 
Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) was established and its first meeting was held in Brussels in 
November that year. AEMM is the most senior dialogue process between the EU and ASEAN and 
is held every 18 months (alternating between Europe and ASEAN venues). In 1979, the first 
European Commission Delegation in Asia was established in Bangkok, demonstrating the 




Wiessala has argued that ASEAN cooperation has evolved from “political necessity” to 
“economic prosperity and political dynamism” largely as a result of “the end of Cold War, the 
Maastricht Treaty, the emerging CFSP and the EC Single Market” (2001, p.61). The EU was thus 
part of the catalyst for ASEAN’s transformation. Historically, most of the ASEAN members, with 
the exception of Thailand, were European colonies and as such, Europe-Asian ties have a historical 
heritage. However, in the early stage of the relationship, Asia “was pushed aside because of [its] 
size and potential financial burdens” (Wiessala, 2002, p.18). Wiessala also correctly asserted that 
EU-Asia relations were strengthened by the development of the wider external competencies of 
the EU such as the CFSP, globalisation, and the economic conditions of Asia. Further, and 
perceptively, Wiessala argued that EU-ASEAN relations have shifted from a donor-recipient 
paradigm where the EU mainly provided development aid to ASEAN members, to a more equal 
partnership status focussing on a much wider remit of economic, political, security and cultural 
cooperation. 
 
Rüland has suggested that “the first initiative for developing ASEAN-EU relations came 
from ASEAN. It was basically a response to economic changes in Europe and shifts in the Asian 
power equation.” (2001, p.9). Singapore and Malaysia feared that they would lose trade preferences 
and access to the British market after UK accession and so demanded an official EU-ASEAN 
dialogue to help counter this. The 1973 accession, together with the collapse of the Bretton Wood 
system and the two oil crises of the 1970s, resulted in increased protectionism in the EU prompting 
greater concern from ASEAN members. In addition, as noted already, ASEAN wanted to balance 
American and Japanese economic presence in the region during this period. ASEAN’s economic 
objectives at the beginning of EU-ASEAN relationship concerned market access, a price 
stabilisation scheme for agricultural products, European investment in the region, technology 
transfer, and development aid (Rüland, 2001). Rüland also asserted that security concerns were 
behind ASEAN’s need to establish a relationship with the EU, and these were specifically the 
withdrawal of American forces from the region after the Vietnam War, as well as the growing 
security threat of Russia and China in Southeast Asia. ASEAN members needed to gain support 
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from Western Europe. Rüland argued that “Europe – though hitherto basically an inward-looking 
player without much actor capacity in the field of foreign relations – was seen as a pivotal partner 
in this respect.” (p.12).  
 
II. ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMM) 1-16 
i) 1978-1992: The Initial Phase of Political and Security Relations  
The EU and ASEAN held their first ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on 21 November 
1978, a significant milestone for the relationship. At that time ASEAN comprised five members 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) while the EU had nine Member 
States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
the UK). Hans-Dietricht Genscher was the Foreign Affairs Minister of Germany and the President 
of the Council. At the end of the meeting, the EU and ASEAN declared their common objectives 
of achieving “world peace, international cooperation and understanding, economic development 
and social justice” (Joint Declaration of the First ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, 1978, p.2). The 
EU saw ASEAN as an organisation that was trying to establish peace and stability in the Asian 
region while both parties stressed the need to develop an ASEAN-EU relationship on the basis of 
equality and enhanced cooperation with a view to promoting prosperity, social justice and human 
rights. It can be seen here that both sides stressed the importance of values in their relations and 
cooperation. On the EU side, the major motivation for the relationship at this stage was promoting 
peace and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, on the other hand, the emphasis 
of the meeting was on trade issues, particularly GSP, trade barriers, and market access. Better 
market access to the European market, improved and permanent GSP status, and the removal of 
other, lower barriers to trade were requested by ASEAN. GSP was seen by ASEAN members as 
crucial to the level of economic development in their countries. European investment in ASEAN 
countries was encouraged by the ministers and both parties agreed to undertake investment 
promotion actions such as the establishment of the EU-ASEAN trade and investment forum and 
the encouragement of joint venture collaboration. It is clear from these actions that ASEAN was 
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trying to balance the level of FDI in the region between Japan, Europe, and the USA. The EU also 
agreed to undertake initiatives to promote the transfer of technology to ASEAN through training 
and educational assistance, and an increase in cooperation in science and technology.  
 
Another important theme of the meeting was that of development cooperation between the 
EU and ASEAN. As a means of promoting development in the region, the EU promised to increase 
financial support to individual and regional projects including feasibility studies for future projects. 
Cultural cooperation in the field of education and information also featured in the meeting and the 
EU declared its intention to open a European Commission Delegation in Bangkok (a decision 
which demonstrated the new importance with which the EU now viewed EU-ASEAN relations). 
The ministers also agreed that a formal cooperation agreement between the EU and ASEAN should 
be explored and established.  
 
During the 2nd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 1980) the first 
ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement was concluded. The agreement represented a historical step 
by the two partners that was to lead to the intensification of cooperation and relations. Although 
the cooperation agreement contained no specific provisions regarding EU-ASEAN political and 
security cooperation, the agreement was significant because it represented the first step in relations 
which would eventually lead to cooperation between the EU and ASEAN in the fields of politics 
and security. The focus of EU-ASEAN cooperation as outlined in the 1980 agreement covered 
MFN (Most-Favoured-Nation) treatment, commercial cooperation, economic cooperation, and 
development cooperation. The ministers agreed that:  
the signing of the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement marks the beginning of a new stage 
in cooperation between the two organisations and their member states. In affirming their 
commitment to the principles and to the concrete measures contained in the documents, 
they confirmed that the Cooperation Agreement is a strong manifestation of the political 
will of both sides to intensify ASEAN-EC Cooperation.  




The Agreement has been, and remains, the foundation of EU-ASEAN cooperation. Table 
3.1 summarises the key articles of the Agreement.  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Key Articles of the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement 
  
Article 1 Granted MFN treatment between the EU and ASEAN under the 
provisions of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
Article 2 Defined Commercial Cooperation between ASEAN and the EU which 
aims “to promote the development and diversification of their reciprocal 
commercial exchanges to the highest possible level…”; demolish various 
other forms of trade barriers (both non-tariff and quasi tariff); and, to 
cooperate at the international level and improve market access for 
manufactured, semi-manufactured and primary products 
Article 3 Defined Economic Cooperation objectives as: to promote economic ties 
through mutual investment; encourage technological and scientific 
progress; establish new supply and new markets; and create employment 
opportunities. The areas of cooperation included science and technology, 
energy, environment, transport and communication, agriculture, 
fisheries, mining, and forestry 
Article 4 Defined Development Cooperation and sought to promote development 
in ASEAN by helping ASEAN achieve self-reliance, economic 
resilience, and higher living standards. Increased European support for 
programmes and projects promoting ASEAN development and regional 
cooperation including food production and supplies, rural sector 
development, and education and training facilities were committed. The 
EU agreed to coordinate the Community development programmes and 
projects with those of its Member States and at the same time promote 
financial cooperation between the two regions 
Article 5 Established the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) to oversee and 
promote EU-ASEAN cooperation initiatives in order to achieve the 
objectives of the agreement 
Article 8 Stated that the agreement had an initial period of five years and was to 





The Joint Declaration of the 2nd AEMM clearly stated that the intention of the EU’s 
cooperation with ASEAN in terms of economic development in the region was “to enhance 
[ASEAN’s] role as a corner stone of political stability in Southeast Asia” (1980, p.3). The inclusion 
of this statement in the Declaration is clear evidence of the EU using economic and development 
measures to achieve its political goals - that is to create peace and stability in the region. Until this 
stage in the relationship, political and security relations between the EU and ASEAN had only 
involved informal discussions on regional and international political and security issues. After the 
2nd AEMM, however, ASEAN and the EU released a Joint Statement on Political Issues, which 
represented the first formal political statement between the two organisations. The statement 
reflected the political and security context of the period, focussing particularly on conflicts in 
Cambodia and Afghanistan. The joint statement emphasised the principles and values shared by 
the EU and ASEAN. The ministers “reaffirmed their commitment to world peace, international 
cooperation and understanding, economic development, social justice and human rights” (Joint 
Statement on Political Issues, 8 March 1980, p.1). In addition, they agreed that all states should 
respect “sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of states; non-resort to force or use of 
force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states” (p.1). The ministers expressed 
their concern regarding the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnamese troops and the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and called for the implementation of UN resolutions which 
included the total withdrawal of the troops from both countries.  
 
The situation in Cambodia and its impact on the Cambodian people was of particular 
concern to the EU and ASEAN. Both partners believed that peace, stability and regional 
cooperation in Southeast Asia rested on a political solution of the conflict including the complete 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and the rapid establishment of a neutral 
government in the country. The ministers also called for the countries involved to prevent any 
spillover of the conflict to neighbouring countries. The EU and ASEAN made an appeal to the 
Secretary General of the UN to implement the Resolution on Kampuchea (adopted by the General 
Assembly on 14 November 1979) which included the holding of an international conference on 
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the issue. The EU supported ASEAN’s calls for an increase in the international and UN presence 
at the Thai-Cambodian border to contain the conflict and to assist the refugees. While the situation 
was highly volatile, one positive result that emerged from the Cambodian conflict was increased 
cooperation among ASEAN countries and increased cooperation between ASEAN and non-
ASEAN partners including the EU. The ministers of the EU “reaffirmed the intention of the 
European Community and of its Member States which have contributed to the international efforts 
to solve the problem – to pursue further their action towards this goal and appealed to other states 
and organizations to continue their efforts in that direction” (p.3). ASEAN members requested 
greater assistance from the international community in dealing with the number of refugees which 
had grown as a result of the Indo-Chinese conflict. They called for larger quotas and the faster 
resettlement of refugees and also for the parties in Cambodia to assist the UN and other 
organizations in providing assistance to the refugees.  
 
The EU “reiterated their belief that the unity of ASEAN, especially the present difficult 
circumstances, is and continues to be an important element in the maintenance of peace and 
stability in the Southeast Asian region” (p.3). The EU ministers welcomed the establishment of 
ZOPFAN by ASEAN agreeing that it would contribute to peace and stability in the region. ASEAN 
in turn expressed its appreciation of the constructive role played by the EU in inducing economic 
and political stability in the region and Third World countries. Through its active participation in 
dealing with the conflict, the EU had now established itself as a relevant foreign power in the 
region and helped to create a balance of power in Southeast Asia and the international community 
more generally.  
 
After the 3rd AEMM, held in London on 13-14 October 1981, the European Commission 
and ASEAN foreign ministers released a Joint Statement in Brussels the following day. The 
Commission announced that the EU would support closer regional economic cooperation between 
ASEAN members and:  
reaffirmed their willingness to work closely with ASEAN by providing all possible 
assistance and support to supplement ASEAN’s cooperative efforts in order to enhance 
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ASEAN as a corner stone of political stability in Southeast Asia. (Joint Press Statement 
The ASEAN Ministers and the Commission of the European Community, 15 October 
1981, p.1).  
 
The EU and ASEAN declared their commitment to the 1980 Cooperation Agreement and 
intended to “translate political will into concrete measures in order to intensify ASEAN-EC 
cooperation” (p.2). ASEAN ministers at the time were concerned with the negative impact of 
Greece’s accession into the EU and implored the EU to prevent any detrimental effects on the 
ASEAN economies. It is interesting to note here that each time the EU underwent historical 
transformations, such as enlargement, the single market, or the Euro, ASEAN has always been 
concerned by the potential negative impacts those policies might have on its members.  
 
The principal focus of the ministers at the 4th AEMM (held in Bangkok on 25 March 1983) 
was the familiar regional and international political and security issues (Cambodia and Afghanistan 
and the refugee problem) and newer developments in the Middle East, EU-ASEAN 
parliamentarian visits, and the progress of EU-ASEAN cooperation. The ministers were concerned 
with the continued occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces and the impact on its people. 
The EU and ASEAN declared their support of the Declaration of the International Conference on 
Kampuchea that demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, the right of 
Cambodians to determine their own destiny through the UN supervised general election, an 
independent and non-aligned Cambodia, and the commitment by all states to non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of Cambodia. They viewed the establishment of the coalition of Democratic 
Kampuchea as an important step in the solution to the Cambodian conflict. The ministers also 
stated in their common position that they would not provide any assistance to Vietnam.  
 
The refugee problem created by the conflict was also a major topic during the meeting. 
Despite the resettlement of many refugees and displaced persons to third countries, there were over 
160,000 Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians in refugee centres in Thailand and over 300,000 
Cambodian refugees on the Thai-Cambodian border (Joint Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN-EC 
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Ministerial Meeting, 25 March 1983, p.2). ASEAN and the EU requested more assistance from the 
international community and an increase in international cooperation with UNHCR. They also 
condemned the attacks by Vietnamese forces against Cambodian refugee camps and facilities on 
the Thai-Cambodian border. ASEAN expressed its appreciation of EU countries’ bilateral 
assistance to the refugees and the United Nations Humanitarian Programmes for Indochinese 
Refugees in the ASEAN Countries.  
 
With respect to Afghanistan, the meeting specifically discussed the continued Soviet 
occupation of the country and the volume of refugees generated by the conflict. The ministers also 
discussed the problems in the Middle East for the first time and called for a peace settlement 
between the disputing parties.  
 
A key development at this time regarding EU-ASEAN political cooperation was the visit 
of an ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization delegation to the European Parliament in 
November 1982. After the visit, the ministers “expressed their satisfaction at the continuing 
development of contacts between parliamentarians of the two regions” (p.4). This development 
was to lead to closer political relations between EU-ASEAN institutions in the future. The 
ministers also discussed the progress of EU-ASEAN cooperation as outlined in the ASEAN-EC 
Cooperation Agreement and which included science and technology, insurance, trade promotion, 
training and development cooperation.  
 
During the 5th AEMM held in Dublin in October 1984, the ministers continued to exchange 
views on the situation in Cambodia, Afghanistan, the Middle East, the refugee problem in 
Indochina, as well as turned their attention to drug abuse and trafficking. The continuing 
occupation of Cambodia remained a major concern for both ASEAN and the EU who viewed it as 
a major threat to peace and security in the region. ASEAN and the EU once again condemned the 
action and supported UN resolutions that called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Cambodia and the restoration of independence and an elected government. They maintained that 
no assistance would be given to Vietnam until the matter was resolved. The ministers supported 
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the political solution as outlined in the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea 
and the Coalition of Democratic Kampuchea under the leadership of Samdech Narodom Sihanouk. 
The EU praised ASEAN’s efforts in trying to find a political solution to the conflict and the 
ministers jointly condemned Vietnam for attacks on refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border 
and the incursion of Vietnamese troops into Thailand. The EU and ASEAN called upon Vietnam 
to cease the attack which they felt would only cause further tension along the border.  
 
The continuing problem of Indochinese refugees was a major topic in the meeting. The EU 
and ASEAN were concerned with the situation and called for more assistance from the 
international community as well as the parties involved in the conflict to solve the problem. 
ASEAN ministers expressed their appreciation of the assistance provided by the EU and its 
Member States through various refugee relief programmes, while EU ministers noted the efforts 
of ASEAN countries in providing first refuge for the refugees.  
 
ASEAN and the EU also discussed the situation in Afghanistan and expressed their concern 
over the occupation of the country by the Soviet Union and the impact on the local people. The 
ministers called for a solution that would lead to the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the return to 
independence of Afghanistan, the right of Afghan people to determine their future, and the return 
of Afghan refugees to their homeland.  
 
ASEAN and the EU discussed relations between the West and the East and agreed that the 
communication channels between the two sides should remain open and called for “continued 
progress towards genuine detente on the basis of effective respect for the interests and rights of all 
states according to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter” (p.4). The ministers also 
discussed the Middle East including the lack of progress on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli crisis 
and stressed the need to end this conflict. They also reiterated their support for the return to full 
sovereignty, unity, and independence of Lebanon. ASEAN and the EU expressed concern about 
the tension in the Gulf area resulting from the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq and called for 
both parties to resolve their problem peacefully and in accordance with United National Security 
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Council resolutions. On balance, when EU-ASEAN political and security relations were 
addressed, typically this took the form of discussion and the exchange of views, rather than 
concrete achievements. 
 
The ministers noted that the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement “had fulfilled 
satisfactorily its role in consolidating, deepening and diversifying the cooperation between their 
countries” (Joint Declaration, The Fifth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, 15-16 October 1984, 
p.1). The achievements of the Agreement included an increase in EU-ASEAN trade, an increase 
in manufactured goods in ASEAN exports to the EU, more EU investment in ASEAN countries, 
and more development assistance provided by the EU. The ministers decided, noting the agreement 
would come to an end in October 1985, to extend the agreement and focus on deepening EU-
ASEAN cooperation in the area of training, science and technology, and encourage of EU 
investment in ASEAN countries.  
 
The EU and ASEAN foreign ministers held their 6th AEMM in Jakarta from 20-21 October 
1986. They exchanged views on familiar and emerging international political matters - Cambodia, 
Afghanistan, East-West relations, Southern Africa, Middle East, international terrorism, and the 
illegal trade in narcotics. The EU and ASEAN called for Vietnam to start negotiations for the 
withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia. The ministers were concerned with the pace of refugee 
resettlement in ASEAN countries and along the Thai-Cambodian border. In Afghanistan the 
ministers agreed on the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces as called for by UN resolutions. They 
also exchanged views on the developments of East-West relations and both ASEAN and the EU 
expressed serious, if belated, concern with apartheid in South Africa, called for continuing 
international pressure to abolish racial segregation and showed support for the independence of 
Namibia.  
 
The ministers also addressed the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq conflict 
and called for peaceful resolutions between conflicting parties. Views on international terrorism 
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were exchanged with an agreement to cooperate in combatting terrorism. With respect of illegal 
narcotics including drug production and trafficking and both declared their intention to again 
cooperate. By way of gesture, the EU agreed to consider supporting ASEAN’s candidacy for the 
post of President of the International Conference on Abuse of Drugs and Illicit Trafficking.  
 
The 7th AEMM (Dusseldorf, 2-3 May 1988), saw the ministers once again discuss an 
increasingly familiar range of international political issues. The ministers noted the positive 
developments in East-West relations. Regarding disarmament and arms control, ASEAN and the 
EU welcomed the conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the 
USA and the Soviet Union designed to lead to a reduction of nuclear arsenals. The ASEAN and 
EU ministers also fully supported the negotiations on a convention to ban chemical weapons at the 
Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The situation in Cambodia was further discussed, the 
ministers supported Prince Sihanouk’s initiative to start peace talks, but continued to insist that 
Vietnam remove its forces from Cambodia and agreed once again that no assistance would be 
given to Vietnam. The ongoing problem of Indochinese refugees remained a major concern for the 
EU and ASEAN. The EU promised to assist refugees and displaced persons in returning to their 
homeland. The ministers called for Vietnam to cooperate with UNHCR, countries of first asylum, 
and resettlement countries to find a solution. The EU and ASEAN maintained that they would 
coordinate their humanitarian assistance for the refugees.  
 
Over Afghanistan, the EU and ASEAN agreed that the solution would necessarily involve 
the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the country, the return of refugees, and a political 
settlement involving Afghans. Once again, the ministers condemned apartheid in South Africa, 
called for its abolishment, the lifting of the state emergency, the release of political prisoners, and 
the unbanning of all political parties. The EU and ASEAN also condemned the oppression by 
South Africa of its neighbours and called for the independence of Namibia. The ministers again 
exchanged views on international terrorism and declared that they would cooperate to combat 
terrorism and find political solutions to the cause of terrorism. The EU and ASEAN agreed to 
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implement the strategies produced by the first International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking in June 1987 and the recommendation adopted by the Commission at the Narcotic 
Drugs meeting. They also supported the UN Convention on Illicit Trafficking. ASEAN ministers 
expressed their appreciation to the EU for assisting in EU-ASEAN drug related projects regarding 
drug prevention and rehabilitation.  
 
From the 16-17 February 1990, EU and ASEAN ministers met in Malaysia for the 8th 
AEMM. The discussions at this forum reflected the enduring nature of many international political. 
The ministers discussed developments regarding East-West relations and noted the positive step 
towards rapprochement between the major powers which had reduced tensions in the region. They 
also exchanged views on the new post-Berlin Wall reality for Central and Eastern Europe and the 
opportunities and challenges that lay ahead. The EU and ASEAN discussed the progress in nuclear, 
chemical and conventional disarmament and arms control.     Cambodia was still a major topic 
during the meeting. The two partners agreed that a comprehensive political settlement was still 
needed and supported the Paris Conference process. The ministers discussed developments 
including the establishment of a UN interim government in Cambodia until the election, the 16-
point Summary of Conclusions adopted at the UN Security Council Meeting, and the establishment 
of an intra-secretariat taskforce by the UN Secretary General. The EU and ASEAN continued to 
discuss Indochinese refugees and displaced persons and reaffirmed their support of the CPA 
adopted at the International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in 1989.  
 
The ministers exchanged views on the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops and called for the parties concerned to implement the Geneva Agreements in order 
to achieve a comprehensive political settlement. They also continued discussion of the situation in 
the Middle East including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue, Lebanon, and the Iran-
Iraq situation. ASEAN supported EU initiatives outlined in the Madrid and Strasbourg 
Declarations as solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. They called for Iran and Iraq to resume 
negotiations under the supervision of the UN. The apartheid policy in South Africa also remained 
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a major concern although the ministers did note the positive developments such as the release of 
Nelson Mandela from prison and the lifting of ban on political parties, however until apartheid 
was abolished, they agreed to continue to pressure the South African government for change. 
ASEAN and the EU also welcomed the independence of Namibia.  
 
The 9th AEMM was held in Luxembourg at the end of May 1991. The ministers considered 
the positive changes in Central and Eastern Europe and noted the conclusion of the Paris Charter 
in November 1990 by the 34 CSCE states which promoted peace and cooperation in the region. 
For the first time ASEAN and EU ministers also exchanged views regarding the political situation 
in Burma as well as in Vietnam again and they expressed their concern over the issues of human 
rights and the fundamental freedoms of the Burmese and Vietnamese people. The partners 
expressed their support for the reconvening of the negotiation process for the PICC and reiterated 
their condemnation of the genocide from 1975 to 1978. The EU and ASEAN also welcomed the 
establishment of the Supreme National Council and the draft agreements for the comprehensive 
political settlement between the UN Security Council and the Co-Chairmen of the PICC in 
November 1990.  
 
The continual flow of Indochinese refugees remained a major concern for the EU and 
ASEAN and they noted that the number of Vietnamese asylum seekers in refugee camps had 
reached the highest levels since 1979. The ministers reaffirmed their support of the implementation 
of the CPA and stressed the return of non-refugees to their home country as crucial to the 
effectiveness of the CPA. They discussed the implementation of the first phase of the EU’s 
repatriation and reintegration assistance programme for Vietnamese refugees that had been 
initiated in July 1990, and called for international assistance for this programme.  
 
At the 9th meeting, the EU and ASEAN ministers also discussed the situation in the Middle 
East including the sudden invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Lebanon. The 
ministers exchanged views on the restoration of the government of Kuwait, expressed their support 
for UN humanitarian assistance and condemned the abuse of the refugees and displaced persons. 
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In addition, support for the United States' effort in finding a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the Palestinian issue was given and the ministers reiterated their support for UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and called for the convening of an international 
conference to negotiate a settlement. They also expressed their support for the implementation of 
the Taif agreement in Lebanon.  
 
While welcoming the positive changes which had been introduced by President de Klerk, 
concerned was continued to be expressed over the political instability in South Africa and the 
ministers agreed to continue to maintain pressure on the South African government to abolish 
apartheid. In terms of international drug issues, the EU and ASEAN expressed their support for 
the 1988 UN Convention on the Illicit Production and Trafficking of Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances. They also agreed to enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation in combating the illegal drug 
market by implementing programmes under the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline for 
Future Activities in Combating Drug Abuse and the UN Global Programme of Action Against 
Drug Abuse. The ministers expressed their support for the European Plan Against Drugs which 
had been endorsed in December 1990. They also welcomed the first incoming EU-ASEAN Senior 
Official Meeting on Drug Matters where officials from both regions would discuss further 
cooperation in combating drugs. The ministers noted their joint efforts in combating drugs, 
especially the EU assistance in EU-ASEAN projects including drug prevention, detection, and 
rehabilitation. For the first time, the ministers discussed the importance of anti-money laundering 
measures adopted by the International Financial Task Force and during the meeting, the future of 
EU-ASEAN cooperation was raised and it was agreed that the Cooperation Agreement should be 
revised in order to cover a broader range of cooperation areas. 
 
The 10th AEMM was held in Manila on 29-30 October 1992. At this meeting, the ministers 
agreed that “there was a need to consolidate, deepen and diversify ASEAN-EU cooperation to 
enable it to keep abreast of global changes and to ensure an enduring and mutually beneficial 
relationship in an increasingly interdependent world” (Joint Declaration of the 10th ASEAN-EC 
Ministerial Meeting, Manila, Philippines, 29-30 October 1992, p.1). Looking to internal EU 
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developments, the ASEAN ministers welcomed (if prematurely) the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the introduction of the Single Market, and future enlargements, with the hope that these 
developments would enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation. The ministers also exchanged views on 
political and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the primary focus was 
on the situation in former Yugoslavia and both partners strongly condemned the violation of 
human rights and international law and called for the stop of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the return of displaced persons to their homes, and the abolition of detention camps 
and prisons. They announced their support for Lord Owen and Cyprus Vance in finding a political 
solution to the situation in Bosnia, and the EU and ASEAN called for the full support of UN 
Security Council Resolutions No. 770, relating to peacekeeping operation and humanitarian 
assistance of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and Resolution No. 780 (1992), relating to 
the establishment of a commission to assist the Secretary General of the UN in prosecuting war 
crimes.  
 
Regarding the developments in Asia, the EU ministers welcomed the accession of Vietnam 
and Laos to the TAC of ASEAN. The ministers initiated discussion on the situation in the South 
China Sea and agreed that sovereignty and jurisdictional issues should be settled peacefully. 
Consequently, the EU ministers endorsed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea that 
was issued in July 1992. The ministers reiterated their full support for the peace process in 
Cambodia and the implementation of the Paris Agreement on schedule. They noted the success of 
the CPA undertaken by UNHCR and called for international funding. The ministers also called on 
the UNHCR to accelerate the process of repatriation for refugees in third countries. The EU and 
ASEAN welcomed the political and economic developments in Vietnam and its closer ties towards 
ASEAN countries, and they again discussed the situation in Burma which they hoped could be 
resolved by country-wide economic and political reforms.  
 
The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance the effectiveness of their policies and measures to 
combat drug supply and trafficking, money laundering, the diversion of trade precursor chemicals, 
and drug abuse. The ministers discussed the World Conference on Human Rights to be held the 
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following year and agreed that the conference agenda needed to be finalised. They stressed their 
commitment to the promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms, development, democracy 
and social justice. The partners also announced that they would continue their cooperation in 
promoting these issues.  Finally, during the meeting, it was decided to intensify EU-ASEAN 
cooperation based on the 1980 Cooperation Agreement by establishing a regular dialogue at 
ministerial and senior official level where ministers would meet at least biennially with senior 
officials meeting in the intervening years. 
 
 
ii) 1994-2007: From Karlsruhe to Nuremberg 
EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation intensified significantly from 1994 onward. The 
11th AEMM, held in Karlsruhe on 22-23 September 1994, began a new chapter in EU-ASEAN 
political and security relations. They European Commission’s communication on a new strategy 
towards Asia was welcomed and the ministers agreed that “ASEAN should remain a cornerstone 
of the EU’s dialogue with the Asian region” (Joint Declaration of the 11th ASEAN-EU Ministerial 
Meeting, 22-23 September 1994, p.1). The ministers further noted that the EU and ASEAN “have 
experienced an increase in political and economic weight and contributed to welfare as well as to 
the maintenance of security and stability in an increasingly interdependent world” (p.1). They 
agreed to intensify their dialogue and cooperation in the fields of peace and security, the 
environment and sustainable development, trade and investment, and human rights. The ministers 
also welcomed the completion of the Single Market and the final ratification and implementation 
of the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
Regarding EU-ASEAN cooperation on narcotics, the ministers reiterated their 
commitment to increasing the effectiveness of policies and measures to combat drug trafficking, 
money laundering, the diversion of trade in the precursor chemicals, and drug abuse. They also 
restated their support of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 




During the meeting, the ministers agreed that “increased EU-ASEAN cooperation is a 
central element in relations between Europe and Asia-Pacific region” (p.4) and they discussed the 
future direction of EU-ASEAN cooperation. They established an ad hoc informal eminent persons 
group to investigate measures for strengthening EU-ASEAN relations, particularly in the political 
and security fields. This was arguably a consequence of the establishment of the ARF in July 1994 
where the EU became, and remains, a dialogue partner. The purpose of the ARF was to bring 
together countries in the region and their dialogue partners to discuss political and security matters 
in Asia-Pacific region. The ASEAN and EU ministers agreed to enhance cooperation between 
strategic and international studies institutes in Europe and Southeast Asia. They also reiterated 
their commitment to supporting disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives including the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and 
the Conference on Disarmament of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The two partners 
jointly held the view that the UN's capabilities regarding preventive diplomacy, peace-making, 
peace-keeping and post conflict peace-building needed to be more efficient. They also called for 
the promotion of confidence and security building measures regionally and globally. The ministers 
stressed their commitment to promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and expressed 
their support for the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action. They also stressed their commitment to enhance 
international multilateral cooperation under the auspices of the UN. 
 
Turning again to the political and economic developments in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, the rapprochement strategy and the reform process were examined. 
The EU encouraged ASEAN to take advantage of the economic opportunities in these countries. 
However, the situation in the former Yugoslavia remained a major concern and the ministers 
condemned the practice of ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian-Serb forces in the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and called for an immediate halt to such actions. They declared their full support for 
the peace plan of the Contact Group and for the independence of the Republic of Bosnia-
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Herzegovina. In addition, the ministers called for international assistance in rebuilding the country 
after any peace solution had been agreed. 
 
Regarding developments in Asia, the ministers exchanged views on matters including the 
Indochinese refugees, the South China Sea, Cambodia, Myanmar and for the first time, on the 
Korean Peninsula. The admission of Vietnam into ASEAN was welcomed and the EU’s interest in 
becoming a dialogue partner with APEC noted. On the issue of Indochinese refugees, the ministers 
discussed the recent statement of the 5th Steering Committee of the International Conference on 
Indochinese Refugees that called for a need to accelerate the return of non-refugees from the 
countries of first asylum by the end of 1995. An exchange of views regarding the situation on the 
Korean Peninsula took place and a solution to the nuclear problem involving the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was expressed consistent with the International Atomic 
Energy Authority (IAEA) safeguards agreement.  
 
The situation in the South China Sea was raised and bilateral talks between the parties 
noted. They congratulated Indonesia’s efforts in holding multilateral talks in the Workshops on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. Instability in Cambodia remained a concern 
and support for the Cambodian government in reconstructing the country and economy offered. 
The ministers noted the positive developments in Myanmar and discussed the progress of 
ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy and the EU’s efforts in helping to bring about changes 
in the country. At the conclusion of the meeting, the EU and ASEAN agreed to strengthen 
cooperation on the basis of the 1980 Cooperation Agreement through EU-ASEAN dialogue 
mechanisms. 
 
While seeming something of a paradox to some, at the 12th AEMM (Singapore, 13-14 
February 1997) ministers repeated the mantra that “ASEAN remains a cornerstone of the EU’s 
dialogue with the Asian region” (Joint Declaration of the Twelfth ASEAN-EU Ministerial 
Meeting, 1997, p.1). This was despite these same ministers welcoming the inaugural ASEM which 
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had been held in Bangkok in March 1996. They also welcomed the participation for the first time 
of the new members of the EU and ASEAN including Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Vietnam. 
Among other decisions made at the meeting, the partners signed the Protocol on the Extension of 
the Cooperation Agreement between the EU and ASEAN to Vietnam. 
 
The 12th AEMM established the outline of EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation for the 
first time since the start of formal relations. The EU and ASEAN agreed to cooperate in the 
following areas: to 
 
- share perspectives and information on regional and global political and security issues; 
-  hold a regular political and security dialogue based on equality and mutual respect; 
- continue the EU-ASEAN dialogue and cooperation in order to foster EU-ASEAN   
   relations and cooperation regardless of their differences; 
- cooperate in various international fora and to fully support international cooperation  
   under the framework of the UN; and, 
- coordinate their efforts in dealing with global challenges including the  
environment, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, human  
trafficking, child abuse, narcotics and trafficking, money laundering and diversion of  
chemical precursors. 
 
The ministers also discussed a full-range of regional and international political and security 
issues - the ARF, disarmament, human rights, the South China Sea, the situation in Myanmar, the 
Korean Peninsula, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and 
narcotics (a list that bears a striking resemblance to the EU-ASEAN concerns some twenty years 
on). The EU and ASEAN welcomed the success of the ARF as an effective political and security 
forum in the Asia-Pacific and recognised the two-track approach as “offering opportunities for 
both formal and informal exchange of views between ARF-participants on a wide range of issues” 
(p.3). The ministers held a discussion on the issue of disarmament where they welcomed the recent 
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conclusion of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty in Southeast Asia, the signing of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the conclusion of the Fourth Review Conference of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention. In addition, they called for the banning of anti-
personnel land-mines (APLs) including their use, stockpile, production, and transfer. On the issue 
of human rights, the EU and ASEAN declared their full support for the implementation of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the work of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. The ministers discussed the developments on the situation in the South China Sea and 
noted the progress achieved by the Informal Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the 
South China Sea. They also exchanged views on the situation in Myanmar. Regarding the situation 
on the Korean Peninsula, the EU and ASEAN called for the establishment of a peace mechanism 
and expressed their support for the 1953 Armistice Agreement and the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Organisation (KEDO). The ministers also called for the resumption of peace talks between the 
DPRK and South Korea. 
 
Once again the ministers exchanged views on the economic and political reform process in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the future EU membership for the associated countries. On the 
situation in former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, they discussed the progress in the 
implementation of the Peace Agreement that was concluded in Paris in December 1995 and the 
peace process in the former Yugoslavia. They declared their full support for this implementation 
and the economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and appealed for additional assistance 
from the international community in reconstructing the country. Regarding the situation in the 
Middle East, the EU and ASEAN reconfirmed their support for a comprehensive peace settlement 
and called on all involved parties to implement the agreements and to follow the principles of the 
Madrid and Oslo Declarations. They also made an appeal to the international community to assist 
in the development of the Palestinian territories. The ministers noted EU-ASEAN cooperation in 
fighting narcotics, in particular the progress in the conclusion of bilateral agreements on Drugs 




The new Millennium saw the EU and ASEAN hold the 13th AEMM in Vientiane in 
December 2000, where Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar participated for the first time since 
becoming ASEAN members. The EU and Laos and Cambodia agreed to “strengthen [their] 
relations on a bilateral basis, seeing this as a way to reinforce the dialogue between the EU and 
ASEAN as a whole” (Vientiane Declaration, the 13th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, 2000, p.1).  
 
The EU ministers discussed recent developments in the EU including the emerging ESDP, 
EU enlargement perspectives, and the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). Ministers from 
ASEAN welcomed the EU enlargement process and again stated that it could strengthen EU-
ASEAN relations. ASEAN ministers updated the EU on recent ASEAN developments including: 
the implementation of the HPA; the ASEAN Troika process; the progress of the TAC; the 
implementation of the SEANWFN; the negotiations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea; 
and, the results of the fourth ASEAN Informal Summit in November 2000.  
 
The EU and ASEAN reiterated their commitment to promoting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and declared their support for the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna. The ministers exchanged views on the situation in Myanmar - including the 16 November 
2000 decision of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office - and expressed their 
support for the mission of the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Mr. Razali Ismail, in 
encouraging a national reconciliation process. The partners expressed their support for a united 
and democratic Indonesia and welcomed the Partnership for Good Governance framework adopted 
by the Indonesian government which sought to find a peaceful solution to its internal conflict 
through dialogue and a national reconciliation process. The EU and ASEAN expressed their 
support for the transition to independence of East Timor and the implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1272. They also declared their full support for the work of UN’s Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in the reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
process and the joint efforts by Indonesia and the international community in providing assistance 
in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1319 for the East Timorese refugees in the 




Regarding developments on the Korean Peninsula, the dialogue between South and North 
Korea and the June 2000 Summit in Pyongyang were welcomed. The ministers expressed their 
support for the implementation of the South-North Declaration including humanitarian issues, 
economic cooperation, military issues, and Confidence Building Measures, and they also implored 
the DPRK to cooperate with the international community in areas of nuclear and ballistic non-
proliferation. The EU and ASEAN welcomed the DPRK’s participation at the 7th ARF in Bangkok 
and promoted its use to further the peace and security dialogue process. The EU and ASEAN 
exchanged views at the meeting on the recent developments in the Balkans including the 
democratic progress in Croatia. The ministers stressed the need for non-violent action and 
reiterated their support for initiatives that promoted peace and stability in the region. The EU and 
ASEAN also expressed their concerns regarding the resumption of violence in the Middle East 
and called for the continuation of the peace negotiation process. 
 
On the issue of EU-ASEAN security cooperation, the ministers agreed “to enhance [their] 
cooperation in regional security…through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which [they] 
recognised as an important forum for dialogue on peace and security issues in the Asia-Pacific 
region” (p.2). The partners expressed their support for the intensification of the Confidence 
Building Measures (CBMs) in order to strengthen the ARF process and called for the conclusion 
of the principles of preventive diplomacy. The EU offered to share its expertise in these areas. The 
ministers agreed to intensify their cooperation in narcotics control. They also noted the decision 
of the Fourth ASEAN Informal Summit regarding the candidacy for participation of Laos, 
Cambodia, and Myanmar in the ASEM process.  
 
The 14th AEMM was held in Brussels on 27-28 January 2003. The ministers stressed that 
“economic and development co-operation, as well as political dialogue and co-operation, are key 
aspects driving EU-ASEAN relations” (Joint Co-Chairmen’s Statement of the 14th EU-ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting, 2003, p.1). The EU and ASEAN reiterated their commitment “towards peace 
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and stability and welcomed the current cooperation between ASEAN and the EU in enhancing 
regional security through bilateral and multilateral channels, including the ASEAN Regional 
Forum” (p.1). They called for further strengthening of the ARF by enhancing confidence building 
measures, preventative diplomacy, and practical cooperation on the basis of consensus and an 
incremental approach. The ministers welcomed the meeting of the first ARF Inter-sessional 
Meeting on Terrorism and Transnational Crime in March 2003 and the 9th ARF in July-August 
2002. The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their dialogue on issues of common concern on the 
basis of partnership and equality, and in particular on their commitment in promoting human rights 
including fundamental freedoms and the right to development. The ministers decided to intensify 
their political, economic, and social cooperation at the bilateral, sub-regional, regional, and 
multilateral levels, and in the latter the European Commission stated that it would issue a 
communication on a new EU strategy towards Southeast Asia in 2003. They also agreed that future 
EU-ASEAN cooperation would now cover non-traditional security issues and would create 
communication channels between the ASEAN Secretariat and its EU counterparts. The ministers 
discussed key developments in the EU and ASEAN. ASEAN briefed the EU on the results of the 
8th ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN +3 Summit, and the ASEAN +1 Summit (with China, India, 
Japan, and South Korea respectively) held in November 2002. The EU informed ASEAN on the 
results of the Copenhagen European Council meeting which discussed the issues of enlargement 
and the recent developments on ESDP.  
 
The partners exchanged views on the issue of terrorism and strongly condemned earlier 
terrorist attacks. The ministers stressed their commitment in combating terrorism and adopted the 
EU-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism. The Declaration outlines EU 
and ASEAN commitment to supporting UN anti-terrorism resolutions and conventions, the UN 
Counter Terrorism Committee and other UN bodies. The EU and ASEAN noted that terrorism and 
related activities including transnational organised crime, money laundering, illegal arms 
trafficking, and narcotics represented new type of security challenge that had to be dealt with at 
both the regional and international levels and they stressed the importance of the role of the ARF 
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in this matter. The ministers noted the overlapping initiatives adopted at the ASEM Copenhagen 
Cooperation Programme on Fighting Terrorism in November 2002 and declared their intention to 
support its implementation. The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance further EU-ASEAN 
cooperation in the following areas: the 
 
- universal implementation of UN Resolutions related to terrorism including resolution 1373 
(2001), 1377 (2001), and 1390 (2002);  
- universal implementation of UN Conventions and Protocols related to terrorism including 
encouraging countries to implement measures to prevent and combat terrorism and the 
financing of terrorism; 
- early conclusion and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism; 
- early entry into force of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and 
its protocol; 
- information exchange on strategies in combating terrorism including  information on the 
development of more effective policies and legal, regulatory and administrative 
frameworks; 
- intensification of ties between EU and ASEAN law enforcement agencies including 
EUROPOL and ASEANPOL in order to foster cooperation on counter terrorism and 
organized crime; and, 
- cooperation to assist ASEAN countries in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 
1373 and to deal with the effect of terrorism. 
 
The ministers welcomed the conclusion of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea at the 8th ASEAN Summit in November 2002 and its contribution in promoting 
peace and stability in the South China Sea. They also exchanged views on the situation in 
Myanmar, again expressing support for the efforts of the UN Secretary General’s Special 
Representative. They noted that for the national reconciliation process to be successful, more 
commitment from those concerned was needed to promote national unity, democracy, and human 
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rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU and ASEAN discussed the recent developments on the 
Korean Peninsula and expressed their concern regarding the withdrawal of the DPRK from the 
NPT and the cooperation with the IAEA. Most importantly for this thesis, the EU and ASEAN 
reaffirmed their support for the stability and national unity of Indonesia. The conclusion of the 
Aceh Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Geneva on 9 December 2002 was welcomed and the 
decision by ASEAN countries to send observers to monitor the implementation of the agreement 
and the EU’s political and financial assistance supporting the rehabilitation of Aceh was 
foreshadowed. However, at this stage the parameters of the EU’s ESDP mission was not 
determined. 
 
On the Middle East, the EU and ASEAN condemned the latest attacks and called on those 
involved to cease the hostilities. The ministers expressed their support for the initiatives including 
the work of the Middle East Quartet in “contributing to a final, just and comprehensive settlement 
with two states, Israel and an independent, sovereign, and democratic Palestine, living side by side 
in peace and security” (p.5). The EU and ASEAN also exchanged views on the serious situation in 
Iraq and called on Iraq to comply fully with UN Resolutions regarding its disarmament obligations. 
They reaffirmed their support for the UN process and called on Iraq to cooperate fully with the 
UN's weapons inspectors.  
 
Looking forward, and perhaps in response to the initial enthusiasm for the parallel track of 
ASEM, the EU and ASEAN agreed to develop a balanced and comprehensive agenda to inject 
momentum into EU-ASEAN relations. Regarding political and security cooperation, they agreed 
to enhance their cooperation in combating transnational crime and terrorism and to promote 
dialogue on democracy, human rights good governance, and the rule of law.  
 
The 15th AEMM was held in Jakarta on 10 March 2005 and constituted the first region to 
region meeting after the historic 2004 EU25 enlargement. The meeting focused on developments 
in EU-ASEAN relations, and the familiar international issues of the Middle East, the Korean 
Peninsula, and Myanmar. The ministers noted the 2005-2006 EC-ASEAN Cooperation 
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Programme including the fight against terrorism and the success of the 5th ASEM in Hanoi in 
October 2004. They exchanged views on the issue of terrorism and reaffirmed their commitment 
and support for UN initiatives and international law in combating terrorism. Progress in the 
ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism was noted and the intention 
to further enhance cooperation in this field reaffirmed. They also reiterated their support for 
ASEAN counter-terrorism agencies including the International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA), the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) and the Jakarta 
Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC).  
 
The European Commission’s A New Partnership with Southeast Asia strategy was 
discussed and it was agreed to encourage policy dialogue in other non-trade areas endorsing the 
READI concept. They also exchanged views on the trilateral cooperation initiative which was 
adopted in 2004 involving cooperation between ASEAN countries and the EU in providing 
development assistance for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam which would contribute to 
the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). Regarding EU-ASEAN political cooperation, the 
ministers instructed the ASEAN-EU SOM to promote an EU-ASEAN dialogue on international 
issues of mutual interest.  
 
The ministers acknowledged recent developments in both the EU and ASEAN. The EU 
expressed its support for ASEAN initiatives to promote regional integration including the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, the Plans of Action of ASEAN for the three pillars of the 
ASEAN Community, and the VAP. ASEAN welcomed the latest EU enlargement in May 2004 
admitting 10 new members from the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe. The ministers 
unsurprisingly agreed that “the increasing political and economic integration in the two regions 
would contribute positively to the strengthening of ties between Europe and Southeast Asia” (Joint 
Co-Chairmen’s Statement of the 15th ASEAN-EU Ministerial meeting, 2005, p.2). They decided 
to enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation in order to intensify the integration process in ASEAN: an 




The aftermath of the Asian tsunami disaster became a major issue during the meeting and 
the partners discussed their cooperation to support countries which had been affected. The 
ministers noted the results of the Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on the Aftermath of 
Earthquake and Tsunami held in January 2005 including the Ministerial Meeting on regional 
Cooperation on Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements in January 2005 and ASEAN’s initiatives 
in coping with the impacts of Tsunami. The ministers discussed ASEAN's initiatives including the 
establishment of a regional early warning system and the endorsement of the ASEAN-initiated 
General Assembly resolution 59/279 regarding the strengthening of emergency relief, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention of a tsunami disaster. They also acknowledged the 
EU and its Member States’ assistance in providing rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance to 
the affected countries.  
 
The EU and ASEAN continued to exchange views on the Middle East, focusing on the 
occupied Palestinian territory and the situation in Iraq. They hoped that the Palestinian presidential 
election of January 2005 would drive the Middle East peace process forward and expressed their 
support for the implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit initiatives and called for 
international support for the Road Map to Peace. The EU and ASEAN reaffirmed their support for 
the UN Security Council Resolutions and for a solution involving the peaceful co-existence 
between Israel and Palestine. On the situation in Iraq, the ministers welcomed the return to 
sovereignty of Iraq in June 2004 and the results of the election in January 2005. They called for 
the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) and expressed their 
continuing concern regarding the levels of violence in the country.  
 
The ministers also exchanged views on the recent developments on the Korean Peninsula. 
They noted the results of the Third Round of Six Party Talks in June 2004 and supported the goal 
of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but also expressed concern regarding the DPRK’s 
withdrawal from peace negotiations. Inevitably, the political situation in Myanmar was another 
140 
 
major topic during the meeting. The ASEAN and EU ministers noted the developments in the 
country including the reconvening of the national convention in February 2005 and called for the 
lifting of all restrictions and for the full participation of all political and ethnic groups. They also 
called on Myanmar to cooperate fully with the UN and the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General. The EU and ASEAN agreed to continue their dialogue to find a peaceful 
solution to the situation in Myanmar. 
 
The 16th AEMM was held in Nuremberg on the 15 March 2007 marking 40 years of EU-
ASEAN relations. The ministers adopted the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced 
Partnership which aimed “to further strengthen and reinvigorate the ASEAN-EU process” (Joint 
Co-Chairmen’s Statement of the 16th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 2007, p.1). In the area of 
political and security cooperation, the EU and ASEAN reiterated their common commitment to 
promoting multilateralism in solving international problems, human rights and good governance, 
disarmament and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass of Destruction (WMD), and the fight 
against terrorism. During the meeting, the EU and ASEAN also held a discussion on the general 
progress in EU-ASEAN cooperation, the developments in both regions, and international issues.  
 
The ministers noted the progress made in the area of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement being negotiated between the EU and several ASEAN countries which aimed to 
promote further political and economic cooperation under the new bilateral and regional 
framework. They reiterated their support for the implementation of READI and tasked the 
ASEAN-EC Joint Co-operation Committee to follow up this initiative. They also expressed their 
support for the recommendations of the Report of the ASEAN-EU Vision Group: Transregional 
Partnership for Shared and Sustainable Prosperity. Both the EU and ASEAN noted the success of 
the AMM - the first EU-ASEAN cooperation in crisis management in Southeast Asia. Perhaps 
overly optimistic, the mission was seen to have “considerably enhanced the EU-ASEAN 
relationship and raised the profile of EU-ASEAN policy and security cooperation in the region” 
(p.2). The ministers exchanged views on trilateral cooperation and agreed to extend their support, 
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maintaining that it would enhance ASEAN integration by closing the development gap between 
ASEAN countries.  
 
The EU and ASEAN Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership 
issued on 15 March 2007 states that the EU and ASEAN are committed to promoting:  
universal values of justice, democracy, human rights, good governance, anti-corruption, 
the rule of law, social equality and caring societies, that are the foundations for lasting 
peace, stability, progress and prosperity, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the 
United nations, and for further strengthening and expanding EU-ASEAN Relations  
 (The Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, 2007,  p.1).   
 
The EU and ASEAN agreed to “further enhance EU-ASEAN dialogue and cooperation, including 
at the highest level” (p.2). They were also committed to:  
cooperat[ing] to strengthen ASEAN capacity and institution building processes that will 
contribute to achieving the goal of the ASEAN Community consisting of ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community (ASCC) through, among other steps, exchange of information and experience 
between the EU and ASEAN on community building (p.2).  
 
Regarding political and security cooperation specifically, the EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance 
their cooperation the following areas: to 
 
-  intensify their political dialogue through the ARF, to promote peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region and to reaffirm the primary role of ASEAN in driving this process; 
- enhance their cooperation in multilateral frameworks including the UN and the WTO; 
- enhance global and regional security which involves political, human, and economic 
aspect; 
- intensify cooperation in combating terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, sea 
piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, cyber crime, and other related transnational 
crime in accordance with  international law; and,  
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- intensify their cooperation on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of WMD 
and reiterated their support for the implementation of existing disarmament and non-
proliferation treaties, conventions, and instruments.   
 
The EU and ASEAN also agreed to draft a Plan of Action to implement the initiatives of 
the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced partnership. 
 
During the meeting, ASEAN welcomed the EU’s stated intention to accede to the TAC in 
Southeast Asia and its intention to participate in the East Asia Summit. On EU-ASEAN security 
cooperation, the ministers noted the progress of the ARF process including the co-chairing of the 
ARF Inter-sessional group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in 
2004/2005 and 2005/2006. Regarding EU-ASEAN cooperation in combating terrorism, the 
ministers reaffirmed their partnership in this area and noted the recent conclusion of the ASEAN 
Convention on Counter Terrorism and the achievements of ASEAN counter-terrorism agencies. 
The EU and ASEAN expressed their full support for the conclusion and implementation of the UN 
Global counter-terrorism Strategy. 
 
The EU and ASEAN outlined developments in their respective regions. ASEAN informed 
the EU of the results of the January 2007 12th ASEAN Summit including the endorsement of the 
Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter and the establishment of the high level 
Task Force to draft the ASEAN Charter in time for the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007. 
The ministers also noted the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Members of the Eminent Persons Group and the High Level Task 
Force visited Brussels, and Berlin as part of the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter. The EU 
reaffirmed its support for the ASEAN regional integration process and ASEAN regional initiatives 
and sub-regional initiatives. The EU briefed ASEAN on the status of the European Constitutional 
Treaty and the EU’s plan to incorporate its values into its policies. Myanmar continued to pose a 
problem for both partners. The ministers were concerned with the lack of progress in the transition 
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towards a democratic government and expressed their support for national reconciliation and the 
lifting of bans on political parties and the release of political prisoners. They called on Myanmar 
to maintain its cooperation with ASEAN, the UN, international humanitarian organizations, and 
NGOs. The EU and ASEAN reaffirmed their commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation treaties, conventions, and instruments including WMD and conventional weapons. 
They also reiterated their support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the upcoming Prepcom in 
April/May 2007.  
 
Following previous patterns, the EU and ASEAN also discussed developments in the 
Middle East and the Korean Peninsula with the ministers reaffirming their support for the Middle 
East Quartet and a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine in accordance with UN 
resolutions and the road map. On the issue of the Korean Peninsula, the EU and ASEAN reiterated 
their support for the Six-Party-Talks and the implementation of the agreement reached on 13 
February 2007. The ministers called on the DPRK to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 
1718 and the NPT and to address its human rights problems. The EU and ASEAN exchanged 
views on the situation in Iran and implored the Iranian government to implement UN Security 
Council Resolution 1696 and 1737 (2006) as well as the recommendations and resolutions of the 
IAEA Board of Governors. The ministers also discussed the situation in Iraq and reiterated their 
support for the Iraqi government and its initiative of organizing a ministerial meeting with its 
neighbouring countries to foster regional cooperation and peace in Iraq. The EU and ASEAN 
reaffirmed their support for Afghanistan and its efforts to create peace, stability, and prosperity in 
accordance with the Afghanistan Compact. They noted the role of the Joint Coordination and 
Monitoring Board as the central coordinating agency of the international community with the 
Afghan government.  
 
The ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit was held in Singapore on 22 November 2007 
where EU and ASEAN leaders issued a Joint Declaration affirming that the EU and ASEAN were: 
determined to deepen and broaden [their] cooperation, based on mutual trust and 
respect, with the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership as a strong foundation for 
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[their] relations and cooperation to ensure peace, stability, progress and 
prosperity in the region. 
(Joint Declaration of the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit, 2007, p.1) 
 
 The Declaration outlined their commitment to enhance EU-ASEAN dialogue in the following 
areas – political and security cooperation, promoting ASEAN regional integration, and human 
rights.  
 
The EU and ASEAN agreed to continue their cooperation on regional and international 
issues with a view to preserving peace, security, and prosperity. The leaders declared their 
commitment to enhancing EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation on promoting regional 
security, counter-terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, and the Myanmar problem. The 
partners agreed to intensify their political dialogue especially through the ARF process in order to 
promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN also welcomed the 
EU’s intention to accede to ASEAN’s TAC. The leaders declared their full support for the 
implementation of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, the early conclusion of a UN 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the ASEAN Convention on Counter 
Terrorism, and the implementation of the ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration on Cooperation to 
Combat International Terrorism. In the area of disarmament, the EU and ASEAN agreed to 
enhance their cooperation in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation of WMDs as 
well as reiterated their support for the existing disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, 
conventions, and instruments. On the issue of Myanmar, the EU and ASEAN reaffirmed their 
support for the work of the UN and the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari 
to promote national reconciliation and the democratic process in Myanmar. They also called for 
the release of political prisoners, the lifting of bans on political parties and welcomed Myanmar’s 
cooperation with the UN and its dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi. The leaders reaffirmed their 
commitment to providing assistance to Myanmar in the areas of humanitarian and political reform 




Regarding ASEAN integration, the EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their cooperation 
in implementing the Vientiane Action Programme, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, and sub-
regional initiatives through EU bilateral programmes with ASEAN members. They also agreed to 
enhance their cooperation in promoting and protecting the rights and welfare of migrant workers.  
 
The leaders also endorsed the Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration. The Plan 
of Action outlines EU-ASEAN cooperation initiatives between 2007 and 2012. It has the objective 
of enhancing EU-ASEAN cooperation covering areas as diverse as political and security, 
economic, energy security and environment, socio-cultural cooperation, and development. It also 
aims to promote ASEAN integration by implementing the Vientiane Action Programme and the 
initiatives of ASEAN Concord II (including the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015). 
In the area of political and security cooperation, the EU and ASEAN agreed to undertake the 
following initiatives. 
 
i) Deepen political and enhance regional cooperation  
The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their cooperation in terms of bilateral dialogues including 
the AEMM, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with the EU (PMC+1), and the SOM to 
review the progress of EU-ASEAN cooperation. They also agreed to enhance their cooperation in 
multilateral fora including the UN and Asia Europe Meetings as well as strengthening the role of 
multilateral cooperation in Asia including the accession of the EU to the TAC.  
 
ii) Deepen security cooperation  
The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance the role of the ARF in promoting regional cooperation, 
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They agreed to intensify their cooperation in the 
ARF process and strengthen its confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. The 
leaders agreed to promote exchanges of best practice between Track I and Track II of the ARF. 
They also agreed to enhance cooperation between the ARF and other regional and international 
organisations such as the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), ASEAN 
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Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  
 
The EU and ASEAN decided to enhance their cooperation and dialogue on crisis 
management focusing on knowledge transfer and exchange of best practices based on the 
experience of the AMM, although this was to prove to be somewhat wishful thinking. The leaders 
also agreed to promote women’s participation in conflict prevention in the area of aid operations, 
relief, and recovery. They also expressed their full commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 
1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and the UN Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In the area of human rights, the EU and ASEAN 
agreed to enhance regional initiatives to protect human rights including the co-hosting of seminars 
on human right issues and the strengthening of dialogue, exchange, and capacity building. The 
leaders agreed to promote ASEAN participation in ESDP operations – again something that was 
to prove an unfulfilled expectation.  
 
iii) Traditional and Non-traditional Security Issues 
The Plan of Action outlines EU-ASEAN cooperation in traditional and non-traditional security 
areas including counter-terrorism, transnational organised crime, human trafficking, narcotics, 
corruption, disarmament and non-proliferation, and anti-money laundering. Table 3.2 summarises 
the initiatives to be undertaken under each of these headings. 
 
This review of the series of EU-ASEAN ministerial summits has revealed the intensity of the 
political and security dialogue built up over a 40 year period. Perhaps reflecting both a European 
as well as Asian cultural characteristic, this ongoing process was necessary in order to build mutual 
confidence, respect and establish a firm basis for cooperation and policy innovation. In that sense, 
this region to region process was fundamental to the decision to undertake a joint political and 
security initiative in Aceh. That this collaboration remains unique also underlines the difficulties 
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that such joint action involve. Despite almost universal acclaim of the success of the AMM it has 
failed to be a springboard to further EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation. 
 
Table 3.2 PoA: Cooperation in Traditional and Non-traditional Security Areas 
 
Counter-Terrorism The EU and ASEAN agreed to implement the ASEAN-EU Joint 
Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and to enhance 
regional and multilateral counter-terrorism measures through the 
exchange of experiences and information sharing, capacity 
building, and greater cooperation between EU and ASEAN 
governmental agencies and institutions. The PoA also promotes 
the implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter 
Terrorism and international treaties and conventions on terrorism 
including UN Security Resolutions on terrorism, the UN Global 
Counter Terrorism Strategy, and the conclusion of the UN 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism 
Transnational 
Organised Crime 
The PoA will enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation in implementing 
the protocols of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime and ASEAN measures in combating 
transnational organised crime. The EU and ASEAN also agreed 
to hold an ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational 
Crime (SOMTC) with EU consultation and workshops, as well as 
an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime 
(AMMTC) with EU Consultation in order to exchange 
information and review the progress of EU-ASEAN cooperation 
on the matter. In addition, the PoA was intended to promote 
cooperation between EU and ASEAN law enforcement agencies 
in tackling transnational organised crime. 
 
Human Trafficking The PoA will enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation in addressing 
human trafficking problems by promoting the ASEAN 
Declaration against Trafficking in Persons particularly Women 
and Children, the recommendations of SOMTC Work 
Programme on Trafficking in Persons, the ASEAN Plan of 
Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters, and the 
protocols of the Palermo Convention. 
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Narcotics The PoA will support ASEAN in achieving the goals of a Drug 
Free ASEAN 2015 through enhanced law enforcement 
cooperation and information exchange between the EU and 
ASEAN. It will also encourage regular dialogues, personnel 
exchange programmes, information exchange, and activities to 
combat the trafficking and manufacturing of narcotics. 
Corruption The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their cooperation in 
fighting corruption and promoting joint activities in this area. 
Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation 
The PoA was intended to promote EU-ASEAN cooperation in 
the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It is 
hoped to promote the implementation of existing disarmament 
and non-proliferation treaties, conventions, and instruments such 
as UN Security Council Resolutions. It will also encourage EU-
ASEAN consultation on disarmament and non-proliferation 
problems and international cooperation. Under the framework of 
the agreement, the EU and ASEAN will continue to support 
international institutions that enforce the obligation of these 
treaties. The POA will assist ASEAN countries in establishing 
effective national export control systems through EU export 
control programmes. The EU and ASEAN will cooperate to 
control the illegal trade of small arms by adopting the ARF 
Statement on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The PoA also 
promotes EU-ASEAN cooperation on implementing the 
initiatives of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Uses, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mine 
and on their Destruction.  
 
Money Laundering The PoA will enhance ASEAN capacities in monitoring and 
detecting money laundering and terrorist-financing activities in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Financial Action 









(ii) EU Policies toward ASEAN (1994 – 2008)  
 
This Chapter has already provided a comprehensive historical description of the formal EU-
ASEAN meetings. Drawing on this context, this section (ii) considers two complementary EU 
initiatives towards ASEAN: the Commission’s “New Asia Strategy” and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF). The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is not considered as it has limited if any impact 
on the core research question of this thesis. The implications for future of EU-ASEAN political 
and security relations are then explored and the utility of the thesis’s theoretical approach in 
explaining EU-ASEAN political and security relations evaluated.  
 
 
The “New Asia Strategy” 
i) The 1994 Communication from the Commission: Towards a New Asia Strategy 
In 1994, the Commission issued a Communication to the Council entitled “Towards a New Asia 
Strategy”. The Commission stressed that:  
the main thrust of the present and future policy in Asia is related to economic matters. 
However, this major component of the Union policy has to be presented in the framework 
of the political and security balance of power in the region (European Commission, 1994, 
p.2).  
 
The communication outlined general EU objectives and policy priorities in order to 
enhance Europe’s economic and political presence in Asia. In the area of political and security 
relations, the communication explored a “new political approach towards Asia" and outlined those 
political and security issues that EU-Asia cooperation should focus on.  
 
The Commission stated the general objectives of the new Asia strategy as follows: 
- strengthening the EU’s economic presence in Asia; 




- promoting economic development in less developed countries in the region; and 
- promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Asia. 
 
With regard to its political and security objectives, the Communication outlined policy 
priorities including: 
- enhancing the EU’s bilateral relations with countries and regions in Asia; 
- improving the EU’s profile in Asia; 
- encouraging regional and sub-regional cooperation in Asia in order to promote peace and 
security in the region; 
- enhancing the EU’s relations with regional organisations in Asia; 
- encouraging Asia’s involvement in managing international affairs especially in the area of 
maintaining peace and security; and,  
- encouraging Asia’s participation in international organisations and enhancing EU-Asia 
cooperation in multinational fora.  
 
The communication outlined the “new political approach towards Asia”. It identified the 
basic objective of EU policies towards Asia as increasing the EU's profile and presence in Asia 
and  demonstrating to Asian countries  the EU’s commitment “to mak[ing] a positive contribution 
to the peaceful development and stability in the region” (p.9). The communication suggested that 
the EU should establish a political dialogue with Asian countries that are ready to contribute to the 
maintenance of peace and stability in the region. It also suggested that the political dialogue should 
focus on specific topics with follow-up mechanisms. In addition, the communication suggested 
that the EU-Asia political dialogue should be developed at an expert level with the objective of 
deepening the political dialogue and making it more operational. Regarding the ARF, the 
communication stated that the EU should continue its involvement in the process and contribute 




The communication identified three areas in which the EU should focus its political 
dialogue with Asia – arms control including non-proliferation, human rights, and drugs. In the area 
of arms control and non-proliferation, the Communication argued that the EU should focus on the 
following initiatives: 
- encouraging Asian countries to adopt the UN Conventional Arms Register; 
- promoting the prohibition of the use of certain types of conventional weapons that create 
excessive injuries such as anti-personnel landmines; 
- promoting the extension of the NPT; 
- strengthening the IAEA’s Safeguards System; 
- controlling the export of sensitive goods and technologies including chemical, ballistic, 
biological, and nuclear; 
- promoting the adoption of 1993 Convention Prohibiting Chemical Weapons as well as 
strengthening the terms of the 1972 Convention Prohibiting Chemical Weapons; and, 
- promoting a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
 
In the area of human rights, the communication stated that the EU should promote the 
adoption and the full implementation of international standards and instruments on human rights 
as guided by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 UN World Conference 
on Human Rights. The EU should apply, according to the Communication, the concept of the 
interrelationship between human rights, democracy and development in its dialogue with Asia. In 
addition, the EU should encourage legislative and institutional reform including technical training, 
providing scholarships, visits, and seminars on this issue. 
 
The communication stated that “drug trafficking, drug production and drug consumption 
also presents a problem to Asian regions and has significant repercussions on the European 
economies and EU security and stability” (p.11). Regarding this issue, the political dialogue 
between the EU and Asia should focus on improving the capacity and willingness of Asian 
countries to combat drugs and should encourage Asian countries to ratify the three UN 




ii) The 1996 Communication from the Commission: Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN 
Relations 
The 1996 Communication from the Commission entitled “Creating a New Dynamic in EU-
ASEAN Relations” updated the EU strategy for dealing specifically with its ASEAN relationship 
(the previous EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement having been signed in 1980). The revised 
strategy was a response to the Karlsruhe Ministerial Meeting in 1994 which called for “a 
strengthening of [EU-ASEAN] ties in a spirit of greater equality and partnership” (p.4) and to 
ASEAN’s debate on the “Future Direction of EU-ASEAN relations”. The Communication was 
drafted on the basis of the 1994 “Towards New Asia Strategy” (discussed above) and the 
recommendations made by the informal Eminent Persons’ Group Report released in June 1996. 
The Commission stated that “launching a new dynamic in [EU] relations with ASEAN can make 
a considerable contribution to the strengthening of the European Union in Asia” (p.4). It recognised 
that EU-ASEAN relations had evolved from the donor-recipient relationship which it had been 
when the EU and ASEAN concluded their first Cooperation Agreement in 1980, to one that 
demonstrated “balanced trade, the development of investment and greater economic cooperation” 
(p.8). However, the negotiation process towards a new agreement was hampered by the human 
rights situation in East Timor.  
 
The 1996 Communication had four objectives: 
- stimulate political dialogue; 
- promote the liberalisation of regional market and strengthen the links between two regions 
through various programmes; 
- facilitate and liberalise trade and investment; and, 
- adjust cooperation framework in economic, development, environment, cultural, crime 




The Communication stated that the EU should focus its political dialogue with Asia 
through ASEAN because ASEAN plays a central role in promoting peace and stability in the Asia-
Pacific region. The Communication outlined several initiatives that would strengthen and deepen 
the EU-ASEAN political dialogue. Firstly, the EU should encourage an annual meeting between 
the relevant directors of the Commission, EU Member States, and ASEAN Member States to 
discuss specific issues such as maritime security, denuclearisation in Southeast Asia, drugs, 
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Secondly, the EU-ASEAN political dialogue should 
discuss ways of coordinating a common position and enhanced cooperation between the EU and 
ASEAN on international issues of mutual interest such as the reform of the UN, disarmament and 
non-proliferation, and peacekeeping operations. Thirdly, the EU should incorporate human rights 
and the consolidation of democracy in its political dialogue with ASEAN. The EU should adopt 
programmes that promote respect for human rights and democracy. Fourthly, the EU should 
enhance parliamentary links between the EU and ASEAN members to establish “coordinated 
views concerning overall ASEAN-EU political issues” (p.12) and promote inter-societal 
exchanges and people-to-people contacts. Finally, the Communication stressed the importance of 
establishing informal and personal relations at EU-ASEAN meetings. 
  
On the issue of crime prevention, including the fight against organised crime and related 
money-laundering activities, the Communication suggested that the issue should be dealt with 
through a stronger coordinated bilateral cooperation framework and multilateral bodies. It also 
suggested that specific collaboration methods should be established with individual ASEAN 
members when demanded. Regarding drugs, drug trafficking was the focus of the Communication 
and it suggested that the EU should enhance cooperation between customs administration in both 
regions. The Communication also stressed the need to fight against illegal immigration including 
human trafficking. 
 
Two options were proposed for launching a new dynamic in EU-ASEAN relations – a 
formal agreement and an active partnership. The idea was to “choose a model corresponding to the 
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specific situation of the country or countries concerned” (p.23). The proposed options “mark[ed] 
the transition to a new era in [EU-ASEAN] relations and [the need] to embark together on a new 
dynamic entailing concrete action” (p.24).  
 
The first option proposed the completion of the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement to 
incorporate the objectives of the Communication. The goal of the agreement was “to complete 
[EU-ASEAN] ties in all those aspects for which the present agreement does not provide the 
necessary framework” (p.25). However, this option was constrained by the immature state of 
ASEAN integration and lack of unity between members at the time 
 
The second option proposed the establishment of an active partnership that entailed “the 
adoption of a common declaration of Ministers, or even Head of State, defining the general 
objectives for which they charge a group of high-level experts to produce a draft programme of 
concrete actions” (p.27) within the existing framework of the Cooperation Agreement. These 
objectives included the original objectives set out in the Cooperation Agreement as well as new 
objectives identified at the ministerial level. This option was seen to offer greater flexibility for 
ASEAN countries as an individual country could choose to accept certain initiatives or not. It also 
provided immediate responses to issues that required urgent action. The Communication also 
suggested that bilateral agreements with individual ASEAN countries were another option if the 
level of progress between ASEAN countries is varied.  
 
The Commission recommended the second option to enhance EU-ASEAN relations and 
indicated that the first step towards implementing this would be to adopt the declaration of the next 
AEMM in 1997. The declaration would contain initiatives that would strengthen EU-ASEAN 
relations and an Action Plan for achieving these initiatives. The Commission also suggested that 
the EU should enhance its relationship with ASEAN within the framework of ASEM in order to 





iii) The 2001 Communication from the Commission - “Europe and Asia: A Strategic 
Framework for Enhanced Partnership”  
The Commission released the Communication entitled “Europe and Asia: a Strategic Framework 
for Enhanced Partnership” in July 2001. The Communication sought,  
to review and update [EU] approach to Asia, to provide a new strategic 
framework which will address the changes since 1994, and to establish a 
coherent, comprehensive and balanced strategic approach for [EU] relations 
with Asia in the coming decade. (p.5)  
 
The core objective of the Strategic Framework was “strengthening the EU’s political and 
economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing 
global weight of an enlarged EU” (p.3). The Strategic Framework covered South Asia, Southeast 
Asia, Northeast Asia, and Australasia.  
 
The Strategic Framework included the following goals:  
- contribute to peace and security in the region and the world; 
- continue to strengthen trade and investment between the EU and Asia; 
- promote development and reduce poverty in developing countries in the region; 
- contribute to the adoption of democracy, good governance and the rule of law; 
- create a partnership with Asian countries in various international fora to address the 
opportunities and challenges created by globalization and to enhance EU-Asia cooperation 
in dealing with environment and security issues; and, 
-  enhance the awareness of the EU in Asia. 
 
In order to contribute to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, the Strategic 
Framework stated that the EU should strengthen its engagement on regional and global security 
issues; strengthen its dialogue and cooperation on conflict prevention; and intensify cooperation 
on justice and home affairs issues. First, the EU should enhance its engagement with Asia on old 
and new security issues through bilateral, regional, multilateral frameworks. In particular, the 
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Union should play a more active role in the ARF and ASEM process. Secondly, the EU should 
support conflict prevention initiatives and promote the sharing of experience between the EU and 
Asia on long-term confidence-building measures. This action would be guided by the 
Communication on conflict prevention focusing on “preventive action in a framework of 
international cooperation and coordination, and mobilizing all Community instruments more 
effectively” (p.16). Thirdly, the EU should enhance its dialogue and cooperation with Asia in the 
area of justice and home affairs. The focus would be on immigration issues and transnational crime 
including drugs and human trafficking, arms control, money laundering, the exploitation of 
migrants, and combating corruption.  
 
Regarding the objective of contributing to democracy, good governance, the rule of law, 
and respect for human rights, the Strategic Framework stated that the EU should strengthen its 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral dialogue with Asia in promoting the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights. The Union should also encourage Asian countries to adopt 
international human rights instruments. Second, the EU should encourage the strengthening of 
civil society in Asia and promote a dialogue between civil societies in the two regions. Thirdly, 
the EU should also mainstream human rights and good governance issues in its cooperation with 
Asia. These issues should be kept in mind when the thesis turns to the AMM case study. 
 
On the issue of building a global partnership with Asian countries, the Strategic Framework 
outlined areas in which the EU should strengthen EU-Asia cooperation. These included enhanced 
cooperation in the UN and with its related activities; enhanced cooperation with Asian partners in 
the WTO; working with Asian partners in dealing with environmental challenges; enhanced EU-
Asia cooperation and dialogue to handle global challenges; and intensified cooperation in the areas 
of science and technology.  
 
According to the Framework, the EU should strengthen its cooperation with its Asian 
partners in the UN in the following areas:  
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- through the early ratification of international instruments including the CTBT, the 
conventions on small arms and anti-personnel land-mines, and future anti-corruption 
instrument; 
- The promotion non-proliferation and the control of WMD; 
- Reforming the UN system including the Security Council; 
- Strengthening UN peacekeeping initiatives by promoting the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Brahimi Report; and, 
- Encouraging full payment by all UN members to improve the functioning of the UN 
system. 
 
Regarding global challenges, the Framework claimed that the EU should enhance its 
dialogue and cooperation with Asia in dealing with transnational crime, terrorism, corruption, 
xenophobia, racism, and epidemic diseases. In addition, the EU should help developing countries 
to take advantage of global opportunities. 
 
The last objective of the Strategic Framework concerned increasing the awareness of the 
EU in Asia. To achieve this objective, the EU should strengthen and expand its delegation network 
across Asia as well as enhance coordination and information efforts. The Commission proposed 
to open new delegations in Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, and Nepal. Secondly, 
Framework stated that the EU should enhance educational, scientific and cultural exchanges with 
Asia including promoting cooperation and networking between higher education institutions, 
research and student exchanges between Europe and Asia. Finally, the EU should promote the 
development of civil society partnerships between the two regions (such as parliamentarians and 
NGOs) and enhance intellectual cooperation between Europe and Asia. 
 
The Strategic Framework also outlined action plans for individual sub-regions in Asia-
Pacific: South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Australasia. This section will only discuss 
the action plan pertaining to Southeast Asia. The Strategic Framework stated that “ASEAN and 
the ASEAN Regional Forum will continue to be the major focus of [EU] political and security 
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dialogue with Southeast Asia, and it will be important for the EU to play a pro-active role in the 
ARF” (author’s emphasis, p.21). The main focus of the EU's dialogue and cooperation with 
ASEAN, according to the Framework, should be on global security issues including drugs and 
transnational crime; conflict prevention within the region; civil society involvement in promoting 
good governance, transparency, and the rule of law; and promoting human rights issues. The 
Strategic Framework stressed that “the further strengthening of [EU] long-standing partnership 
with ASEAN will be a key priority in the coming years” (p.22), through “a strengthened and 
comprehensive dialogue with ASEAN as a whole, and in the enhancement of [EU] bilateral 
relations with key ASEAN partners” (p.22). The EU should also assist ASEAN with its regional 
integration because of mutual solidarity within the organization. The Strategic Framework stressed 
the importance of developments in Indonesia and indicated that the EU would ensure the full 
implementation of strategy outlined in the Communication on Indonesia. A direct involvement in 
peace building in Indonesia was this foreshadowed soon after the turn of the new millennium and 
prior to both the 2004 enlargement and the implementation of the first E/CSDP mission.  
 
Regarding regional fora, the focus of the Strategic Framework was the ASEM process, 
raising for some the question of inconsistency vis-à-vis the “major focus” on ASEAN by the EU. 
The document stated, “the ASEM process has offered an excellent example of inter-regional 
cooperation, and we will continue to work to ensure that it can make progress in each of its three 
pillars” (p.25). The Strategic Framework suggested that the EU should use ASEM to promote 
increased understanding and cooperation as well as objectives outlined in the Asia-Europe 
Cooperation Framework. Secondly, the EU should encourage civil society involvement in the 
ASEM process. Thirdly, the EU should promote enlargement of ASEM to include countries from 
sub-regions such as Australia and New Zealand to enhance the value of ASEM. In addition, the 
EU should follow developments in other regional fora such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 




To ensure the effectiveness of the Strategic Framework, the Communication suggested that 
the Commission should incorporate the objectives and action points of the Strategic Framework 
into all aspects of its relations with Asia to achieve policy coherence. It was suggested that the 
progress of the Strategic Framework should be reviewed every five or six years to evaluate 
achievements.  
 
iv)  The 2003 Communication: “A New Partnership with Southeast Asia”  
Two years later, the Commission issued a Communication entitled “A New Partnership with 
Southeast Asia” with the objective of “revitalising the EU’s relations with ASEAN and the 
countries of Southeast Asia” (p.3). The Communication provided three reasons for the need to 
enhance EU-ASEAN relations:  economic advantages, the broadened EU policy agenda, and the 
sharing of values between Europe and Asia. It also identified the strategic priorities of the new EU 
strategy towards ASEAN and countries in Southeast Asia as follows: 
- promoting regional stability and combat terrorism; 
- promoting human rights, democracy, and good governance; 
- mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs issues; 
- promoting regional trade and investment relations; 
- promoting development in less prosperous countries in the region; and, 
- enhancing dialogue and cooperation in specific policy areas. 
 
In order to promote regional stability and counter-terrorism, the Communication stated that 
“the EU must continue to support the stability and territorial integrity of all countries in the region” 
(p.12). EU-ASEAN cooperation and dialogue should focus on contributing to conflict prevention, 
peace and stability, as well as regional counter terrorism initiatives. 
 
To reach this objective, the Communication proposed that the EU should continue to 
conduct its political dialogue with Southeast Asian countries in multilateral for a, however, 
bilateral dialogue with individual countries was also seen as applicable if necessary. The 
Communication stated that “a strong ASEAN is probably the best guarantee for peace and stability 
160 
 
in the region” (p.12) and the EU should out of necessity support ASEAN’s integration process by 
sharing its own experience as well as providing the required technical assistance to ASEAN 
institutions. By conducting a political dialogue through ASEAN, regionalism in the region could 
be stimulated. Regarding the EU’s relations with ASEAN the Communication claimed that, 
“political dialogue should, to the extent possible, concentrate on region to region subjects of 
interest and concern, leaving global issues to ASEM” (p.13), an interesting if difficult dichotomy 
to maintain in practice. The Communication noted that the challenges for the ASEM process would 
be enlargement of both parties in 2004 and the Myanmar issue. Regarding the ARF process, the 
EU should enhance, according to the Communication, its role by co-chairing Intersessional Group 
meetings and increasing its military presence.  
 
In the fight against terrorism, the EU is committed to fully supporting the ASEAN countries 
with the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and related UN conventions. 
The objective of the EU, as outlined by the Communication, was to deal with the root causes of 
terrorism by implementing a “comprehensive strategy” that combined political, economic, social, 
and financial governance aspects. Consequently, counter-terrorism initiatives should be 
incorporated into EU development strategy with its ASEAN partners. The EU should also ensure 
that these countries respect human rights in combating terrorism.  
 
The Communication reiterated the EU’s non-negotiable conditionality that “the promotion 
of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms constitute 
core objectives in external relations of the European Union and its development co-operation with 
third countries” (p.14). In order to promote consistency in human rights and democratic principles, 
the Communication stated that an “essential clause” stipulating the respect for fundamental human 
rights and democratic principles according to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights be 
included in all future bilateral agreements with ASEAN countries. The EU should also incorporate 
this condition into its political and development dialogue with ASEAN countries. Secondly, the 
EU may conclude a bilateral dialogue specifically on human rights with individual ASEAN 
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countries in order to promote cooperation regarding human rights issues (such as the ratification 
and implementation of human rights instruments or the abolition of death penalty) in these 
countries and in multinational fora such as the UN. Third, the bilateral dialogue should also 
support:  
the functioning of democratic structures (including through giving support to electoral 
processes), building the capacity of institutions, improving the rule of law and governance, 
strengthening civil society, facilitating the accession to the Rome statute of the 
International Criminal Court, and addressing the issues of trafficking in human beings, 
sexual exploitation of children and women, and indigenous people’s rights (p.15).  
 
The Communication stressed that good governance (including the strengthening of 
institutional and regulatory framework and anti-corruption) should be integrated into EU policy 
dialogue and development cooperation with ASEAN countries by specific cooperation 
programmes and by mainstreaming the promotion of good governance in EU  regional and bilateral 
dialogue with ASEAN and its members.  
 
Regarding the objective of mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs issues, it was stated 
that the EU should integrate these issues into its regional and bilateral dialogues with ASEAN and 
its members. The issues included migration and asylum, human trafficking, money laundering, 
piracy and counterfeiting, organised crime, drugs, and maritime security. The Communication also 
proposed to intensify dialogue and cooperation in specific sectors with ASEAN. The menu 
included economic and trade, Justice and Home Affairs, environment, science and technology, 
energy, transport, and information society. The Communication also provided a list of cooperation 
activities for each sector. The EU and ASEAN could choose to cooperate at regional or bilateral 
level in each sector at an agreed pace. The dialogue was to be developed through four stages – 
exchange of information on legislation and policy, regulatory cooperation and approximation, 





The Common Position of the EU regarding the Myanmar issue had been preventing the 
renegotiation of the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement and therefore the EU and ASEAN 
had to continue to cooperate under the existing framework and through the declarations adopted 
at the EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meetings. For this reason, the Communication proposed to launch 
consultations on new bilateral agreements with interested ASEAN countries in order to 
reinvigorate EU-ASEAN relations. The new bilateral agreements would “provide the needed 
reference frameworks, strengthen the link between policy dialogue and co-operation and raise the 
prospects of timely and effective delivery of development cooperation activities in each of the 
countries concerned” (p.23). The Communication also launched a new visibility strategy in 
Southeast Asia aimed at increasing mutual awareness between Europe and Southeast Asia. The 
strategy aimed to promote the awareness of the EU and its role in the world as well as the new 
EU-ASEAN relations. To achieve this objective, the Commission was to launch a communication 
initiative aimed at promoting and improving the perception of the EU and EU-ASEAN relations 




The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
The ARF was created to preserve peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region with ASEAN as 
the primary driving force. ASEAN leaders, during the 4th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in 
1992, decided to intensify ASEAN’s external dialogues in political and security matters, which led 
to the ARF’s establishment in 1993. The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 
25 July 1994 and at it, ASEAN foreign ministers, ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners, ASEAN’s 
Consultative Partners, and ASEAN’s Observers discussed political and security issues in the Asia-
Pacific region. The official ARF perspective “had enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of 
common interest and concern” (Chairman’s Statement of the First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, 1994, p.1). The main objective of the ARF has been to promote confidence building and 
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preventive diplomacy in the region. The ministers agreed to adopt the principles of the TAC as a 
code of conduct in guiding the ARF process to promote confidence-building, preventive 
diplomacy, and political and security cooperation.  
 
In 1994 the ARF had 18 participants including ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners 
(Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the USA), ASEAN’s 
Consultative Partners (China and Russia), and ASEAN’s Observers (Laos, Papua New Guinea, and 
Vietnam). Throughout the following 14-year period, the ARF has increased in both size and 
agenda. The following section explores the various ARF themes and activities, as well as EU-
ASEAN political and security cooperation within the ARF framework. 
 
ARF Meetings and Issues 
Since the 1st ARF Meeting the issues brought to the discussion table have grown quite considerably 
in both number and dimension. The main objective of the ARF process is to promote peace and 
security in the Asia-Pacific and to foster cooperation in the political and security area among ARF 
participants. Since 1994, there have been fifteen ARF meetings held in various ASEAN capital 
cities where ministers discussed issues related to political and security matters both within the 
Asia-Pacific region and globally.  This section explores the issues that were discussed over the 
1994-2008 period as well as the achievements of the forum within the context of the direct 
relevance to the EU and its Member States. The issues are grouped into eleven categories – i) 
regional security issues, ii) international security issues, iii) non-proliferation and disarmament, 
iv) maritime security, v) terrorism, vi) transnational crime, vii) disaster relief, Viii) avian influenza, 
ix) financial crisis, x) economic security and xi) energy security. Just the first of these are 
specifically relevant to this thesis and are discussed in detail in the following section. 
 
Regional Security Issues 
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 The discussion of regional security issues is perhaps the most important element of the ARF 
process because it represents the core objective of the Forum, that is, to promote peace and security 
in the region. By bringing these issues to the meetings, the participants are able to discuss problems 
and seek solutions together without the use of force. Throughout the years, many regional security 
issues have been discussed at ARF meetings including the political situation of the countries in the 
region, bilateral disputes between countries in the region, the development of security cooperation 
within ASEAN, and the relations between major powers and its impact on security in the region. 
The EU has become increasingly engaged in this broad agenda.  
 
Ever since the first meeting the Korean Peninsula issue has been one of the most frequent major 
concerns for ARF participants. The issue has “a direct bearing on peace and security in the Asia-
Pacific” because it involves the dispute between the DPRK (Democratic People’s republic of 
Korea)  and the ROK (Republic of Korea), and at the same time, poses a nuclear threat within the 
region. The ARF has supported the US-DPRK negotiations on denuclearization and urged the 
DPRK to fully implement the Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994. The ARF participants have 
asserted their support for the continuation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement until a new peace 
agreement is concluded. The Forum noted the actions of the DPRK that could undermine security 
in region such as the payload launch and other missile-related activities in 1998, the naval clash 
in the Yellow Sea and West Sea, the test firing of missiles in 2006.  
 
This context underwent modification when the DPRK joined the ARF in 2000, 
participating for the first time at the 7th ARF Meeting held in Bangkok. During this meeting, the 
participants welcomed the positive developments on the Korean Peninsula including the historic 
Summit between the DPRK and the ROK and the signing of the June 15 North-South Joint 
Declaration. The ministers agreed that confidence-building measures must be promoted to prevent 
further tensions between the two parties. During the 10th ARF Meeting in 2003, the ARF 
participants urged the DPRK to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The ministers also 
welcomed the talks between China, the DPRK, and the USA that were held in Beijing in April 
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2003. They noted the outcome of the Six Party Talks held in Beijing in 2004 and hoped that this 
would lead to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. During the 13th ARF Meeting in 2006, 
the ARF participants expressed their support for the Joint Statement on the Denuclearisation of the 
Korean Peninsula adopted at the Six-Party Talks in September 2005. In 2006, the ARF participants 
urged the DPRK to stop its missile-testing programme after test firing in July 2006. The ministers 
noted the report of the IAEA on the shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear plant in 2007 and welcomed 
the decision at that time of the DPRK to disclose all nuclear related information and to shut down 
all of its nuclear facilities. While not directly party to these security issues, the EU has maintained 
a watchful interest from a global and regional security perspective.  
 
Cambodia has also featured prominently on the ARF agenda since first appearing at the 2nd 
ARF Meeting in 1995. The ARF participants have followed the developments in Cambodia with 
concern while expressing support for the Cambodian government and ASEAN’s initiatives in 
attaining peace, national stability, and economic recovery in the country. During the 5th ARF 
Meeting in 1998, the ministers declared their full support for the ASEAN and the “Friends of 
Cambodia” group in promoting peace and political stability in the country. They welcomed the 
national election on 26 July 1998 and noted the efforts of the UN monitoring team. The ARF 
participants were finally able to welcome Cambodia as a new participant of the ARF during the 
6th ARF Meeting in 1999. 
 
The overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, and 
the ASEAN countries of Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam, has been another major concern for 
ASEAN and the ARF participants, with multilateral implications for the EU and its Member States. 
ARF participants first discussed the situation in the South China Sea in 1995 and the issue has 
remained on the ARF agenda ever since. The ministers urged the parties concerned to exercise 
self-restraint and adhere to ASEAN’s 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea and the relevant 
international law and conventions, in particular, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. The importance of the freedom of navigation in the area was underlined. During the 
10th ARF Meeting in 2003, the ARF participants welcomed the conclusion of the Declaration on 
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Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) by China and ASEAN, as well as 
expressed their support for the full implementation of the declaration. These initiatives sought to 
create favourable conditions for the parties concerned to cooperate and settle their dispute  
 
The political and human rights situation in Myanmar have also been a subject of concern 
for ARF participants. Although Myanmar joined the ARF in 1996, the situation in the country was 
only first discussed during the 7th ARF Meeting in 2000; the ARF have consistently called for 
national reconciliation, a transition to democracy, and the respect for human rights. They supported 
the efforts of ASEAN, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar, and the Special 
Envoy of the UN Secretary General in trying to promote the national reconciliation process and 
improve the human rights situation in Myanmar. The ARF participants called for the release of all 
political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi and the involvement of every group in the society 
in the National Convention.  During the 14th ARF Meeting, the ministers exchanged views on the 
Roadmap to Democracy and hoped that the completion of the National Convention process would 
lead to the next stages of the Roadmap. The ministers noted the adoption of the State Constitution 
of 2008 by referendum and called on Myanmar to work towards the holding of general elections 
in 2010. During the 15th ARF Meeting in 2008, participants reiterated their commitment to 
assisting Myanmar as part of the ASEAN Community building process and urged the government 
of Myanmar to give its full cooperation to the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor Ibrahim 
Gambari, and Tomas Ojea Quintana, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar.  
 
The political and security situation in Indonesia was another issue discussed at several ARF 
Meetings in the early 2000s. During the 7th ARF meeting, the ministers stressed that “a united 
democratic and economically prosperous Indonesia was fundamental to the maintenance of 
regional security” (Chairman’s Statement, the 7th ARF Meeting, 2000, p.3). Importantly, they 
expressed their support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity. During the 10th ARF Meeting in 2003, 
the ministers held a discussion on the situation in Aceh and expressed their support for the 
Indonesian government’s efforts in trying to resolve the conflict through a dialogue process  - 
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something that was to eventually see the EU become directly involved. They welcomed the 
assistance from Thailand and the Philippines in providing monitoring teams to Indonesia as well 
as expressed their commitment to preventing arms smuggling into the hands of the separatists in 
Aceh. Thus the seeds for the subsequent EU-ASEAN AMM were sown. 
 
Although East Timor (Timor Leste) joined the ARF in 2005, the developments in the newly 
independent country have been on the agenda of the ARF since the start of the millennium. During 
the 7th ARF Meeting discussions were held on the progress of East Timor’s transition to 
independence. The cooperation between Indonesia and the UNTAET was reviewed and the death 
of a UN Peacekeeper “deplored”. The ministers expressed their commitment to promoting peace 
and stability as well as supporting the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and nation building in East 
Timor. They also called on the international community to assist the country in these matters. 
During the 2001 ARF meeting, the ministers expressed their support for the efforts in handling the 
problem of East Timorese refugees and for the activities of the United Nations Missions in East 
Timor (UNMISET). During the 13th ARF Meeting five years later, the ministers discussed the 
recent deployment of security forces from Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal to East 
Timor. They also exchanged views on the appointment of the new prime minister and the cabinet 
as well as the results of the general elections. Finally, in 2008, the ministers expressed their support 
for the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship and noted the final report 
produced by the commission. 
 
The ARF participants have followed the situation in South Asia with concern since the 7th 
ARF Meeting, with the dispute between India and Pakistan at the centre of discussions. During the 
9th ARF Meeting in 2002, the ministers called for the immediate end to terrorist activities in the 
region and urged Pakistan to implement counter-terrorism initiatives. In 2004, Pakistan was 
admitted as the 24th participant of the ARF. During the 2006 Meeting the ministers condemned the 
11 July 2006 terrorist attack in Mumbai. The second issue of concern in the sub-region was the 
conflict between Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The ARF participants 
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expressed their support for the efforts of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in finding a 
peaceful resolution satisfactory to both sides. During the 2003 ARF Meeting, the ministers 
exchanged views on the peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE hosted by 
Thailand and on the outcome of the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri 
Lanka held earlier that year. Sri Lanka became 27th ARF participant in 2007.  
 
Since 2000, the political and security situation in the ACP countries of the South Pacific 
also began to feature on ARF agenda. The ministers have specifically discussed the Solomon 
Islands, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea, as well as have exchanged views on the security challenges 
faced by the Pacific Island countries in general and agreed that the international community has 
an important role in assisting these countries in promoting political stability and socio-economic 
development. During the 7th ARF Meeting, a focus was on the new government of the Solomon 
Islands efforts in establishing a cease-fire between the conflicting parties in order to restore law 
and order in the country. They also noted the efforts of the International Peace Monitoring Team 
in the country. At the Meeting, the ministers also exchanged views on the release of hostages in 
Fiji and called for the early return to democratic government. Two years later at the 9th ARF, the 
ministers welcomed the restoration of a democratic government following the previous year’s 
elections. The 2002 Meeting also considered the situation in Papua New Guinea: the ARF ministers 
expressed their support for the conclusion of the Bougainville Peace Agreement of 31 August 2001 
and the efforts to establish peace in Bougainville by the government of Papua New Guinea. 
Importantly, these developments all occurred against the backdrop of the launch of the EU’s 
Cotonou Agreement for the Pacific islands.  
 
The political situation in Thailand that resulted from the coup d’etat on 19 September 2006 
created concerns among ARF participants. During the 14th ARF Meeting in 2007, the Thai Foreign 
Minister gave a briefing on the political developments in Thailand including the drafting process 
of the new constitution and the referendum on the constitution scheduled for 19 August 2007. The 
ARF participants expressed their support for the general election scheduled for December 2007. 
During the 15th ARF Meeting in 2008, the ministers held a discussion on the dispute between 
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Thailand and Cambodia regarding the Temple of Preah Vihear. They urged both parties to exercise 
restraint and resolve the issue by peaceful means.  
 
Since the beginning of the ARF process, ASEAN’s TAC has represented a key regional 
instrument for strengthening security, cooperation and friendship within Southeast Asia and 
between ASEAN and ARF participants. At the very first ARF Meeting, the participants agreed to 
“endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument 
for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation” 
(Chairman’s Statement, 1st ARF Meeting, 1994, p.1.). The ARF Concept Paper stated that in order 
to promote confidence-building measures, one of the complementary approaches would be to 
apply ASEAN’s experience in the ARF process. This could be achieved by encouraging ARF 
participants to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.  
 
During the 5th ARF Meeting in 1998, the ministers noted the conclusion of the Second 
Protocol to the TAC by the High Contracting Parties at the 31st AMM in Manila on 25 July 1998. 
They also agreed to consider the request of the TAC High Contracting Parties for non-Southeast 
Asian States, including the major powers, to accede to the TAC after the Second Protocol entered 
into force. This action would “contribute positively to the evolution of a region-wide code of 
conduct” (Chairman’s Statement, the 6th ARF Meeting, 1999, p.2.). During the 8th ARF meeting in 
2001, the ARF participants noted the adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the High Council of 
TAC at the 34th AMM in July 2001. At the 11th Meeting in 2004, the accession of China, India, 
Japan and Pakistan to the TAC was welcomed. Subsequently, the ROK and Russia acceded to the 
TAC during the 10th ASEAN Summit in 2004. New Zealand, Australia and Mongolia joined in 
2005, and the accession of France, Timor Leste, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh took place in 2007. 
To complement this bilateral activity, the ARF ministers expressed their hope for the early 




The development of the ASEAN Security Community has been another important issue at 
ARF meetings since the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) at the 9th ASEAN 
Summit. During the 2004  ARF Meeting, support was expressed for the establishment of the ASC 
as part of the ASEAN Community and its Plan of Action, believing that it would “strengthen 
ASEAN as it leads the ARF towards a more secure and stable region” (Chairman’s Statement, the 
11th ARF Meeting, 2004, p.2). During the 2006 ARF Meeting, views were exchanged on progress 
made towards the implementation of the ASC Plan of Action under the Vientiane Action 
Programme and noted the first convening of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting in May of 
that year. The ARF participants reiterated “the need to intensify security cooperation to preserve 
and further advance the region towards peace, stability, democracy, and stability” (Chairman’s 
Statement, the 14th ARF Meeting, 2007, p.2).  
 
The ARF participants have stressed the importance of maintaining positive relations among 
major powers – China, Japan, Russia, the EU and the USA - in the Asia-Pacific region because of 
the direct and obvious consequences on security and stability. Consequently, the ministers have 
expressed their support for the development of a constructive strategic relationship between the 
major powers through dialogue and cooperation, including regular meetings and exchange of 
visits. They also encouraged bilateral dialogues between ARF countries and the major powers to 
promote stability and economic development in the region.  
 
In summary, these policy papers were characterized by comprehensiveness (covering a wide-range 
of policy fields), a strong EU preference for a region-to-region dialogue, the belated importance 
given to Asia as well as a strategic use of the ASEM framework. Consequently, this survey of the 
key EU and ASEAN policy initiatives during the 1994-2008 period serves to set the context against 
which the Aceh mission can be evaluated. Was it an unexpected experimental reaction to a crisis 
or was there a longer gestation period spanning several years? Whilst the statements as well as the 
policy documents that emerged from this intensification of EU-ASEAN relations may seem 
somewhat repetitive – even trite – they do serve an essential function. Individually and 
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collectively, they provide the structure upon which policy responses can be launched. Without this 
history of institution building and the sharing of political and security knowledge, the appropriate 
conducive conditions for a joint mission would have been absent. It might be concluded that a 
stereotypical “Asian” way has shaped the relationship: an evolving process that favours familiarity 
over immdediate results; mutual respect even where values my not coincide; and the need to seek 
a balance with other interests. Despite the EU’s early engagement with ASEAN the relationship 
was characteristically formal and only belated given priority in the twenty-first century.   
 
So far, the thesis has focused primarily on official documentation as well as academic theory. Both 
are necessary for contextualization, but not sufficient: empirical data relating to Thailand, the joint 




















The Thailand-EC Strategy Paper for the period 2007 – 2013 described the nature of EU-Thailand 
relations in the following terms: 
 
Over the past decade, Thailand has shown an impressive improvement of its socio-
economic development indicators. Consequently, the nature of Thai-EC relations has 
fundamentally changed from a traditional donor-recipient relationship towards a 
veritable partnership for development. In 2003, the Thai government announced that 
it will stop accepting foreign development aid while proposing to donor countries to 
redirect all their resources towards Thailand’s poorer neighbouring countries. 
 
In line with these developments, the EC no longer sees its role as a donor of 
development assistance but rather as a facilitator of knowledge sharing and a partner 
for substantive policy dialogue on key sectoral issues. The future Thai-EC partnership 
will concentrate on co-operation in a wide range of areas of mutual interests as agreed 
under the draft Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) by drawing on both 
partners’ expertise.  
(European External Action Service, Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper 
for the period 2007-2013, p.3) 
 
Thus the focus of this chapter is on this important change in the EU-Thailand relationship 
(with this early twenty-first century period) and the shifting of Thailand’s position from a 
development assistance recipient country to a new position of a more equal cooperation partner of 
the EU. The chapter investigates EU-Thailand political relations by looking at EU policies toward 
Thailand as well as examining the structure of EU-Thailand political cooperation mechanisms. 
The Chapter concludes by investigating the impact of the 2006 coup d’état in Thailand on EU-
Thailand political relations. The data used is drawn from official documents as well as interviews 





The EU-Thai political relationship can be conceptualised as multi-level governance at 
various levels involving different actors in various political arenas. Most usefully, the relationship 
can be expressed through four levels – inter-regional (EU-ASEAN), bilateral (EU-Thailand), 
between individual EU Member States and Thailand, and sub-national (NGOs and private 
organizations). Historically, the EU has been known to advocate inter-regional relations with other 
regional groups such as the ACP, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA. Consequently, as 
described already, EU-Thailand relations have occurred mainly through the EU-ASEAN 
institutional framework and ASEM dialogue process. An important impetus to the relationship 
took place when the EU issued the 2003 “New Partnership with Southeast Asia Communication” 
(as discussed previously). Thailand was among the first countries with whom the EU chose to start 
negotiations on a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. As of late 2011 a draft had been 
completed although only after a very long delay caused by political instability in Thailand. 
However, it was unable to be finalised due to several sensitive issues and political instability in 




The European Perspective on EU-Thailand Political Relations 
Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Hamburger, the former EU Ambassador and Head of the EC Delegation 
to Thailand, regarded EU-Thai relations as one that had intensified because of economic interests 
on both sides, however, after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 the relationship evolved to include 
stronger political co-operation between the two parties. He described the nature of EU-Thailand 
relations as follows: 
In general, when the EU concluded the co-operation agreement with ASEAN in 1980, at the 
time ASEAN countries were already emerging tigers so I think the co-operation was 
motivated by economic interests of the EU. The relationship with Thailand was based on 
this region-to-region agreement. The relationship was relatively friction free. Thai interest 
was mainly in the GSP system and I would say it was based on economic interests on both 
sides. No highlights of particular importance. I think the relationship moved up an edge with 
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the financial crisis because then Europeans realised that this region is very important with 
regards to globalisation and capital movement. We paid much more attention to political 
systems in ASEAN countries with regards to democratic principles and good governance. 
Not so much because we are noble around the world and we want everybody to behave 
properly but because we think that a lack of respect for these principles may put political 
stability and economic stability into question. So from 1997 on we have followed, from the 
European side, developments mainly in political field much closer. 
(Interview with Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Hamburger, EU Ambassador and Head of EC 
Delegation to Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 21 April 2006) 
 
Thomas Gnocchi, Desk Officer for Thailand and Cambodia, EC Delegation to Thailand, 
commented that the EU promoted relations with Thailand because of Thailand’s role in ASEAN 
and the formal bilateral relationship is grounded in the 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation 
Agreement. Gnocchi stressed that the focus of the EU is at the regional level – EU-ASEAN 
relations and that there are many aspects of the relationship. He stated that the commercial aspect 
has been prominent whereas a political relationship between the EU and Thailand has developed 
significantly since 1980. The EU and Thailand have discussed a range of issues where there were 
some disagreements. The Myanmar issue was a concern for the EU. The negotiation of the PCA 
reflected the maturity of the relationship as it entailed broader sectors of co-operation. Gnocchi 
also mentioned that the PCA would normally be negotiated in parallel with the FTA and  would 
enhance EU-Thai relations in many sectors.  
 
The Thai Perspective on EU-Thailand Political Relations 
From the Thai government perspective, Kulkumut Singhara Na Ayudhaya, Director of European 
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, described the EU-Thai relationship as follows: 
At present the development level of Thailand has increased. In the past, when we dealt with 
the EU, most of the time we were in the position of a recipient, that is, we asked the EU for 
assistance and support. But now, due to the level of Thailand’s economic development, the 
EU sees us as a strategic partner. Our policies are more equal, that is, the EU sees us as a 
partner instead of a country that still needs their assistance. The EU views Thailand with 
interest. The EU values its involvement with Thailand in promoting development in a third 
country or trilateral relations which helps reducing the gap between Thailand and our 
neighbours. Therefore, the EU views Thailand as a country that can help itself and they are 
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happy to co-operate with us in promoting development in our neighbouring countries that 
have lower capabilities than Thailand.23  
(Interview with Kulkumut Singhara Na Ayudhaya, Bangkok, 5 July 2006) 
 
Piyapak Sricharoen, First Secretary of the Royal Thai Embassy in Belgium which also 
functions as the Mission of Thailand to the European Union, stressed that the main focus of EU 
foreign policy towards Thailand is stability and security. He stated that other areas of EU foreign 
policy include developing trade co-operation, academic exchanges and funding, and strengthening 
co-operation in the areas that have an impact on stability and security in the region, for example 
education, minorities, and refugees. Sricharoen considered that “the EU sees Thailand as the key 
member of ASEAN because Thailand is a country that has a democratic governing system and has 
the goal of good governance. Thailand also has capabilities in economic, trade, investment and 
serves as a door to the less developed neighbours”34 (Interview with Piyapak Sricharoen, First 
Secretary, Royal Thai Embassy in Belgium, Mission of Thailand to the European Union, Brussels, 
                                                          
3“ในขณะนีด้ว้ยทีว่า่ความพฒันาของไทยเรามนักา้วสงูขึน้ไปจากทีผ่่านมาเพราะแตเ่ดมิเมือ่เวลาเราคบกบัอยี ู 
สว่นใหญเ่ราจะอยูใ่นลกัษณะเป็น recipient  คอืขอความชว่ยเหลอืสนับสนุนจากอยี ู  แตใ่นขณะนี ้
ระดบัการพฒันาทางเศรษฐกจิของไทยก็ด ี  เพราะฉะน้ันอยีจูงึมองไทยเหมอืนเป็น strategic partner 
คอืในขณะน้ันนโยบายของเรากบัอยีจูะอยูใ่นลกัษณะทีม่คีวามเทา่เทยีมกนัขึน้  คอืเขามองเราวา่เป็น partner 
แทนทีจ่ะมองเราวา่เป็นประเทศทีย่งัตอ้งขอความชว่ยเหลอืจากเขาอยู ่  อยีมูองไทยในลกัษณะใหค้วามสนใจ  











5 August 2006). The EU promotes regional integration within ASEAN especially in the area of 
economics in order to promote economic development by using the EU as a model. In the area of 
trade, the EU wants its position and the position of Thailand to be complementary in the WTO. 
The only conflict between the EU and Thailand in the area of trade concerned Thai agricultural 
products in the European market.  
 
With regards to EU-Thailand political and security relations, Sricharoen believed that the 
EU was very interested in the ARF process especially in the areas of counter-terrorism co-
operation and nuclear proliferation. The EU has been seeking co-operation on these matters where 
Thailand has provided co-operation in these areas through the UN framework and other 
international forums. Throughout the history of EU-Thai relations, the political relationship has 
improved and been positive. Overall, the EU has sought to strengthen relations with Thailand 
across nearly every aspect, if only because Thailand is in a region in which the EU has a high geo-
strategic interest.  
 
Thailand’s EU Strategy  
In general, Thailand’s foreign policy specifically towards the EU is similar to the country’s foreign 
policy towards individual EU Member States. Thailand has two main objectives when dealing with 
the EU. First and most importantly, to uitilise the EU’s expertise in the economic field to strengthen 
Thailand’s economic capability. The focus of the policy is economic co-operation including 
investment and trade promotion. In addition, Thailand needs to access better technology in various 
areas in order to improve its international competitiveness. The strategic areas where Thailand 
seeks to co-operate with the EU are competitiveness, innovation, and energy. In addition, Thailand 
seeks to coordinate its position with that of the EU on the world stage, in particular at the WTO 
(for trade) and the UN regarding security matters such as terrorism.  
 
The Thai Government has set out five objectives/goals in dealing with the EU: 
- become an important EU partner in Asia; 
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- become the centre for the EU in Asia in industry, trade, public health, technology, biology, 
SME, research, and development; 
- reduce economic and trade difficulties in the European market and increase market shares 
for Thai products; 
- promote EU-Thai relations through people-to-people initiatives, society, the media, and 
academic contacts; and, 
- strengthen co-operation with the EU in developing and reforming international 
organisations and co-ordinate common positions on world stage. 
 
An official in the Europe Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 
commented on EU-Thailand relations in the following terms: 
The EU wanted to use Thailand as its base in conducting foreign relations in the region 
because the EU set up EC Delegation in Thailand as its first delegation in Southeast Asia. 
Therefore, the EU saw the importance of Thailand as a diplomatic base. On the other hand, 
the EU is interested in the trade aspect of Thailand because Thailand is the trade centre in 
Southeast Asia. This can be seen in the action of the EU as illustrated in the Country Strategy 
Paper. The EU focuses on trade, investment, sustainable co-operation and public health. The 
EU established Thailand-EU Business Forum and investment promotion.45  
(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005) 
 
Another official from the same department commented further that: 
Before this period, EU-Thai relationship is a growing process therefore the image of the 
relationship is not as clear as bilateral relationship between Thailand and other countries...the 
image is not clear what kind of relationship it is. But the one thing that you can see is the 






มนัสะทอ้นออกมาในสิง่ทีอ่ยีทํูาใน CSP เคา้จะเนน้ในดา้น trade investment 
sustainable co-operation และ public health อยีตู ัง้ Thailand-EU Business 
Forum และ investment promotion”. 
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donor-recipient relationship. In the past, the EU provided a lot of development assistance to 
Thailand. But if you look at the CSP, it can be seen that the EU focuses more on their 
benefits…there is more focus on economics which is another form of assistance but the EU 
also benefits from it, for example, the Small Project Facilities. Many aspects have shown 
that the characteristics of the relationship are changing. There is more equality in the 
relationship. In the Small Project Facilities Thailand provided some of the budget. Thailand 
is now a donor country.5 6  
(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005) 
 
The same official also made a very interesting observation regarding EU-Thailand political 
relations: 
Since I have been assigned to the EU desk, the political aspect of EU-Thai relations has not 
been very exciting. The image of EU-Thai political relations is not very clear when 
compared to the political relationship between Thailand and EU Member States. Before 
Prime Minister Thaksin, the only Thai leader that made an official visit to the EU was Prime 
Minister Chatchai over ten years ago. Until Prime Minister Thaksin made two official visits 
to the EU in June 2002 and in October 2005. And the EU leaders have never come here. We 
will meet them in the framework of international fora like ASEM.67  





สมยักอ่นอยีใูหค้วามชว่ยเหลอืในดา้นการพฒันากบัไทยคอ่นขา้งมาก  แตห่ลงัจากด ู CSP 
จะเห็นวา่มนัจะไปเนน้ผลประโยชนข์องเขามากขึน้  
มนัจะเปลีย่นจากการพฒันาไปเนน้ในทางเศรษฐกจิ  
ซ ึง่มนัก็คอืการชว่ยเหลอือยา่งหน่ึงแตอ่ยีก็ูไดร้บัประโยชนด์ว้ยอยา่งเชน่โครงการ SPF  
หลายๆอยา่งทําใหเ้ห็นวา่รปูแบบความสมัพนัธเ์ร ิม่เปลีย่นแปลง  มคีวามเท่าเทยีมกนัมากขึน้  
ในโครงการ SPF ไทยก็ออกดว้ยสว่นหน่ึง  ซ ึง่ตอนนีไ้ทยก็เป็นประเทศผูใ้ห”้. 
7“ตัง้แตผ่มมารบัดแูลในสว่นของอยี ู 
ความสมัพนัธใ์นดา้นการเมอืงระหวา่งไทยกบัอยีมูนัก็ไม่มอีะไรหวอืหวา  
ภาพไทยอยีไูม่ชดัเจนเหมอืนกบัภาพไทยกบัประเทศสมาชกิ  กอ่นสมยันายกฯทกัษณิ  
ผูนํ้าไทยก็ไปเยอืนอยีคูร ัง้เดยีวคอืนายกฯชาตชิายเมือ่สบิกวา่ปีกอ่น  
จนมาสมยันายกฯทกัษณิซึง่ไปเยอืนสองคร ัง้แลว้คอื มถินุายน 45 ตลุาคม 48 
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(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005) 
 
The MFA official made a very interesting observation about the level of the EU-Thai 
political relationship as of 2005: “if we look at the overall picture, EU-Thai political relations have 
reached its target. I cannot think of what to improve. It is good as it is. Maybe we have to look into 
each specific area”78.  
(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005) 
 
Actors in EU-Thailand Political Relations 
An official in Europe Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand commented on the 
important actors in EU-Thailand political relations as follows: 
 
The image of Thai-EU relations is not as clear as bilateral relationship that is the relationship 
between Thailand and EU Member States. The image of the relationship is one of a 
relationship with an organisation that is run by the European Council therefore the actors 
when we deal with the EU are the Commission, the Thai Embassy in Brussels. Other actors 
are depending on the issues. Other important actors are the NGOs because the EU grants 
high level of assistance to them in the area of development, border assistance, and 
development of our neighbouring countries.”89  
                                                          
และอยีก็ูไม่เคยมาทีน่ี่  จะไปเจอกนัในกรอบของการประชมุระหวา่งประเทศมากกวา่เชน่ 
ASEM”. 
8“ถา้มองในภาพรวม  ความสมัพนัธไ์ทยกบัยโุรปมนัอิม่ตวัแลว้  มนัไม่รูจ้ะทําอะไรเพิม่เตมิ  
มนัดอียูแ่ลว้  อาจจะตอ้งเจาะเป็นรายสาขามากขึน้”. 
9“ ภ า พ ค ว า ม สั ม พั น ธ ์ไ ท ย อี ยู มั น ไ ม่ ช ั ด เ ท่ า กั บ ค ว า ม สั ม พั น ธ ์ท วิ ภ า คี   
ค ว า ม สั ม พั น ธ ์ ไ ท ย กั บ ป ร ะ เ ท ศ ส ม า ชิ ก  
ภาพมนัคอืความสมัพนัธร์ะหว่างไทยกบัองคก์รหน่ึงซ ึง่คนทีบ่รหิารก็คอืคณะกรรมการยุโรป  
เพราะฉะน้ันภาพทีอ่อกมาตวัแสดงหลกัๆคอื เวลาทีเ่ราตดิตอ่อยีคูอืตดิตอ่ผ่าน Commission 
หรอืตดิต่อสถานทูตเราที่ Brussels ตวัแสดงอืน่ๆก็ขึน้อยู่กบัหวัขอ้  อกีอนัหน่ึงคอื NGO 
เพราะอียู จ ะ ให ้ความสนับสนุน  NGO เ ยอ ะโดยให ้เ งินส นับสนุน เพื่อการพัฒนา 
เร ือ่งตามชายแดน พฒันาประเทศเพือ่นบา้น”. 
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(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005. 
 
Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Hamburger identified the actors or the “prime movers” of EU-
Thai relations as follows: 
We have an ongoing negotiation [PCA]. The chief negotiator on the Thai side is the Thai 
Ambassador in Brussels and on our side is our Geographical Director for Asia. They are the 
prime movers of the relationship. The negotiations are almost concluded. Other actors are 
the Thai Foreign Minister, our Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. They meet in regional 
meetings and bilateral meetings. There was a prime ministerial visit in Brussels in 2003 
when this bilateral agreement was proposed. It was actually a Thai initiative but we were 
interested just as much because we do not have a bilateral agreement. Our relationship up 
until now is based on this old 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement so we want this 
bilateral agreement. So we immediately reacted positively to this situation with Prime 
Minister Thaksin. Other prime movers in trade are Thai Trade Minister, on our side EU 
Commissioner on Trade. They meet quite frequently not only in the WTO context but in 
ASEAN context. So I would call the Foreign Minister and Trade Minister the prime movers. 
Besides this, you have the [EU] Member States who move the relationship. There are quite 
a number of ministerial visits from [EU] Member States to Thailand. The third axis of mover 
is on regional basis in the Counter-Terrorism Action Code of the G8 in which the EU is a 
very active participant…we sit together with Americans, Canadians, Australians, and 
Russians. It is G8 Plus. In this, Thai-EU relationship comes to the floor purely because 
Thailand has its own interest in being close and having a good relationship with the European 
Union.  
(Interview with Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Hamburger, EU Ambassador and Head of EC 
Delegation to Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 21 April 2006) 
 
 
EU Relations with Thailand 
The EU and Thailand relationship has been governed by the principles of Article 177 of Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, the EU’s ALA Regulation, and the 1980 EU-ASEAN 
Agreement. Article 177 advocates development co-operation with developing countries to 
promote sustainable economic and social development, integration of developing countries into 
the world economy, and to fight against poverty in these countries. It also stipulates that co-
operation should promote the fundamental values of the EU – democracy, rule of law, respect for 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ALA Regulation is the EU’s development co-
operation policy with Asia and Latin America with the objectives of strengthening the co-operation 
framework as well as promoting sustainable social and economic stability and democracy through 
institutional dialogue.  However, the most important co-operation agreement that governs the EU’s 
relationship with Thailand has always been the 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement (see, 
Council Regulation 1440/80 of 30 May 1980, OJ L 144, 10.06.1980). The agreement focuses on 
trade co-operation, economic co-operation, and development co-operation. In the area of trade co-
operation, the GSP is granted to Thai exports entering the EU’s market which can benefit Thai 
products enormously. However, there have been some conflicts in this area that resulted from the 
removal of GSP for some Thai exports due to their increased competitiveness which caused Thai 
producers and the Thai government to protest against the unilateral decisions made by the EU.  
 
The EU’s April 2000 “Communication on Development Policy” set out six main areas for 
EU development co-operation activities: trade and development; regional integration and co-
operation;  support to macroeconomic policies with a link to poverty reduction, in particular in 
social areas (health and education); transport; food security and rural development; and 
institutional capacity-building, good governance and the rule of law (COM (2000a) 212 final, The 
European Community’s Development Policy, 26 April 2000). Also in April 2000, the EU issued a 
working document aimed at boosting the ASEM process by strengthening co-operation in regional 
and global security, trade and investment, socioeconomic issues and regional macro-economic co-
operation, consumer dialogue between regions, and educational exchanges (COM (2000b) 241 
final, “Perspectives and priorities for the ASEM process into the new decade”, 18 April 2000). 
Then in September 2001, the European Commission issued a Communication outlining the EU’s 
strategies toward Asia with the main objective of strengthening the EU’s presence in Asia as part 
of its ambitious goal of becoming a major player in the international arena. The Communication 
also stated the EU’s intention to enhance its relations with Southeast Asia by strengthening its 
relations with ASEAN, enhancing relations with key ASEAN member states, as well as supporting 




The important boost to EU-Thai relations came when the Commission released its 
Communication on a New Partnership for South East Asia in July 2003. The Communication listed 
those areas in which the EU and ASEAN could strengthen their co-operation, and for the first time 
in the history of EU-ASEAN relations, the EU offered to negotiate a bilateral PCA with key 
ASEAN members, one of which was Thailand. An announcement of the intention to launch 
negotiations with Thailand was made in Hanoi in October 2004, at the margins of the ASEM 
Summit, by the then President Prodi and former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin. The PCA covers the 
following areas: the fight against international organized crime and terrorism, good governance, 
justice and home affair issues, and human rights.  
 
The EU and Thailand started the negotiations with the objective of “strengthening the 
diversification of economic and commercial relations and the promotion of co-operation and 
dialogue in all areas of mutual interest” (Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the 
period 2007-2013, p.22). During the negotiations, the EU and Thailand agreed to enhance co-
operation in the following areas: trade and investment; environment; agriculture; transport; energy; 
industrial policy and SMEs; science and technology; employment and social policy; education and 
culture; statistics; information society; migration; combating illicit drugs; and money laundering. 
With regards to political relations, the PCA is intended to enhance co-operation in the security 
area including NPT (Interview with Piyapak Sricharoen). Initially, it was due to be signed by both 
parties in 2006 but in the wake of the coup d’état that took place on 19 September 2006 in Thailand 
and the political instability that followed, the EU decided to hold off until a democratic government 
was reinstated. However, after the election of a new government in 2007, the PCA remained 




Political Framework: Ministers, Commissioner, Head of State and Government 
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At the highest level of political relations, EU Commissioners, Ministers, and Heads of Government 
conduct political dialogue in various meetings and international forums which help shape the 
overall direction of the EU-Thailand relationship and co-operation. High level visits from both the 
EU and Thailand serve as an important channel to intensify bilateral relations. Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, the former EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood 
Policy visited Thailand on 25 May 2009 where she had a meeting with the then Prime Minister, 
Abhisit Vejjajiva. During the meeting, the two leaders held a discussion on the negotiation of the 
PCA and the possibility of starting discussions on a Thai-EU FTA. In July 2009, Carl Bildt, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, representing the then EU Presidency and Javier Solana, 
EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy visited Thailand during the 
16th ARF and the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conferences held in Phuket. Interestingly, Thailand 
has benefited from a comparatively high number of such senior visits despite a decade of political 
and democratic uncertainty, perhaps underlining again the importance of the longer-term 
relationship for both sides.  
 
These direct interactions were of course complemented by parallel meetings that took place 
over a number of years in the EU-ASEAN context (as described in Chapter 4) as well as through 
ASEM (although this dialogue mechanism carries less weight given its emphasis on informality 
and unpredictable attendance of the EU’s Prime Ministers and Presidents). 
 
Institutional Framework 
Again, a previous Chapter has already examined the broader regional institutional mechanisms 
that help underpin EU-Thai relations: in particular, the ARF, ASEM as well as the SOM were 
identified. This lower level dialogue is often where the most productive work is done. By way of 
example, at the November 1999 SOM it was agreed that EU financial support would be directed 
to the institutional reform process, in particular towards health and the management of 
environmental protection in coastal areas. At the March 2001 SOM it was decided that EU-Thai 
co-operation would evolve from a project based approach to an inclusive process, based on a wider 
policy dialogue. Project financing would be used to facilitate the implementation of co-operation 
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issues agreed under that dialogue. At the 7th EU-Thailand SOM, held in Bangkok on 28/29 March 
2001, the two parties reviewed the state-of-play of the bilateral relationship, notably the ongoing 
EU cooperation programmes, and agreed on a number of co-operation areas and activities. They 
also decided on a new institutional arrangement to support the implementation of the work plan, 
as follows: 
- The SOM was to be  upgraded to the level of Permanent Secretary ( Thailand MFA)  and 
Deputy Director-General (Commission – External Relations DG); 
- Regular political contacts between the Commission and the Thai Minister for Foreign 
Affairs will be organised in the margins of multilateral meetings (ASEM, ARF etc.), on an 
annual basis if necessary, to review bilateral and regional/  multilateral issues ( Council 
Regulation 1440/80 of 30 May 1980, OJ L 144, 10.06.1980). 
- A co- ordination mechanism, with 3- monthly meetings, is established to monitor ongoing 
co-operation at project level and to oversee the follow-up of new project proposals as well 
as to assess the overall co-operation. 
 
It was also agreed at the SOM that EU- Thai co- operation would be part of an inclusive 
process whereby project financing is to be used to facilitate the implementation of co- operation 
issues agreed under a wider policy dialogue 
 
Legal Framework 
The 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement is regarded as the most important co-operation 
agreement that governs the EU’s relationship with Thailand. The agreement focuses on trade co-
operation, economic co-operation, and development co-operation. In the area of trade co-
operation, the GSP is granted to Thai exports entering the EU’s market which potentially benefits 
Thai products enormously. However, as already noted, there have been some conflicts in this area 
resulting from the removal of GSP for some Thai exports due to their increased competitiveness 
which has caused Thai producers and the Thai government to protest against the decisions made 





The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2002-2006, 2007-2013 
Since 2002, the EU has issued two CSPs, the first released in 2002 for the period 2002-2006 and 
the second in 2007 for the period 2007-2013. The CSP is a very significant document because it 
outlines the EU’s Thailand strategy and EU co-operation with Thailand. In a sense it tries to give 
a glimpse into future policy choices and direction. The CSP contains EU co-operation objectives, 
a country analysis of Thailand, a general co-operation framework, and a future EU co-operation 
strategy. It outlines an overview of past and ongoing EU-Thailand co-operation programmes 
including the results and the lessons learnt, bilateral co-operation programmes of EU Member 
States with Thailand, and co-operation programmes with other parties. The CSP also illustrates in 
detail the future of EU co-operation strategy with Thailand and identifies priority areas for future 
co-operation, distinguishing between grouping focal and non-focal areas (cross-cutting issues). 
The CSP examines how these future co-operation programmes can be made coherent with existing 
EU policies and how they can complement other EU programmes and co-operation programmes 
of other parties. It also describes related regional and thematic programmes. 
 
i) CSP for 2002-2006 
General EU-Thailand Co-operation Framework 
EU-Thailand co-operation began with the Tapioca Agreement to help crop diversification in 
Thailand and to assist Thai agricultural products gain access to European markets. The EU 
provided almost €200 million for crop diversification and water irrigation projects in North-eastern 
part of Thailand in the 1970s and 1980s (EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, p.15). 
Later, the characteristics of co-operation shifted from development assistance to economic co-
operation including on the environment and fisheries, social policies, promotion of small and 




During the 1990s, EU co-operation with Thailand focused on providing technical 
assistance in the area of social infrastructure, human resource development, poverty, and the 
environment. The EU introduced numerous multi-level actors into EU-Thailand co-operation 
including EU business associations, NGOs, universities, and trade associations. The EU has 
supported the increasing role of NGOs in Thailand in the area of strengthening civil society, 
refugee assistance, rural area development, and environment. After the Asian Economic Crisis in 
1998, the EU shifted the focus of co-operation to assist the Thai government’s recovery from the 
economic and social impact of the crisis including financial reform technical assistance, 
employment creation, human resources development, social cushioning of the impacts, and rural 
communities stabilisation programmes. As of June 2005, Thailand was allocated 18 % of the 
budget of the ASEM Trust Fund (€5.62 million) to support the implementation of 13 projects in 
the social and financial sectors (EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p.12)910. Coastal 
environmental projects were also launched by the EU to assist Thailand in coping with 
environmental challenges such as the Coastal Habitat and Resource Management (CHARM) and 
the Sustainable Management of Phu Khieo Wildlife Sanctuary initiatives.  
 
Thailand has participated in EU-ASEAN regional programmes in the area of energy, 
environment, transport, education and communication technology, as well as ASEM projects. In 
addition, it is associated with EU-Asia horizontal co-operation programmes such as Asia-Invest 
Asia-Urbs, Asia IT&C and Asia Ecobest. The EU also provided technical assistance in health care 
reform to the Ministry of Health of Thailand.  
 
In the area of humanitarian assistance, the EU has provided €58.2 million, with the highest 
shares allocated under the budget lines for refugees and displaced persons ( €42. 2 million) , 
HIV/AIDS prevention (€10.4 million)  and drugs (€4.8 million)  with just €500,000 allocated for 
human rights protection.  However, there have been a significant number of other EU- supported 
                                                          
10 Note that all of the following figures are also sourced from these two CSPs. 
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projects/ programmes in Thailand, both bilaterally ( in the sectors of energy, public health, 
environment, narcotics, NGO co- financing, humanitarian assistance, worth a total of €59. 3 
million), and in the context of regional programmes, such as ASEAN co-operation (€82.2 million), 
ASIA Co-operation (€166.4 million), and ASEM co-operation (€18.25 million).  
 
Co-operation with EU Member States 
Historically, six EU member states have provided co-operation assistance to Thailand - the UK, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The UK’s assistance to Thailand has 
included co-operation in the area of education, human rights, good governance, HIV/AIDS, 
peacekeeping, health, refugees, and landmines. For example, the funding for 2000/2001, including 
Thailand’s share of the Department for International Development (DFDI) regional programmes, 
was approximately €2.5 million with ongoing assistance likely to remain at this level, the global 
financial crisis not withstanding. Germany has provided co-operation on economic reform and 
development of a market economy to strengthen the competitiveness of Thai SMEs. Funding 
programmes have included Private-Public Partnerships, advisory services for the industry, co-
operation with the German political foundations and scholarships. The commitment amounted to 
approximately €11.3 million for 2001 and 2002.  
 
Denmark has provided development assistance through DANIDA to the Mekong River 
Commission and the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT). These two programmes amount to about 
€8 million annually, for a total of five years. For Finland, cooperation is mostly on a regional basis 
with a focuses on poverty alleviation and improvement of the environment in the Mekong River 
Region, including financial support to the Asia Europe Environmental Technology Centre 
(AEETC) and the AIT. Additional co-operation assistance goes to small-scale projects run by local 
NGOs and industrial joint ventures in Thailand through Finnfund.  
 
Sweden has provided financial assistance to Burmese refugees in Thailand of €2.2 million 
annually. Sweden is also the second biggest foreign donor to the AIT and also contributes 
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substantially to the Mekong River Commission and to the UNEP environmental programme for 
Thailand. In technical co-operation, soft loans are awarded and some 50 Thais to participate 
annually in advanced training courses in Sweden. 
 
The Netherlands has provided financial support to the Burmese Border Consortium and 
acts as coordinator of aid to Burmese refugees in Thailand. Assistance was provided through the 
Dutch NGO ZOA which amounted to US$1.2 million in 2001. Assistance in the area of primary, 
secondary and vocational education to Burmese refugees in the period 2000-2002 was US$0.9 
million. The Netherlands also financed a programme for the promotion of private investments by 
Dutch companies that have positive developmental and environmental effects in Thailand, 
amounting to €4.5 million. 
 
The 2002-2006 CSP also outlined the EU’s future strategy regarding political and external 
relations which defined EU-Thailand political relations in the following period. The CSP stated 
that: 
In the area of political and external relations issues, the Commission should see to it that the 
EC-Thailand dialogue be strengthened to include (1) co-operation in international 
organisations (United Nations, EC-ASEAN dialogue including the ARF process, ASEM); 
(2) co-operation and exchange of views as regards political developments in the region 
(Philippines, Indonesia, Burma/Myanmar, South-China Sea); and (3) co-operation on trans-
national issues (illegal migration, piracy, trafficking in human beings etc.).  
(EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, p.20) 
 
These conditions laid down the foundation for EU-Thailand political co-operation in this 
five-year period. The CSP stresses the importance of economic co-operation with mutual 
benefits over development co-operation expressed in the following terms: 
 
Also, given Thailand’s economic recovery over the last three years and present 
socioeconomic indicators, and the increasing importance of economic relations between the 
EU and Thailand, the main focus of EC assistance should be economic co-operation in the 
mutual interest. Development co-operation projects should be considered only on an 
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exceptional basis, and address key national development priorities where the EC could 
provide a real added value. (p.20) 
 
The resources for EU-Thailand co-operation were allocated from the existing thematic and 
regional programmes including the ASEAN, ASEM and Asia programmes. For the period of 2002-
2006 the EU allocated €13.2 million for bilateral projects with Thailand in the area of economic 
development. The EU focused on technical assistance and capacity-building activities in the 
sectors of trade, investment, and related areas for sustained co-operation. In addition, assistance to 
public health and health services sector to continue the Health Reform process initiative was 
provided. Initiatives in other areas covered by the CSP are briefly described below. 
 
 Trade, investment and related areas for sustained co-operation: the focus was to provide 
trade and investment related technical assistance and capacity building to Thailand in the areas 
outlined in the Doha Ministerial Declaration with particular emphasis on promoting economic 
reforms, international competitiveness, and implementing the Doha work programme. The EU also 
committed to assisting Thailand in adapting to developments in EU legislation that might affect 
EU-Thai trade. In addition, EU-Thai co-operation sought to promote EU investment in Thailand 
by improving conditions for EU investors through enhancing dialogues between EU and Thai 
authorities. The EU would also help to promote sustainable long term trade and investment with 
Thailand. 
 
 Public Health System and Health Services Reform: The EU agreed to provide technical 
assistance for the Thai public health reform process by focusing on increasing efficiency, equity, 
equality, and social accountability of the system. The EU also provided assistance in the fight 
against three communicable diseases – HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.  
 
Other areas of EU co-operation that received less attention (the non-focal areas) included 
science and technology, education and human resources development, environment, energy, social 
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policy related issues11, refugees and displaced persons, knowledge-based economy and culture. 
These issues were handled through thematic and regional (ASEAN, ASEM, Asia) co-operation 
programmes.  
 
Science and Technology: The CSP looked to promote the participation of Thai research 
institutions in EU research and development programmes for mutual benefit as well as promote 
researcher exchanges through the EU RTD Framework Programme, the Asia IT&C Programme 
and the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme. 
 
Education and Human Resources Development: Here, participation under Asia-Link 
programme was encouraged to strengthen co-operation between EU and Thai universities. The 
main EU instrument supporting these activities were horizontal programmes - the Asia-Link 
programme or the ASEAN University Network funded under the budget line for political, 
economic and cultural co-operation. 
 
Environment: Assistance was offered to Thailand to participate in programmes under the 
environment and tropical forest budget lines and Asia Ecobest, with an emphasis on disaster 
preparedness and prevention.  
 
Energy: The CSP sought to promote energy efficiency and conservation through ASEAN-
EU Energy Facility and COGEN III Programme.  
 
Social Policy Related Issues12:  There are four main issues in this area. Fight Against Drug 
Production and Trafficking: The CSP focused on reducing demand to complement the activities 
                                                          
11 The social policy related issues mentioned in the CSP were fight against drugs, good governance, fight 
against trafficking of persons, and death penalty.  




carried out in the context of EC-ASEAN (Co-operation on Precursor Control) and the ASEM 
dialogue process. Good Governance: providing technical assistance focused on respect for human 
rights (NGOs and the National Human Rights Commission). Fight Against Trafficking of Persons: 
to assist Thailand on this issue, particularly the of women and children. �Death Penalty: to initiate 
co-operation with governmental bodies and civil societies on this issue. 
 
 Refugees and Displaced Persons: the CSP was to strengthen co-operation with Thai 
governmental bodies and international bodies (ECHO and UNHCR) in providing humanitarian aid 
to refugees in refugee camps and villages in border areas especially the Thai-Burmese border with 
a focus on Karen, Karenni, and Shan people. Assistance was to focus on protecting the refugees 
from military clashes along the borders.  
 
 Knowledge-based Economy and Culture: A bilateral dialogue to establish connections 
between e-ASEAN Framework Agreement and e-Europe in order to assist Thailand in ITC 
development field was proposed as was co-operation through the EC’s RTD Framework 
Programme. 
 
The CSP also outlined the EU’s intention to promote trilateral co-operation between 
Thailand and the EU to provide assistance to its neighbouring countries through EU-ASEAN 
dialogue. Sub-regional co-operation was also to be considered with a view to promoting regional 
integration in ASEAN.  
 
Bilateral assistance to Thailand from 2002-2006 amounted to €13.2 million (with €10 
million allocated under the 2002-2004 National Indicative Programme (NIP) with an additional 
€3.2 million allocated under the 2004-2006 NIP). The 2002-2004 NIP provided financial support 
for technical assistance for the reform of the Thai public health service (a total of €5 million) and 
the establishment of an EC-Thailand Small Projects Facility (SPF) to support trade and 
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investment-related projects (also €5 million). In 2005, 19 projects out of 60 proposals received 
funding totaling almost €3 million under the SPF programme. In 2006, 10 projects were selected 
for SPF funding (worth €1 million). The SPF programme also allowed the EC Delegation to 
Thailand to manage 10 percent of SPF funding designed to provide technical assistance to the Thai 
government on trade-related issues. The 2004-2006 NIP allocated an additional €3.2 million for 
scholarships for Thai graduate students in the “Thailand Window” of the Erasmus Mundus 
programme of the EU.  
 
 
ii) CSP for 2007-2013 
The 2007-2013 CSP proclaimed that the “the future Thai-EC partnership will concentrate on co-
operation in a wide range of areas of mutual interest as agreed under the draft Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement (PCA) by drawing on both partners’ expertise” (Thailand-European 
Community Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p.3). For this 2007-2013 7-year period, the CSP defined 
the focal areas of EU-Thailand co-operation as follows: 
 
- deepening the Thai-EC relationship in various areas of strategic importance and mutual 
interest to both partners, with a particular focus on economic relations, scientific and 
technology co-operation as well as higher education and culture 
- addressing specific capacity constraints crucial to advancing Thailand's    
national development agenda 
- advancing co-operation on a more modern agenda including good governance,   justice 
and home affairs issues, human rights and mine action 
- increasing mutual awareness between Europe and Thailand (p.3) 
 
Informed by these priorities, a series of EU projects and programmes with Thailand were 




- Bilateral co-operation: 3 projects in the sectors of public health, environment/ natural 
resources, and economic co-operation (a total of €18 million). 
- ASEAN co-operation: 24 projects in the sectors of higher education, IPR and standards, 
energy, environment, economic co-operation (€58.31 million). 
- Asia co-operation: 51 projects in the sectors of higher education, trade and investment, 
environment, IT&C (€13.67 million). 
- ASEM co-operation: 2 projects in the sector of financial and social sector reform (€6.23 
million). 
- Horizontal (NGO) budget-lines/ programmes: 5 projects in the sectors of health and the 
environment (€24.23 million). 
- Support to uprooted populations (budget line for aid to uprooted people) and 
Humanitarian assistance (ECHO): 14 projects (€19.26 million). (p.13) 
 
Co-operation with EU Member States  
Co-operation with individual EU Member States has focused on providing policy advice, technical 
assistance, and capacity building. Direct financial assistance was reduced significantly. Areas of 
co-operation include enterprise competitiveness, environmental management, higher education, 
and research collaboration. The EU Delegation in Bangkok played the role of co-ordinator 
between EU Member States’ Development Co-operation Counsellors to ensure policy coherence. 
EU Member States’ co-operation with Thailand certainly decreased when compared with the 
2002-2006 period and the 2007-13 CSP only mentioned three main donors – Germany, France, 
and Denmark – as opposed to six donors previously (the UK, Germany, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands). The emergence of France as a key Member State in this area was, 
however,  notable. 
 
Germany’s co-operation programme focused on strengthening the competitiveness of 
SMEs in the agro-industry sector by improving business development services. The programme 
194 
 
provided yearly financial resources of €3.5 million until 2007. France’s co-operation programme 
concentrated on higher education, research collaboration, capacity building and human resource 
development across a wide range of areas. France also sought to explore the possibility of trilateral 
co-operation activities with Thailand in its neighbouring countries. Denmark’s co-operation 
concentrated on Natural Resource management, urban environmental management, sustainable 
energy and the Clean Development Mechanism with the Partnership Facility Programme 
promoting the involvement of the private sector in environmental activities. 
 
The EU’s Priorities for Co-operation 
The CSP proposed the creation of a Thailand-EC Co-operation Facility which is 
an instrument, inspired by the earlier SPF to enable technical assistance in all sectors of 
mutual interests as referred to in the PCA…. The advantage of a more comprehensive 
Thailand-EC Co-operation Facility lies in the increased flexibility to leverage meaningful 
and highly visible interventions as needed and to respond to the dynamics and fast changing 
challenges and opportunities arising in an evolving relationship with Thailand. 
(Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p.18) 
 
The Thailand-EC Co-operation Facility’s main focus was economic co-operation in areas 
of mutual interest. The Co-operation Facility sought to support Thailand’s economic reforms and 
international competitiveness. Technical assistance and capacity building in trade-related and 
investment-related areas was foreshadowed including: customs co-operation and those outlined in 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration, issues related to EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations, regional 
economic integration, and adaptation to developments in EU regulations, mandatory and voluntary 
market requirements13.  
 
The Co-operation Facility also promoted the facilitation of knowledge flows and 
collaboration in science, technology, higher education and research. Thailand was encouraged to 
                                                          
13 These include food safety, core labour rights and standards, environmental regulations, industrial standards, 
consumer protection, customs co-operation, air and marine transport, IPRs, GMOs, labelling, CSR and etc.. 
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participate in the EU’s 7th Research Framework Programme which could provide co-operation in 
these fields. The activities promoted under the Co-operation Facility included: 
- exchange of information, know-how and best practices in science and technology; 
- sustainable co-operation between universities and the scientific communities of the EU and 
Thailand such as facilitation of joint research projects, exchange of professors and scientists, etc; 
- human resource development and capacity building (training courses, seminars and conferences); 
and, 
- activities in the area of employment and social policy and environment. 
 
In addition, the Co-operation Facility was also designed to support activities that could 
foster EU-Thai co-operation in areas such as good governance, human rights, and mine removal. 




Unsurprisingly, the EU was committed to incorporating gender equality issues into EU-Thailand 
co-operation in order to promote female participation in economic-decision making at local levels, 
regional and international conferences, workshops, and exchange programmes. In addition, the EU 
aimed to strengthen the social dimension of globalisation including matters related to the 
international management and governance of globalisation, and the promotion of decent work for 
all. The impact on employment and social cohesion were to be considered under the trade and 
investment co-operation heading with Thailand as were improved working and social conditions 
in Thailand. Another issue under the Co-operation Facility concerned environment and natural 
resources management where co-operation was to concentrate on strengthening technical expertise 
and the planning capacity of Thai institutions regarding this issue. Lastly, the activities under the 
Co-operation Facility had explicit conditionality in the form of promoting the best practice of 
European good governance and human rights for Thai government officials as well as providing 




Regional and Thematic Programmes 
The EU also expressed their intention to pursue thematic co-operation in the following areas: 
democracy and human rights, human and social development, migration and asylum, environment 
and sustainable management of natural resources including energy, non-state actor development, 
and higher education (mobility). Funding for these activities was to come from the MIP, Asia-




IV. Coup d’état and the Impact on EU-Thailand Political Relations 
 
The Coup d’état on 19th September 2006 
On 19th September 2006, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal 
Thai Army along with the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Royal Thai Navy, the Royal Thai Air 
Force staged a successful, bloodless coup d’état against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and 
his caretaker government on the charges of “corruption/conflict of interest, abuse of power, 
infringing on the ethics and moral integrity of the country’s leader, interference in the system of 
checks and balances, policy flaws that lead to human rights violations and creating rifts and 
destroying unity of the public and instigating confrontation” (The Nation, 21st September 2006, 
no author). The timing was well calculated as Prime Minister Thaksin was in New York City for 
a UN General Assembly meeting and thus was unable to salvage the situation. Other key members 
of the Cabinet were also at international conferences outside the country and could not actively 
resist the military take-over. The September 2006 coup d’état was the seventeenth such coup the 
country had seen since 1932. To understand why the military seized power from Prime Minister 
Thaksin, the political turmoil in the country as well as internal conflicts within the Thai Army must 
be examined. Only then can the reaction from the EU and the impact of the coup d’état on EU-




Political Situation Prior to the Coup  
In 2006, Prime Minister Thaksin was under enormous pressure from the “Yellow Shirts” or the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), led by Sondhi Limthongkul and Major General 
Chamlong Srimuang, which accused him of corruption and conflict of interest, among other 
charges. The PAD, which was composed of mostly upper and middle class citizens, organised 
rallies and protests with the goal of forcing Prime Minister Thaksin to resign his position. PAD 
was formed after Prime Minister Thaksin’s family sold their shares of Shin Corporation to 
Temasek Holdings of Singapore for 73 billion Baht or approximately US$1.88 billion. The PAD 
accused Prime Minister Thaksin of amending the law to allow higher foreign ownership in 
telecommunication companies just prior to the sale of his company14, avoided paying tax on the 
capital gains of the sale, and selling a national security-related company to a foreign company. 
 
Apart from pressure from the PAD, Prime Minister Thaksin and his government had been 
in a critical political situation ever since he called for a house dissolution on 24 February 2006. 
The subsequent election was held on 2 April 2006 which the Democrat Party refused to contest. 
The Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party ended up winning 462 out of the 500 seats. However, the ratio of 
voters to no-voters was 16:10 causing the result of the election to be heavily criticised by the 
public. By-elections were also needed for 38 TRT candidates who had won with less than 20% of 
the votes cast15. On 8 May 2006, the Constitutional Court ruled that the April election was 
invalidated on the grounds that “the ballot booths were placed in a way to compromise voting 
privacy despite the fact that the constitution stipulates that the voting has to be direct and secret”1516. 
The Court then set a new election date to be held on 15 October 2006. 
                                                          
14 The Thai Telecommunication Act (2006) became effective on 23 January 2006, raising the limit on foreign holdings 
in telecom companies to 49% which replaced the Telecom Business Law (2001), that put the foreign investment cap 
at 25%. 
15 The Nation, “Election Result: 38 One-Horse Candidates Failed”, 4 April 2006, 
http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/04/03/headlines/headlines_30000858.php 





Surin Pitsuwan, the then Secretary General of ASEAN Secretariat, in an interview during 
an “Asian Voices in Europe” lecture gave his support for the coup due to the following reasons:  
Over the last six years, democracy in Thailand had been centralised around one person, and 
one clique. Civil liberties had been contained, the media intimidated and the government 
bureaucracy politicised. The system of checks and balances had disappeared as the 
constitutional body was filled with people who toed the line, so by 19 September 2006, little 
democracy was left in the country. Unfortunately, Thailand had taken the path of other 
emerging democracies such as Venezuela, Nicaragua or Russia, where the population felt 
under pressure from globalisation and believed that strong leadership would protect them 
and their livelihoods. Thaksin’s government had played on this fear, using a strong dose of 
nationalism, and popularism, sustaining its support through corruption and taking a very 
authoritarian line, stamping out opposition in parliament, sidelining environmentalists and 
silencing journalists.  
(Asian Voices in Europe, 2007, p.30) 
 
Thaksin’s leadership had reached such a great level of power that it soon began to expose its 
weaknesses through deep corruption, conflict of interests, controversial deals and the failure 
of its unsustainable populist programmes and schemes. Institutions and norms had been 




Surin concluded that to the outside world, it might seem that Thailand was lost in transition, but 
from the Thai perspective, it was a necessary and corrective coup. He believed that there had been 
“no other way to stop the train running at high speed that was going to wreck everything”. (p.31) 
 
Internal Conflict within the Thai Army 
One of the catalysts of the 2006 coup d’état was the internal conflict within the Royal Thai Army 
that was caused by interventions of Prime Minister Thaksin. Thaksin used his authority to promote 
his cousin, General Chaiyasit Shinawatra, to Commander-in-Chief in 2003. His promotion was 
extremely controversial in the Thai Army because General Chaiyasit was an Engineers corps 
officer and traditionally Engineers corps officers have never been promoted to commander-in-
chief of the Army. General Chaiyasit was also not in the direct command line to become the 
commander-in-chief of the Army. He had been transferred from the Army to an advisor position 
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in the Supreme Command Headquarters in 2001. When Prime Minister Thaksin came into power 
so did General Chaiyasit. He gradually rose to power with the Prime Minister’s help and was 
eventually appointed the commander-in-chief of the Army, a promotion that caused a rift in the 
Army. Many high ranking officers began to dislike the Prime Minister for his intervention in the 
appointment of the commander-in-chief. However, General Chaiyasit was Commander-in-Chief 
for only one year before being transferred to the position of Commander of Supreme Command 
Headquarters. 
 
Prime Minister Thaksin graduated from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School 
(AFAPS), and therefore, he had many friends in the Armed Forces. Through his interventions his 
classmates were promoted to high ranking positions during his time as Prime Minister. Seniority, 
which represents the tradition of the Thai Army, was ignored by the Prime Minister. His friends 
were promoted to influential positions over their senior officers causing internal conflicts within 
the Army. As a result, the Army was divided into three factions: a pro-Thaksin group, a neutral 
group, and an anti-Thaksin group.  
 
Two important army figures were responsible for planning and staging the 2006 coup d’état 
– General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and General Anupong Paochinda. Prior to the coup d’état, General 
Sonthi Boonyaratglin was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and General Anupong Paochinda 
was the Commander of 1st Army Area. The conflict between Prime Minister Thaksin and General 
Anupong originated from Prime Minister Thaksin’s plan to appoint General Pornchai Kranlert to 
be the next commander-in-chief of the Army. Both General Anupong and General Pornchai were 
classmates of the Prime Minister but due to personal reasons General Pornchai was chosen by 
Prime Minister Thaksin even though he was not in the direct line of command to be the 
commander-in-chief. At that time, General Pornchai Kranlert was promoted to the Assistant 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, waiting to replace General Sonthi. This decision meant that 
General Anupong would be over-looked for the position even though he was in the direct line of 
promotion. Prime Minister Thaksin’s classmates in the Army were divided between two groups – 
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those supporting General Pornchai and those behind General Anupong. There was silent conflict 
between them. This incident led to General Anupong’s decision to stage the coup d’état against 
Prime Minister Thaksin on 19 September 2006.  
 
General Sonthi, although appointed by Prime Minister Thaksin, knew that he would soon 
be replaced by General Pornchai as the commander-in-chief. Not wanting to let go of his position, 
General Sonthi together with General Anupong decided to stage a coup d’état against Prime 
Minister Thaksin just as Prime Minister Thaksin’s popularity was declining and under heavy attack 
by the PAD. 
 
In the evening of 19 September 2006, Thailand yet again witnessed a coup d’état after 
fifteen years of uninterrupted democracy. General Sonthi deployed troops from the Special Forces 
Headquarters from Lopburi province into Bangkok to control key government buildings and key 
areas while General Anupong ordered his troops in Bangkok and nearby provinces to control the 
city. The troops were met with no resistance from the government. Key members of the Cabinet 
were detained or were ordered to report to the Army Headquarters. Some ministers fled the country 
or went underground. Prime Minister Thaksin, stuck in New York City, tried to salvage the 
situation by broadcasting from New York City. His statement contained the reassignment order of 
General Sonthi from Commander-in-Chief to a position in the Prime Minister’s Office among 
other messages. Unsurprisingly, no one followed his orders as by then the Army had full control 
of Bangkok and the country. The interesting aftermath was that the people of Bangkok clearly 
welcomed the coup as indicated when they greeted the troops with flowers, food and refreshments. 
No single person was injured or killed during the 2006 coup d’état. 
 
After General Sonthi and other chiefs of the Armed Forces, who now called themselves 
the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), had taken full control of the country, they immediately 
dissolved both houses of the parliament, the Cabinet, the Constitutional Court, and suspended the 
Constitution. Martial Law was imposed throughout the country banning political activities and 
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freedom of the media. On 1 October 2006, the CDR then appointed an interim government to 
govern the country until the next general election which was set to be held in October 2007. The 
person chosen to be the new prime minister for the interim government was General Surayud 
Chulanont, the Privy Councilor to King Bhumibol Adulyadej and an ex-Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army. The CDR then transformed itself into the Council of National Security to oversee the 
interim government and the security of the country.  Thaksin, unable to return to Thailand, had to 
first take refuge in the UK (and elsewhere subsequently) and since then has been running his 
political party and plotting strategies to return to power from outside Thailand. 
 
Reaction of the EU to the Coup d’état  
After the coup d’état took place on 19 September 2006, the EU Finnish Presidency immediately 
released an official statement which stated the EU’s position regarding the coup d’état which had 
important implications for the coup leaders: 
The Presidency of the European Union condemns the take-over of power from the 
democratic government of Thailand by the Thai military forces. The Presidency demands 
that the military forces stand back and give way to the democratically elected political 
government. Thailand has been living several years without major political turmoil. The 
Presidency wishes that Thailand will soon be able to return to democratic order.  
(EU Presidency, 20 September 2006) 
 
Consequential actions taken by the EU against the interim government headed by General 
Surayud demonstrated the EU’s disapproval of the situation which contradicted the core values of 
the EU – democracy and the rule of law. All high level meetings and official visits were suspended 
immediately.  
 
Thus, the EU-Thailand PCA that was under negotiation in 2006 and about to be concluded 
had to be put on hold because of the coup. As was stated in the CSP (2007-2013): “The PCA is 
still being negotiated and will only be initialed and signed once a democratically elected 
government is in place in Thailand” (p.4). As late as 2012, the PCA still had not been concluded 
and obviously one of the main reasons for this was the aftermath of the coup. Consequently, the 
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2006 coup has had a detrimental and profound impact on EU-Thailand political relations. On the 
other hand, Thailand had a general election in 2007 where Thaksin’s party again won the election 
and replaced the interim government. Samak Sundaravej became the new prime minister and it 
appeared that Thailand was back on track again. However, the PCA still was not concluded. 
According to Dusit Meksingvee, the business information officer at the EU Delegation to 
Thailand, there were other sensitive issues that had yet to be agreed by both parties that were 
primarily responsible for the new delay. There were a number of differing views expressed towards 
the coup by European policy officials. 
 
Thomas Gnocchi, (Desk Officer for the Thailand, Cambodia and Uprooted People in Asia, 
South East Asia Unit, DG External Relations, European Commission)  stated in an interview that 
“ his department had been monitoring developments closely since the coup and hoped that the 
period of transition would be used to correct some of the deficiencies in the previous system” 
(Asian Voices in Europe, 2007, p.31) .  This demonstrated the fact that even the EU accepted that 
the previous regime under Thaksin was flawed. However, as David Fouquet, Director of the Asia-
Europe Project, noted, the EU does not tolerate military governments and believed that the problem 
in Thailand should be solved by the people (p.31). He argued that the 2006 coup set a bad example 
for other countries in the region that are going through a transition process such as Indonesia and 
the Philippines. Fouquet even mentioned that Burmese leaders used Thailand as an example of the 
evolution of government processes in the region. He also expressed his disapproval of the defence 
budget increase of 30% after the coup by the interim Thai Government. Fouquet said he would be 
following the developments regarding the drafting of the new constitution and institutional 
relationship because they could have an impact on the political development in other countries in 
the region. His conclusion was that there were many lessons to be learnt from the 2006 coup.  
 
 
This Chapter has provided a detailed overview of the formal policy documents underpinning Thai-
EU relations during the 1994-2008 period. Their scope and intensity certainly suggested that a 
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PCA was both an immanent and logical progression in relations. This institutionalization, however, 
was derailed by an all too familiar political event in Thai domestic affairs – its seventeenth coup 
d’état – with relations remaining frozen up until and beyond the eighteenth coup d’état in May 
2014. This political context stands in stark relief with the closer military and security relations that 
grew between Thailand and the EU over the same period – symbolized perhaps most dramatically 
in the joint EU-ASEAN AMM that had full Thai participation. It is to these military and security 





















The new millennium has witnessed a significant evolution in the EU’s long-standing ambition of 
becoming an effective global actor.  One manifestation of this has been in 2003 the creation of the 
European Security and Defence Policy mechanism (ESDP – latterly renamed CSDP after the 
Lisbon Treaty) and the subsequent execution of EU-driven military and civilian missions across 
three continents. Geographically, the EU has extended its historical territorial priorities (the near 
abroad and the ACP and has reconnected with Asia through the ASEM process. In both of these 
areas, however, the EU is confronted by the reality of American competition, status and military 
authority. Research drawing on empirical case-studies that address this new phenomenon is rare, 
while bilateral examples may only provide a limited capacity for more general conclusions, this 
chapter explores EU relations with Thailand from the perspective of this emerging EU military 
and security agenda. 
 
Although Thailand was never colonised by a European power, undeniably Europe has been 
playing an important role in shaping the Thai military throughout its history. Thailand has had an 
interest in Western military developments since the sixteenth century and the Thai military first 
began using Western fire-arms in the early 1800s. Battye has noted that  
[a]t least since the Crawford negotiations of 1824, in which fire-arms were the favourite 
Siamese subject of discussion, men like Captain Hunter (“Sir Good Weapon”) and Monsieur 
Joseph (the Armenian) had trafficked in fire-arms, perhaps the most sought after Western 
trade item.  
(1974, p.56) 
 
 King Vajiravudh (King Rama VI, 1910-1925) was the first Thai monarch to be educated at the 
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the UK, while the first naval instructor of the Royal Thai 
Navy in 1893 was a European, as recalled by Admiral Prida Karasuddhi, the former Deputy 
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Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces: “Thailand has long-standing relations with 
Denmark, the first naval instructor of the Royal Thai Navy was Danish. When French gunboats 
attacked Phra Chulachomklao Fortress, our instructor was Danish”1617 (Interview with Admiral 
Prida Karasuddhi, former Deputy Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces, 28 February 
200). Since the reign of King Chulalongkorn (King Rama V, 1868-1910), Thailand has also sent 
cadets to military academies in Germany.1718 
 
After World War II, Western Europe began to lose its former strategic influence in 
Southeast Asia. The USA, China, and Russia emerged as important strategic actors in the region 
during Cold War era and have remained so until the present day. Since 1950, the USA has been 
Thailand’s major strategic partner and has provided significant levels of assistance to the Thai 
military. This context characterises and colours Thailand’s current military relations with the EU 
and its Member States. Consequently, this chapter examines both the contemporary EU-Thai 
military relations at bilateral and regional levels, as well as US-Thai military relations to illustrate, 
for comparative purposes, the significant role played by America in this area. The chapter also 
examines bilateral military relations between Thailand and three key EU Member States – France, 
Germany and Italy and investigates the level of EU manufactured military equipment in the Thai 
armed forces. The chapter concludes by focusing on EU-Thai military cooperation at the regional 
level by examining the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) that was deployed in 2005 and evaluates 
the potential for future military cooperation between the EU and Thailand.  
 
Much of the military data presented here is unavailable elsewhere and this analysis has 
benefited greatly from access to Thai military sources and personal interviews with key military 
personnel. For security reasons, limited information was available in the analysis. Key documents 
                                                          
17 Original version of the interview in Thai “ประเทศไทยมคีวามสมัพนัธเ์กา่แกก่บัเดนมารก์  
ครูทหารเรอืคนแรกของกองทพัเรอืเป็นคนเดนมารก์  ตอนทีเ่รอืรบฝร ัง่เศสมาบุกป้อมพระจลุฯ  ครูของเราคอืเดนมารก์”. 
18  German-Thai military information has been provided by Captain Chaiyapruk Didyasarin (the Air Attaché, 




and reports were provided by Thai Defence Attachés (France and Germany), the Thai Ministry of 
Defence, the Directorate of Intelligence (Royal Thai Army), and the Directorate of Operations 
(Royal Thai Army). Interviews were conducted with military officials, both European and Thai, in 
Bangkok, Thailand during the course of 2006 to 2008. 
 
In the American Shadow: US-Thailand Security Relations 
For Thailand the United States emerged after World War II as the principal guarantor 
of the country’s independence against hostile regional powers. For the United States, 
Thailand became an important regional ally, a ‘front-line state’ in an area threatened 
both by overt Communist Chinese and Vietnamese expansionist policies and by 
domestic insurgencies aligned with revolutionary Communist regimes (Muscat, 
1990, p.18)  
  
The 1954 Manila Pact of the since dissolved Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the 
1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué represent the foundations of the long-established Thai-US 
security relations (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). Article IV(1) of the Manila Pact stipulates that “in the 
event of armed attack in the treaty area, each member would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional process” (US State Department, 2015). The Thanat-Rusk 
communiqué in 1962 stated that the US “regards the preservation of the independence and integrity 
of Thailand as vital to the national interests of the United States” (Muscat, 1990, p.22) and “the 
United States would act even without consensus to do so on the part of the other SEATO member” 
(p.22). In October 2003, Thailand was given the status of a major non-NATO ally by US President 
George W. Bush. This special status has provided the country with further access to US foreign 
aid and military assistance.  
 
During the Cold War era, Thai-US security relations grew significantly because Thailand 
was a major US ally in fighting against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. When the Korean 
War erupted in 1950, the Thai government sent more than 6,500 soldiers to participate in the UN-
led mission. This action led to the signing of the US-Thai military assistance agreement later that 
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same year. This agreement established the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) which 
functions as a US military mission overseeing Thai-US military cooperation in Thailand and which 
continues to operate up to the present day. 
 
Since 1950, the US has provided a significant amount of military aid and development to 
Thailand. Between 1955 and 1963, the US provided funding worth US$18 million for military aid 
projects that included airfield upgrades, the installation of a military communication network 
between Bangkok and North-eastern provinces, and the construction of military facilities at 
Sattahip naval base on the eastern coast of the country (Muscat, 1990). The US Navy Seabee units 
together with the Thai Army have built roads connecting important strategic locations to increase 
military mobility in event of invasion by China or North Vietnam.  
 
The USA began stationing American troops in Thailand when the civil war in Laos broke 
out in 1961. However, the major deployment of US forces in Thailand only took place after 1966 
when America became heavily involved in the Vietnam War. At its peak there were up to 50,000 
American soldiers in Thailand and the US operated bombing raids and rescue missions from its 
military bases in the country (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). The Thai government also sent Thai soldiers 
to assist the US in Laos and Vietnam. During the same period, the US assisted Thailand in fighting 
domestic Communist insurgencies that were started in 1965 by the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT) and were backed by China and North Vietnam. More recently, during the Persian Gulf War 
in 1991 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, the USA was 
authorised by the Thai government to use Thai ports and airfields to transport troops, military 
equipment and logistics to the Middle East. The US Department of Defense has adopted a plan to 
transform and realign US troops around the world to establish a more mobile and capability-based 
force. In Southeast Asia, the US plans to use military facilities in host countries on a temporary 
basis to conduct US military operations and training in order to decrease the costs of maintaining 
a permanent base. The US refers to this practice as “cooperative security location” (CSL); a concept 




Since the September 11 attacks in America in 2001, Thailand has supported US operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq through troop deployments. The Thai government sent 130 soldiers to 
Afghanistan to assist American troops in the reconstruction phase of Operation Enduring Freedom 
in 2001. In 2003, 450 Thai soldiers were deployed to Karbala in southern Iraq to assist with 
reconstruction of the city and to provide medical assistance for Iraqis. The troops remained in Iraq 
until September 2004. During that time there were two Thai military casualties as a result of a car 
bomb attack. In addition to participating in these military operations, it has been reported - though 
not confirmed – that the CIA used Thailand as a black site to secretly hold and interrogate 
suspected terrorists.  
 
Bilateral security cooperation between the USA and Thailand can be divided into six 
categories: security assistance, military exercises, training, intelligence, law enforcement, and 
counter narcotics (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). The US has provided Thailand with funding for the 
purchase of military weapons and equipment through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
programme. In 2006, it was estimated that the USA granted US$1.485 million under FMF to the 
Thai military (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). In addition to the FMF programme, Thailand also receives 
used US military weapons and equipment through the Excess Defense Article (EDA) programme, 
thanks to the country’s major non-NATO ally status. Since 1950 the USA has provided training 
for Thai military officers under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
programme: by 1997, more than 20,000 Thai military officers had received training under this 
scheme (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). In 2006, it was estimated that Thailand received US$2.376 million 
in funding under the IMET programme (one of the highest recipients in the world). Thailand also 
enjoys peacekeeper training by the US military under the Global Peace Operations Initiative 





The USA and Thailand participate in over 40 joint military exercises each year. Cobra Gold 
is the largest annual joint military exercise. Cobra Gold 2008, held in Thailand, marked the 27th 
anniversary of this regional joint military exercise and saw the USA, Thailand, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Japan participate in the event. Cobra Gold training exercises cover computer 
simulated staff exercises, field training exercises, and humanitarian/civic assistance projects 
(USPACOM).   
 
In the area of intelligence, Thailand and the US have strengthened their intelligence 
cooperation since the September 11 attacks. The Counter Terrorism Intelligence Centre (CTIC) 
was created in Thailand in 2001 as a joint Thai-US effort to combat terrorism by sharing facilities 
and information. CTIC activities resulted in the capture of Jemaah Islamiyah leader, Hambali near 
Bangkok in August 2003. Thailand and the USA also coordinate intelligence cooperation on drug 
trafficking and military intelligence.  
 
Additionally, and since 1998, the USA has been involved with providing legal training for 
law enforcement officers from countries in Southeast Asia at the International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok. The main goal of ILEA is to strengthen the efficiency of law 
enforcement officials to combat transnational crime and to enhance intra-regional cooperation. 
The US agencies involved are the Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Internal Revenue Service. The USA and Thailand have also been cooperating in counter-narcotics 
activities. The US Drug Enforcement Agency together with the Thai law enforcement agencies 
coordinate their resources to arrest international drug traffickers.  
 
The Thai coup d’état in September 2006 caused US-Thai relations to be put on hold and American 
military cooperation was suspended for eighteen months. However, a return to normal relations 
was signalled by Admiral Timothy J. Keating, US Navy, Commander of US Pacific Command, in 
a statement on 12 March 2008 confirming that the “December 2007 elections and certification of 
210 
 
a democratically-elected government has allowed us to move forward - at an appropriate pace – 
with restoration of our military relations with Thailand, a major regional ally”.1819 
 
EU Member States-Thailand Military Relations  
The EU, at the European level, does not have military relations with Thailand. Relations are 
more on a nation-to-nation basis. France, Germany, Spain, and the UK maintain strong 
military ties with the Royal Thai Armed Forces… [The EU] are lacking a lot in terms of 
political agreements and military agreements. Even though the European Corps is already 
established and their missions and responsibilities are stated, there is no strong commitment 
on the missions that this corps would be used in the future…we are lacking way behind 
economic and political process in the military agreement and military influence in the rest 
of the world or military relationship with single country like would be the case with Thailand. 
(Captain Jose Manuel Verdugo Paez20 , the Spanish Defence Attaché to Thailand.) 
 
The EU and Thailand do not have a specific bilateral military cooperation agreement. The EU-
Thai security relationship is instead conducted under the framework of EU-ASEAN security 
cooperation. The ASEAN Regional Forum is the stage on which the EU and ASEAN members – 
including Thailand – discuss and cooperate on security matters. In the area of EU-Thai military 
relations, the principal relationships are between individual EU Member States and Thailand. The 
Royal Thai Armed Forces have eight defence attachés stationed in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
and the UK. This section examines bilateral military relations between Thailand and three key EU 
Member States – France, Germany and Italy21. 
 
i) France22 
                                                          
19 Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy (Commander of U.S. Pacific Command) before the House 
Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture on 12 March 2008. 
20 Interview with Captain Jose Manuel Verdugo Paez, 10 March 2008, Defence Attaché, Defence Office, Embassy of 
Spain in Bangkok, Thailand.  
21 Due to the sensitive nature of the information, access to comparable data on the UK and Spain was not available.  
22 French-Thai military information has been provided by Colonel Raksak Rojpimpun (Defense Attaché, Royal Thai 




Thailand and France have a long established military relationship. King Prajadhipok (King Rama 
VII, 1925-1935) attended the École Supérieur de Guerre in France with General Charles de Gaulle 
which led to the strengthening of political, diplomatic, and military relations between France and 
Thailand during the inter-war period. Thai Field Marshal Phibun was educated at the prestigious 
Écoles De Saint-Cyr Coëtguidan (Saint-Cyr) and between 1921-1923 there were six Thai cadets 
studying at the French military academy (Bumroongsook, 1991). In 1948, Thailand and France 
officially exchanged defence attachés in order to develop and strengthen their bilateral military 
cooperation.  
 
Military Agreements - The signing of the “Agreement on Military Logistics Cooperation between 
the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the French Republic” on 26 
April 2000 represented a significant step in enhancing military relations between France and 
Thailand. This agreement established the Joint Franco-Thai Logistics Committee with the 
objective of enhancing military relations and logistics cooperation between military logistics 
organisations in both countries. The Joint Committee has convened annually since 2001: France 
and Thailand alternate as hosts of the meeting. During the 5th Joint Franco-Thai Logistics Meeting 
held in Bangkok (18-21 July 2006), committee members from both sides discussed the results of 
military logistics cooperation in 2005, including the exchange of military equipment and weapons 
procurement information between the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the French government. 
 
During an official visit to Thailand, President Jacques Chirac and Thai Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra issued a “Joint Declaration in the Field of Defence between France and 
Thailand” on 18 February 2006. This declaration has significantly bolstered the Franco-Thai 
military relationship. The objective of the declaration is to enhance defence cooperation between 
the Ministries of Defence and the armed forces under a bilateral framework. In addition, the 
declaration established the Franco-Thai Defence Committee to oversee and promote military 
cooperation between the two countries. Consequently, on 24 February 2006, the French Defence 
Ministry proposed a draft “Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) on Defence Cooperation between 
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the Ministry of Defence of France and the Ministry of Defence of Thailand” to the Thai Defence 
Ministry. This draft MoA focuses on the following: 
 
1. Cooperation areas were to include: strategic analysis; high level official meetings; 
military equipment; personnel exchanges in various fields; education; official visits to 
ports, airports, and military bases; command headquarters and field operation training. 
2. Establishment of the Franco-Thai Defence Committee. The committee would be 
responsible for initiating, coordinating, and promoting cooperation activities. It also was 
required to investigate new cooperation initiatives and supervise the implementation of 
security and defence cooperation initiatives mandated in the Franco-Thai Action Plan. 
3. An Agreement on the Status of Force. 
4. An Intelligence Security Agreement. 
 
The Thai Defence Ministry subsequently consulted with the Supreme Command 
Headquarters, Royal Thai Army, Royal Thai Air Force, and the Royal Thai Navy. The draft MoA 
was returned to the French Defence Ministry in December 2006 after some amendments were 
made on the Thai side. The French Defence Ministry reviewed the revised draft and made some 
additional minor adjustments: however, as a consequence of the Thai coup in September 2006, the 
French Defence Ministry postponed the signing of the MoA until an elected government returned 
to office. In February 2008, after Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and the coalition government 
resumed office, the French Defence Ministry proceeded with the signing of MoA. The French 
Defence Ministry also proposed an additional MoA on education exchanges for officers and cadets. 
The Thai Defence Ministry reviewed the MoA and recommended that the signing of this MoA was 
essential to further enhancing Franco-Thai military cooperation and would lead to a stronger 
relationship. 
 
Education -  The French Armed Forces have provided scholarships and funding for Thai cadets 
and military officers to attend military institutions in France since the early 1900s. The Royal Thai 
Navy sent its first naval cadet to attend the École Naval in 1956. The current education exchange 
programmes provided on an annual basis by the French military include: 
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1. Joint Staff Course: 1 scholarship to attend Collège Interarmées de Défense (CID) for a 
period of 18 months. The scholarship is rotated between the Royal Thai Army, the Royal 
Thai Navy, and the Royal Thai Air Force. 
2. Army Officer Course: 1 scholarship to attend the Écoles De Saint-Cyr Coëtguidan. An 
army cadet of Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy (CRMA) is eligible for a 6-year 
scholarship to undertake a Masters Degree. There are currently 10 CRMA cadets studying 
at Saint-Cyr. 
3. Army Officer Course: 1 scholarship to attend the Lycée Militaire Aix-en-Provence. An 
army cadet of CRMA is eligible for a scholarship to study the course designed by the 
French Army and DCMD. 
4. French Language Course: Scholarships are given to language instructors, military cadets, 
and Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School (AFAPS) cadets to learn the French 
language and to visit France. 
5. Information visits to the Écoles De Saint-Cyr Coëtguidan: CRMA instructors and cadets 
may visit the French military academy for one week. 
 
To reciprocate, the Royal Thai Armed Forces provide one scholarship for a French army 
officer to study the Staff Course at the Thai Army Staff College for a period of one year. A French 
cadet from the Écoles De Saint-Cyr Coëtguidan is eligible for a scholarship to attend CRMA for 
a period of three months.  
 
High and mid-level visits and observation missions between the French and Thai armed 
forces play an essential role in strengthening the military relationship and are regularly undertaken 
by both sides. From the 5-6 September 2007, an envoy from the Office of the Naval Comptroller 
of the Royal Thai Navy, visited the French Defence Ministry to observe the French military 
financial management system. The French armed forces organise seminars annually and provide 
funding for Thai officers to participate in the events. French Navy battleships in the Indian Ocean 
sail to Thailand two to three times a year and Thai Navy battleships sail to France on a regular 
basis during training exercises. 
 
Procurement -  One of the consequences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis was that - due to budget 
constraints - for a decade the Thai armed forces were not in a position to purchase major military 
equipment from France. Nonetheless, the French government continued to promote the sale of 
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French military equipment to the Thai government and on 12 September 2005, the Thai Defence 
Minister approved the purchase of six CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems from the 
French arms producers Nexter Systems (formerly GIAT) and Lohr Industrie. The purchase came 
with technical manuals, maintenance and training parts, and two training courses (maintenance 
and operation). The total amount of the purchase was €25.8 million and the CAESAR system was 
to be delivered to the Thai armed forces at the end of 2008. Over the last 30-years the Royal Thai 
Navy has purchased MM-38 Exocet missiles (tactical air-to-air missile) and in the last decade, a 
Sadral short range anti-air self-defence system from MBDA. In 2007 the Thai Navy purchased the 
Samahe Helicopter Handling System from DCNS, a French contractor. The French government 
has always invited high ranking Thai armed forces officers to attend EUROSATORY, the world’s 
premier military equipment exhibition organised by the French Ministry of Defence, the French 
Procurement Agency (DGA), the French Army, the French Land Defence Manufacturers 
Association (GICAT), and the General Commission for Exhibition and Events (COGES). 
 
ii) Germany 
Formal relations between Germany and Thailand started in 1862 when the “Treaty of Friendship, 
Trade and Navigation”  was signed by the Kingdom of Siam and the German Customs Union on 
7th February (von Stechow, 2001). During the reign of King Chulachomklao (King Rama V) 
political ties grew stronger as the monarch visited Germany twice (in 1897 and again in 1910) 
(Sangchai, 2006). In the military field, Battye (1974) has noted the use of German fire-arms 
(Dreyse and Krupp guns) by the Thai military during the reign of King Mongkut (King Rama IV, 
1851-1868). Military contacts commenced during the reign of King Chulalongkorn when Thai 
princes were sent to study at German military academies as part of the King’s military 
modernisation initiative.  
 
Military Agreements - Although Germany and Thailand have 146 years of established diplomatic 
relations, prior to 2006 there was no official military cooperation agreement between the two 
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countries. In April 2005, the Thai Defence Ministry hosted “Fact Finding Mission Talks” with the 
German Defence Ministry in Bangkok regarding German-Thai security cooperation, the German 
representatives requested that the two parties hold Staff Talks and Expert Talks on German-Thai 
security cooperation. In June 2006, the German Defence Ministry proposed German-Thai military 
cooperation initiatives for consideration by the Thai Defence Ministry (in 2006, Thailand was 
ranked second in Southeast Asia, after Vietnam, in terms of military assistance from Germany). 
The initiatives included: 
 
- Staff talks on military policy to be held in Berlin during April-May 2006; 
- Expert talks on military restructuring, personnel planning, military law, education, and 
proliferation; 
- Naval expert talks on education, joint training exercises, and exchange of official visits; 
- Air Force expert talks on flight safety conduct, air traffic control, aviation medicine, and 
military restructuring; and, 
- Military training assistance. 
 
After reviewing the proposal, the Thai Defence Ministry made two recommendations 
regarding the structure of bilateral level meetings and military training assistance. The Thai 
Defence Ministry suggested that the bilateral-level meetings should follow the format of the 
Chinese-Thai and Australian-Thai meetings in the sense that there should be three types of 
meeting: policy level; coordination committee; and working group level. Regarding military 
training assistance programmes offered by the Germany, Table 5.1 lists those elements that the 
Thai Defence Ministry was most interested in pursuing. 
 
During the first German-Thai Staff Talks (held in Berlin in May 2006) the issues discussed 
were varied and included EU and NATO security, ASEAN security cooperation and counter-
terrorism, UN missions, German military restructuring, conventional arms control as well as other 
bilateral issues. Discussions were also held, on German prompting, on the insurgency situation in 





Table 5.1 Thai Preferences for German Military Training Assistance Programmes 
Military Restructuring Secondary Function Press 
Officer - Practical Training 
Missile Production Course 
Personnel Management Public Relations Course Space Training 
Civil Affairs Intelligence Analysis 
Course 
Flight Course 




VIP Security Protection Staff Course (2 seats) Jungle Warfare 
Detection Technology Company Basic Training 
Course 
Strategic Designation 
UN Military Observer 
Course 




UAV Course Leather Processing 
Finance Management 
Course 
Aviation Medicine Course Bullet-Proof Vest 
Production 
 
Military Cooperation -  In 2008, there were sixteen active projects under German-Thai military 
cooperation initiatives (seven projects for the Thai Defence Ministry, four projects for the Thai 
Army, one for the Thai Navy, and four for the Thai Air Force). These projects were grouped into 
five categories – military policy, logistics, air defence, medical service, and training. There were 
two projects under military policy: the German and Thai Defence Ministries planned to hold staff 
talks on military policy in Bangkok; the Thai Supreme Command Headquarters (SCHQ) and the 
German military also agreed to have technical/expert talks in Berlin concerning consultation on 
bilateral annual programmes. In the logistics field, an information visit by the representatives of 
the Royal Thai Army (RTA) to the German Army was to be organised. In air defence cooperation, 
a technical/expert talk was scheduled for Köln on air defence between representatives of the Royal 
Thai Air Force (RTAF) and the German Air Force. In the field of medical service, Thai medical 
officers from the SCHQ planned to have information visits to Koblenz. The largest category of 
2008 projects were for training (eleven projects: three general training, four army training, three 
air force training, and one navy training project). Thai officers from SCHQ undertook an 
information visit on general training to Rheinbach. There were a further two technical/expert talks 
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on general training between the SCHQ and the German military held in Bonn and Thailand. The 
Royal Thai and the German armies planned to hold four technical/expert talks on general training 
to be held in Bonn and Köln, while the Royal Thai and the German air forces planned to hold three 
technical/expert talks on air force training in Kaufbeuren. The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) 
and the German Navy planned to hold one technical/expert talk on navy training. 
 
Education -  The Thai military has been sending cadets to German military academies for more 
than a century, since the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). Since 1967, the German 
government has provided scholarships for Thai military officers and cadets to attend German 
military institutions, such as the Universität der Bundeswehr München or the Helmut-Schmidt-
Universität (Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg). In general, the German Defence Ministry 
provides the following dedicated scholarships for the Thai military: 
 
1. Staff Officer Courses –Three scholarships annually to Thai military officers to study the Staff 
Course at Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg for a period of nine months (including 
a German language course at Bundessprachenamt Hürt for a period between 6-12 months). 
2. Army, Air Force, Naval Officer Courses - Two scholarships for Chulachomklao Royal Military 
Academy (CRMA) cadets, one scholarship for a Royal Thai Navy Academy (RTNA) cadet, and 
two scholarships for Royal Thai Air Force Academy (RTAFA) cadets. The scholarship covers 
enrolment in a German language course at Bundessprachenamt Hürt (nine months); internship, 
military studies, and army/navy/air force preparatory academy (two years); military university 
(Bachelor and Masters Degree) for a period of four years. 
3. Air Force Aviation Medicine Internship – One scholarship for a RTAF medical officer. The 
course includes German language course (as before) and a medical internship at a German Air 
Force facility. 
4. United Nations Military Observer Course (UNMOC): Two scholarships for Thai military 
officers (Second Lieutenant-Captain) from RTA, RTN, and RTAF.  The course is for one-month 
and is taught in English. 
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5. United Nations Staff Officers Course (UNSOC): Two scholarships for Thai military officers 
(Major-Colonel) from RTA, RTN, and RTAF.  The course is also for four weeks and again taught 
in English. 
 
 In 2008, there were 51 military officers and cadets studying in German military 
institutions: four officers studying Staff Officer Course (1 Army, 1 Navy, and 2 Air Force) at 
Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg; 15 CRMA cadets, 7 RTNA cadets, and 24 
RTAFA cadets studying Officer Course at Universität der Bundeswehr München and Helmut-
Schmidt-Universität. In addition, there is one RTAF medical officer under Aviation Medicine 




Similar to its relationship with Germany, Thailand and Italy have had a long-standing relationship 
since the signing of the “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation”  in 1868 (Sunthoraphan, 
2006).  
 
Military Agreement -  The Thai and Italian Defence Ministries have an established relationship 
that has led to the development of military cooperation across various fields, from the exchange of 
visits by military officials to military procurement from Italian manufacturers. On 24 February 
2005, Italy’s Defence Ministry and its Thai counterpart began a negotiation process for a draft 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation. The draft MoU contained 
provisions concerning bilateral military cooperation, military procurement, and extraterritorial 
law. The Thai Defence Ministry and the Italian Defence Ministry agreed to create a general 
framework for military cooperation and decided to establish subcommittees to determine the 
details for different types of military cooperation. In the military procurement field, Thai officials 
                                                          
23 Italian-Thai military information has been provided by the Thai Defense Ministry, the Directorate of Intelligence 
(Royal Thai Army), and the Directorate of Operations (Royal Thai Army). 
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requested that the clause on military procurement cooperation between the two countries be 
removed from the draft MoU because the Thai Defence Ministry already had a committee handling 
this issue. The Ministry stated that this provision could be added later when there was progress in 
other areas of cooperation. The last provision concerned the extraterritorial law. The Thai Ministry 
requested that the clause that permitted the extraterritoriality of Italian troops in Thailand be 
amended so that Italian troops who broke Thai law should be tried in Thailand. At the time of 
writing, the draft MoU was still being reviewed by the Italian Defence Ministry and had not been 
concluded, again as a result of the Thai coup in 2006, although negotiations are expected to 
eventually proceed. 
 
In 2006, the Italian Defence Ministry proposed an additional draft MoU: “Between the 
Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Ministry of Defence of the Italian 
Republic on Defence Cooperation in Aerospace Technology” . The objective of this draft was to 
enhance cooperation on satellite imagery training and techniques of signal receiving stations for 
defence and security purposes. The Italian Defence Ministry offered to provide the following 
assistance to Thailand: 
- techniques of installing the satellite imagery receiving station; 
- satellite imagery data; 
- technical advisers on aerospace technology; 
- aerospace technology education and training programmes; 
- data and documents on aerospace technology; and. 
- other assistance agreed by both parties. 
 
After reviewing the draft MoU with related agencies (including the Defence Information 
and Space Technology Department), it was resubmitted to the Italian Defence Ministry for further 





EU Military Equipment in the Royal Thai Armed Forces 
As already noted in this thesis, since the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties the EU has 
increasingly attempted to define its international role and capabilities. One aspect of this has been 
the emergence of the European/ Common Security and Defence Policy - an area of activity of 
which involves the European Defence Agency (EDA) established in 2004. In part, this initiative 
was an attempt at increasing European competitiveness with other major arms producers such as 
the USA and Russia, as well as to increase intra-EU cooperation in the defence sector and to 
eradicate duplication where possible. This section reflects on this changing EU dynamic, switching 
the focus of analysis from key bilateral Member State relations to the military equipment acquired 
by the Royal Thai Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) supplied by EU Member States. In 
2006, the European Commission reported that EU arms exports to Thailand were worth €46 
million (European Commission, TDC XIX Ch.93).  
 
According to a US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on “Conventional Arms 
Transfers to Developing Nations” , in 2007 the major EU arms producers were France, the UK, 
Germany, and Italy who “serve as alternative sources of armaments that the United States choose 
not to supply for policy reasons” (Grimmett, 2007, p.12). Asia is considered to be the second 
biggest arms market in the developing world. From 2003-2006, arms transfers to Asia totalled 
US$38.8 billion representing 38.7% of the total value of transfer agreements with developing 
countries. Collectively, EU Member States ranked third in terms of arms agreements with Asian 
developing countries (at 19.3%) while Russia (37.1%) and the USA (24.4%) ranked first and 
second respectively. Between 2003-2006, the UK (US$10.1 billion) and France (US$8.7 billion) 
were ranked third and fourth in terms of the value of arms transfer agreements to developing 
countries, while the US (US$32.4 billion), Russia (US$24.6 billion), and China (US$4.5 billion) 
were ranked first, second, and fifth respectively. Israel (US$3.5 billion), Germany (US$2.7 
billion), Spain (US$2 billion), Italy (US$1.7 billion), the Netherlands (US$1.4 billion), and 




The level of military expenditure by Thailand declined markedly after the Asian economic 
crisis of 1997, and prior to 2007 there were no major military procurements made by the Thai 
government. However, the September 2006 coup, which removed the Thaksin Shinawatra 
administration, saw an interim government appointed by the military to govern Thailand. During 
this period, the military “awarded themselves substantial funding increments in the 2007 and 2008 
budgets, which respectively saw 34% and 28 % increases in the allocation to the military” 
(Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p.365). In 2007, the Thai military also proposed a ten-year 
modernisation programme worth US$9.8 billion which would see an increase in the defence 
budget from 1.58% to 2% of GDP by 2014 (Bitzinger and Mahari, 2008).  
 
Major procurement items from 2007-2008 included 96 Ukrainian BTR-3E1 armoured 
vehicles, 15,000 TAR-21 assault rifles from Israel, C-802 surface-to-surface missiles and launch 
systems from China, and new avionics for six C-130H aircraft (Matthews and Maharani, 2008). 
A recent major arms deal with an EU Member State was in 2007 with the purchase of twelve JAS 
39 Gripen Fighters (US$1 billion), one Saab 340 Erieye AEW aircraft, and one Erieye AEW 
command-and-control system from Sweden’s Saab. Saab has also agreed to the technology 
transfer for Gripen by releasing source code data for the aircraft and the weaponry to the Royal 
Thai Air Force. In addition, the Gripen Package included one year training courses for RTAF 
pilots, training courses for RTAF mechanics, spare parts for an initial two years, and air-launched 
missiles (The Nation, 17 October 2007). 
 
In October 2002, the Thai government and BAE Systems (representing the British 
government) signed the “Economic Compensation Agreement” . The objective of this agreement 
was to upgrade the military equipment of the Royal Thai Armed Forces and generate social 
development and sustainable economy. The Thai government approved the purchase of twenty-
two L119 105mm Light Guns under this agreement. With this purchase, the British government 
and BAE Systems provided the following: technology transfer for the assembly, integration and 
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testing of L119 Light Guns; assistance in overhauling one Scorpion CVR (T) Light Tank; and the 
licensing of the design data package for the 76mm L23 Gun.  
 
The data released by CRS to a large degree portrays the characteristics of the military 
equipment of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. Major arms suppliers to Thailand include the USA, 
China, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Czech Republic, and Israel. Since the end 
of World War II, the USA has been the biggest military equipment supplier for Thailand. American 
military equipment has either been given at no cost or purchased as part of the military assistance 
given to the Royal Thai Armed Forces, especially during the Cold War era. In 2006, the USA 
provided US$1.48 million to Thailand for the purchase of military equipment through the Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) programme. And as noted above, Thailand also receives used US 
military equipment under the Excess Defence Article (EDA) programme, thanks to Thailand’s 
major non-NATO ally status.  
 
However, during the early part of this century EU Member States have been the second 
biggest suppliers of arms to Thailand. Table 5.2 illustrates EU military equipment in the Royal 
Thai Army as of 2008. As can be seen, the UK was a major supplier of light tanks, reconnaissance 
vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. France was a major supplier of artillery, while Germany supplied 
armoured personnel carriers and land radar systems. Spain supplied aircraft with Italy and Sweden 
supplying surface-to-air missiles and towed-guns respectively.  
 
Table 5.2 EU Military Equipment Supplied to the Royal Thai Army24 
EQUIPMENT by TYPE COUNTRY of ORIGIN QUANTITY 
   
LIGHT TANK (LT TK)   
Scorpions UK 127 
RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE (RECCE)   
Shorland S52 Mk3 UK 32 
                                                          
24 Army military equipment data compiled from the Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 
2008, the Thai Defense Attaché to Paris, and the Thai Defense Ministry. 
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ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIER (APC)   
Condor Germany 18 
ARTILLERY (ARTY)   
GIAT LG1 Mk2 (TOWED 105mm) France 24 
L119 105mm UK 22 
AIRCRAFT   
CASA 212 Aviocar (TRANSPORT) Spain 2 
Short 330UTT (TRANSPORT) UK 2 
AIR DEFENCE (AD) AND  
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM) 
 
 
Aspide (STATIC) Italy N/K 
Bofors L/70 40mm (TOWED GUNS) Sweden 48 
RADAR (LAND)   
RASIT (vehicle and artillery) Germany N/K 
 
Table 5.3 provides a similar outline for EU military equipment in the Royal Thai Navy. 
Arguably, the most famous procurement from the EU was the Spanish Chakri Naruebet aircraft 
carrier (US$175 million) in the 1990s. Italy has been a major supplier of patrol and combatant 
craft, mine warfare and mine counter-measures vessels, guns, and missiles. The UK has supplied 
a frigate, guns, torpedoes, aircraft (fighter and training), and helicopters to the navy. Germany has 
supplied mine warfare and mine counter-measures vessels, and aircraft (maritime patrol and 
transport). France has supplied amphibious ships, missiles, and helicopter handling systems, while 
Sweden has been a significant supplier of guns to the navy.  
 
Table 5.3 EU Military Equipment Supplied to the Royal Thai Navy25 
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE                 QUANTITY 
                                                                                                                       
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANT   
Chakri Naruebet (Aircraft Carrier and Helicopter) Spain 1 
Makut Rajakumarn (Frigate) UK 1 
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANT   




Chonburi (fast patrol craft coastal) Italy 3 




                                                          
25 Navy military equipment data compiled from the Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2008, interview 
with Admiral Prida Karasuddhi, and the Naval Attaché to Paris. 
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Bang Rachan (mine countermeasure coastal) Germany 2 
Lat Ya (mine countermeasure vessel) Italy 2 
AMPHIBIOUS   
Sichang (landing ship tank) France 2 
GUNS   
OTO Melara 76mm/62 Italy 18 
Mk 8 4.5 inches UK 2 
Bofors 57mm/70 Sweden 3 
OTO Melara 30mm Italy N/K 
OTO Melara 20mm Italy N/K 
Oerlikon GAM-BO1 20mm/85 UK N/K 
Breda 40mm/61 Italy 3 
Bofors 40mm/70 Sweden 10 
TORPEDO   
Sting Ray UK N/K 
MISSILE   
MM-38 Exocet (tactical surface-to-surface missile) France 12 
Albatros and Aspide (Surface-to-Air Missile) Italy 2 
Sadral (short range anti-air self-defense system) France 1 
NAVAL AVIATION   
AIRCRAFT   
AV-8A Harrier (fighter ground attack) UK 7 
DO-228-212 (maritime patrol) Germany 5 
F-27 MK 200 MPA (maritime patrol) Germany 3 
F-27 400M Troopship (transport) Germany 2 
TAV-8A Harrier (training) UK 2 
HELICOPTER   




Super Lynx (utility) UK 2 
Samahe DCNS (helicopter handling system) France N/K 
 
Table 5.4 illustrates EU military equipment in the Royal Thai Air Force as of 2008. In 
2007, the Royal Thai Air Force announced the purchase of twelve JAS-39/CD Gripen fighters 
(US$1 billion) from Sweden, the first six of which were delivered in 2009. Historically, the Czech 
Republic has been a major supplier of training aircraft; the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain 
supply transport aircraft; and France and Germany also supply training Alpha Jets to the Royal 




Table 5.4  EU Military Equipment Supplied to the Royal Thai Air Force26 
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE                                            
   
AIRCRAFT   
JAS-39/CD Gripen (fighter) Sweden 6 
A-310-324 (transport) UK/France/Germany/Spain 1 
A-319 (transport) UK/France/Germany/Spain 1 
Bae-748 (transport) UK 6 
Basler Turbo-67 (transport) UK 9 
G-222 (transport) Italy 3 
Alpha Jet (training) France/Germany 10 
L-39ZA/MP Albatros (training) Czech 46 
   
HELICOPTER   
AS-332L Super Puma (support) France/Germany 3 




Thailand’s Future Military Relations – China, Europe, or the USA? 
The USA remains Thailand’s most important strategic partner because of its enduring involvement 
in Southeast Asia. The US constitutes the largest donor of foreign military assistance to Thailand 
and has a strong influence on the Thai military. Currently, the EU plays a less important role in 
military affairs in comparison with the USA. Out of twenty-eight EU members, only six (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and UK) have significant military relations with Thailand. And 
post-Brexit the EU military influence seems destined inevitably to shrink. In an interview with 
Colonel Somnuek Anakwat, Director of Academic Division at the Royal Thai Army Intelligence 
School, he reflected that: 
The US-Thai military relationship is long established. In principle, the Thai military has 
always relied on the USA. US-Thai military relations are stronger than our relationship with 
the EU. The USA has given Thailand the status of a major non-NATO ally. In the Thai armed 
                                                          




forces, most of our military equipment came from the USA…we have joint training exercises 
with the USA every year but we do not have any with the EU.26 27 
 
However, Colonel Somnuek Anakwat also raised an interesting development concerning 
the possible future direction of Thai military policy. He noted that, “[t]he Thai military is 
concerned that its current over reliance on the USA has given them monopoly status and has 
limited our independent military capacity so we are beginning to develop relations with other 
allies”2728. In view of this, the EU may be in a position to take advantage of this situation by 
presenting itself as an alternative military ally for Thailand – at least position itself to take 
advantage of this immediately if democracy returns to Thailand as anticipated in 2019. There is a 
precedent supporting this possibility,  in 2007, Sweden signed a MoU with Thailand on the transfer 
of twelve Gripen fighters after the USA refused to sell F-16 fighters to Thailand (because the 
country was run by a military appointed government after the September 2006 coup). Such 
increased pragmatism may well shape the future EU-Thai relationship. 
 
Regarding EU-Thai military cooperation, the EU and Thailand can enhance their military 
cooperation in crisis management or peacekeeping. The EU is equipped with the expertise and 
resources while Thailand has been involved in peacekeeping missions all over the world. However, 
it is crucial to stress the dominant military role of China in Asia. Thailand has developed a strong 
military relationship with China since the Cold War era and China is Thailand’s second most 
                                                          
27 Interview with an army officer, 17 June, 2008, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army.  Original interview in 
Thai “ ความสัมพันธ ท์ า งการทหารร ะหว่ า ง ไทยกับสหร ัฐ ฯ  น้ั นมีม านานแล ้ว   โดยหลักกา ร  
ก อ ง ทั พ ไ ท ย จ ะ พึ่ ง พ า ส ห ร ั ฐ ฯ ม า โ ด ย ต ล อ ด  
ค ว า ม สั ม พั น ธ ์ท า ง ก า ร ท ห า ร ร ะ ห ว่ า ง ไ ท ย กั บ ส ห ร ั ฐ ฯ น้ั น แ น่ น แ ฟ้ น ม า ก ก ว่ า ยุ โ ร ป  
ส ห ร ั ฐ ฯ ใ ห ้ ไ ท ย เ ป็ น เ ม เ จ อ ร ์ นั น น า โ ต ้ อ ั ล ล า ย  
ในกองทพัไทยอาวธุยุทธโทปกรณส์ว่นใหญ่มาจากสหรฐัฯ...เรามกีารฝึกรว่มกนัทุกปีแต่เราไม่มกีารฝึกรว่มกั
บยโุรปเลย”. 






important strategic partner after the USA. China has also become a major arms supplier to 
Thailand.  
 
An important factor that determines the types of military equipment that a country needs 
is the type of equipment that their neighbours are looking to purchase or have already acquired. 
Malaysia has purchased Polish tanks, Russian Su-30 fighters, British frigates, submarines from 
France, corvettes from Germany and multiple rocket launchers from Brazil. Indonesia is buying 
Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, submarines, attack helicopters, corvettes, and land systems (Bitzinger 
and Maharani, 2008). Singapore has ordered Apache gunship helicopters, F-15 Eagles fighters, 
and La Fayette frigates. The Thai army purchased ninety-six APCs while the Thai air force 
purchased six Gripen fighters in 2007. The Thai navy was less successful in this period: the 
government rejected their request to purchase a submarine and two frigates. However, the navy 
continues to lobby for their purchase: EU leading arms producers are among the best 
manufacturers of submarines and frigates in the world so Thailand may well choose to purchase 
them from the EU at some future point. 
 
While clearly impacting on Thailand’s relationship with the USA, the September 2006 
coup had only a limited impact on EU-Thai military relations. The major actions taken by the EU 
were to cancel high-level visits and suspend military cooperation agreements and programmes 
until an elected government resumed power in February 2008. However, with the seemingly 
continuing political unrest in Thailand, there were rumours regarding another coup – a reality that 
eventually transpired within a few years. This certainly can have a more seriously negative impact 
on EU-Thai relations as the EU would be more likely to respond with meaningful sanctions and 
suspend bilateral political relations, including possibly disrupting arms sales, as well as again 
halting military cooperation until a democratically elected government is returned to office.  
 
The often claimed success of the ESDP AMM has given a new role to the EU – that of a 
crisis management operator – and provides an interesting bridge between past EU-Thai military 
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relations and areas for potential future engagement. Through this mission, the EU gained in 
reputation and credibility with its ASEAN counterpart suggesting that in the future, if similar 
situations arise, the EU could become the external partner of choice. As the Joint Action of the 
Council on AMM adopted on 9 September 2005 stated: “The EU is committed to promote a lasting 
peaceful settlement to the conflict in Aceh (Indonesia) and to increase stability throughout South 
East Asia, including progress in the economic, legal, political and security reforms”. The AMM 
has also enhanced the relationship between ASEAN and EU in general, not to mention the personal 
friendship between ASEAN military officers and EU monitors. Southeast Asia, undeniably, still 
faces internal conflicts. There are separatist movements in many countries including Burma, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. The EU could perform a similar function with the cooperation of 
ASEAN in monitoring any stabilisation processes. However, before any monitoring mission can 
begin, the conflicting parties must first agree to settle their conflict. The most challenging aspect 
is to mediate the peace negotiations between the parties involved. If the EU is capable of achieving 
this, future monitoring processes could well follow the successful example of the AMM. In the 
case of Burma, high levels of human rights violations have been seen, yet the international 
community has been largely unable to persuade the Burmese government to stop the oppression 
of their people. Unless Burma is invaded by military troops as in the case of Iraq, the Burmese 
government seems extremely unlikely to allow interference from the EU. In the case of Thailand, 
with a much more favourable political environment than that of Burma, the EU has potentially a 
greater chance of being invited. However, as an earlier Thai incident regarding an EU election 
monitoring proposal made in 2007 has shown, Thailand is similarly sensitive to foreign 
interference in their domestic affairs and any intrusive EU effort could have a negative impact on 
EU-Thai relations. Lieutenant General Nipat’s response to the idea of EU involvement in the 
southern part of Thailand provides a fitting context on which to draw this analysis of EU-Thai 
military relations to a close.  
 
I discussed this matter with my superior and we agreed that EU mission is not 
suitable for the southern part of Thailand. It is not the right place at the right 
time. The EU approached me and informed me that when the mission in Aceh 
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is completed, the EU is ready to shift to the southern part of Thailand…I had 
to announce that now is not the right time and I always confirmed that it was 
under different conditions. And the most important thing is that the Thai 
government has always stated that we will fix the problems ourselves because 
it is a domestic matter which I believe is correct…I agree with using peaceful 














                                                          
29 Original interview in Thai “ผมไดก้ลบัมาคุยกบัผูบ้งัคบับญัชา  เราก็มคีวามเห็นเหมอืนกนัว่าภารกจิของอยูีไม่เหมาะ 
สมกบัภาคใตข้องประเทศไทย  ไม่ใชอ่ะไรทีถู่กทีถู่กเวลา  อยูีมคีวามตัง้ใจทาบทามผ่านผมว่าเมือ่เสรจ็ภารกจิอาเจะหแ์ลว้น่ีอยูี 






Chapter 6:  Perspectives on the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
Building on the military focus of Chapter 5 and the initial discussion of the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM), this Chapter provides an overview of this unique EU-ASEAN joint mission and 
draws on original interview material provided by two informed senior players: one from the EU – 
Andreas List, formerly the Indonesian Desk Officer in DG External Relations (and subsequently 
Deputy Head of Delegation, Commission (and latterly EU) Delegation in Bangkok); the other from 
the Thai military - Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Head of Mission, Aceh Monitoring 
Mission. There have been a number of academic accounts of this “successful” E/CSDP mission 
and it is not the purpose of this chapter to extensively regurgitate this history30. Rather the 
interview material is presented here to draw out the individual EU and Thai perceptions of the joint 
activity and offer a unique insight into this first - and so far only - military collaboration between 
the EU and Asia within the ASEAN region. However, the Chapter does have to begin with a brief 
overview of the range of ESDP/CSDP missions that have been taken since first being launched in 
2003. The Chapter then offers a compressed summation of this ESDP AMM mission before 
turning to the qualitative interview data.  
 
Scope and Focus of E/CSDP Missions since 2003 
The first years of the twenty-first century were heady ones for European integration. Enlargement 
from 15 to 25, the initial euphoria surrounding a putative EU Constitution and the clear 
acceleration in foreign policy coordination through the then ESDP mechanism. This was the 
context within which AMM was conceived and implemented (despite the soon to be reality check 
of the French and Dutch referenda rejecting the Constitutional Treaty). Given that after May 2004 
enlargement EU foreign policy decisions were to be based on the consensus of 25, it is quite 
                                                          




remarkable that so many ESDP missions were undertaken. For the newer Member States economic 
rather than political integration was the priority. 
Since being launched in 2003, over the next 15 years of E/CSDP some 35 missions were 
undertaken: over half have been completed (including AMM) while 16 remained ongoing as of 
late 2018. These missions and their respective webpages are listed in the Appendix A. Table 6.1 
provides a descriptive overview emphasizing the diversity of mission (both between and within 
those that were military and those that were civilian in nature), geographical focus as well as an 
indicative timeline suggesting when the EU was more willing to respond – or when a consensus 
of the 15, 25, 27 or 28 was feasible. The type of missions are classified as follows. For the military: 
- Ground force deployment (EUFOR) 
- Naval force deployment (EUNAVFOR) 
- Training (EUTM) 
 
For the civilian missions: 
 
- Policing (EUPOL, EUPM, EUPAT) 
- Capacity building (EUCAP) 
- Border assistance (EUBAM) 
- Rule of Law (EULEX, EUJUST) 
- Monitoring (EUMM) 
- Security Sector Reform (EUSSR, EUSEC) 
- Aviation security (EUAVSEC) 
- Advisory (EUMAM) 
 
 
Table 6.1 lists these ESDP/CSDP missions by type (militiary or civilian), geography and 
year.  For a fuller description of the manadte for each mission, see Appendix B. 
 
Table 6.1   ESDP/ CSDP Missions 2003 -201831 
                                                          








Type  Mission       Location Date 
  1. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia   (2003) 
  2. Democratic Republic of the Congo                  
 
(2003) 
 (EUFOR) 3. Bosnia and Herzegovina                               
 
(2004 – present) 
  4. Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
(2006) 
Military  5. Chad and the Central African Republic  
 
(2008 – 2009) 
  6. Central African Republic (2014 – 2015) 
 (EUNAVFOR) 7. Somalia  
 
(2008 – present) 
  8. Mediterranen  
 
(2015 – present) 
  9. Mali       (2013 – present) 
 
 (EUTM) 10. Central African Republic 
 
(2016 – present) 
 
  11. Somalia  
 
(2010 – present) 
    
 
  1. Kinshasa  (2005 – 2007) 
  2. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia    
 






  4. RD Congo  (2007 – 2014) 
Civilian   5. Bosnia and Herzegovina  (2003 – 2012) 
  6. Palestinian Territories  (2006 – present) 
 (EUPAT) 7. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia    
 
(2005 – 2006) 
  8. Sahel Mali  
 
(2014 – present) 
 (EUCAP) 9. Sahel Niger  
 
(2012 – present) 
  10. Somalia  (2012 – present) 
  11. Moldova and Ukraine  
 
(2005 – present) 
 (EUBAM) 12. Libya  (2013 – present) 
  13. Rafah (2005 – present) 
 (EULEX) 14. Kosovo  (2008 – present) 
 (EUJUST) 15. Iraq  
 




Certain general broad patterns can be ascertained. From 2003 to 2006 (the period during 
which the AMM took place) the EU instigated 11 civilian missions and 4 military. This number 
represents a sizeable percentage of all E/CSDP missions undertaken in the last fifteen years (out 
of a total of 35). Geographically the scope of these missions was expansive: 5 in the territories of 
the former Yugoslavia, a further 5 in Africa, 2 in the Middle-East yet just 1 in South East Asia – 
Aceh. Furthermore, looking at the 11 civilian missions in the 2003-6 period, just under half were 
Policing Missions, and another two were Border Assistance Missions. Thus Aceh was unique in 
both its peacekeeping mandate as well as geography. 
Indeed, policing missions seem to have become the preferred mission format for the EU. 
Since 2003 there have been 6 such interventions all of which have involved significant 
commitments in time and finances (see Appendix B). For example, the EU’s only other Asian 
mission – EUPOL Afghanistan –ran for 11 years and was consistently among the costliest E/CSDP 
missions (for example, in 2016 – its final year of operation - the budget was €43.7m and involved 
269 staff and 22 Member States)3132. The mandate was “to contribute significantly to the 
establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective policing arrangements… to 
                                                          
32 Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-
2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf 
About EUPOL| EUPOL Afghanistan. (n.d.). Retrieved June 10, 2016, from http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/37 
  16. Georgia  (2004 – 2005) 
  17. Aceh  
 
(2005 – 2006) 
 (EUMM) 18. Georgia  (2008 – present) 
 (EUSSR) 19. Guinea-Bissau  (2008 – 2010) 
 (EUSEC) 20. RD Congo  (2005 – 2016) 
 (EUAVSEC) 21. South Sudan  (2013 – 2014) 
 (EUMAM) 22. RCA  (2015 – 2016) 
  23. Ukraine  
 
(2014 – present) 




support reformation process towards a trusted and efficient police service” (Council Joint Action 
2007/369/CFSP, 30 May 2007). Similarly long-term (launched in 2005) and ongoing, if less 
costly, is – EUPOL COPPS – which has a mandate to establish “sustainable and effective policing 
arrangements under Palestinian ownership” (Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 
November 2005). The budget for 2017 was €10.32 million to support 114 staff drawn from 21 
Member States. In comparison, as the following section demonstrates, AMM can be described as 
more modest, of limited duration and somewhat frugal. 
Thus it would appear that the EU’s decision to become involved in Aceh was not a 
predictable formulaic response but one that required a precise mandate fit for the peculiar specifics 
of the Aceh conflict. The AMM cannot be criticized as a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Indeed, prior 
to 2005 there had only been 6 other ESDP missions implemented, the majority of which were 
within the Former Yugoslavia presenting fewer logistical hurdles to confront. There were no 
precedents to help shape the EU’s response to Aceh. What, then, was the mandate given to the 
AMM? Was it an undisputed success? And if so, why is it still a rare example of EU engagement 
with South East Asia and of a peacekeeping initiative. 
 
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)3233 
In August 2005, Indonesia’s (and one of Asia’s) long-standing conflicts was finally resolved with 
the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Indonesian Government and 
the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)) in Helsinki, Finland. It was on this 
basis that an ESDP Joint Action (the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)) was launched representing 
                                                          
33 The data used in this section, unless otherwise stated, is primarily drawn from www.aceh-mm.org and EU Council 






an untried and ambitious intervention for the first time in Asia and involving two regional 
organisations – the EU and ASEAN. This brief summary and chronology of the conflict and the 
EU’s role draws heavily from Schulze (2007). 
AMM focused primarily on restoring the peace and stability in Aceh with the monitoring 
of the implementation of MoU regulations agreed by the Indonesian Government and the Free 
Aceh Movement. GAM was established in 1976 with the objective of achieving an independent 
Islamic Sharia state and to redress grievances over the use of the area’s natural resources. Three 
historic phases of violence have been identified: 1976-9; 1989-91; 1999-2002.  In 2003 Aceh was 
declared a military operations area or dearah operasi militer (DOM) by the Indonesian 
Government and given the status of “military emergency”. The conflict had lasted for nearly 30 
years with the loss of almost 15 000 lives and the displacement of tens of thousands people in 
Aceh, and consequently heavily impacting the economy and political status of Indonesia (Schulze, 
2007). 
On the 26 December 2004, an earthquake induced tsunami wreaked widespread destruction 
and resulted in 100,000s of deaths in Aceh. This natural disaster was the prime motivation for the 
two sides to conclude a peace agreement leading to the signing of an MoU in Helsinki in August 
2005 under the chairmanship of Martti Ahtisaari, the former President of Finland. The MoU’s 
guiding principles were: governance; Human Rights; amnesty and social reintegration; security 
arrangements; and the establishment of an Aceh Monitoring Mission and dispute settlement 
process. As noted previously, the AMM was an untested foreign policy innovation and required 
the collaboration of two regional organisations – the EU and ASEAN. The formal legal purpose 
of AMM was to monitor the implementation of the MoU, especially the demobilisation of GAM 
and the decommissioning of its weapons, the redeployment of non-organic forces and police 
together with any additional mandates given to the mission by the EU.  
From the EU’s perspective, the AMM was established as a civilian mission under the then 
European Security and Defence Policy and was just the second such monitoring mission mandated 
under ESDP (albeit the first mission conducted in Asia). The legal basis was the Council Joint 
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Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh. 
The EU mandate primarily focused on monitoring the implementation of the MoU by Indonesia 
and GAM. Specifically, the Joint Action mandate limited the EU’s role to: 
- monitoring the demobilisation of GAM and the decommissioning of its weapons; 
- monitoring the redeployment of non-organic forces and the police; 
- monitoring the reintegration of GAM and the human-rights situation; 
- rule on disputed amnesty cases; and, 
- investigating violations of the MoU. 
The initial mandate only covered a 6-month period commencing 15 September 2005: 
however, this was extended for a further nine months till 15 December 2006. The Mission drew 
its personnel from EU Member States, ASEAN members (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines 
and Singapore), and third countries - Norway and Switzerland. A pre-AMM civilian and military 
technical assessment mission visited Jakarta and Aceh and subsequently the provincial capital of 
Banda Aceh was chosen as the AMM headquarters and Dutch senior diplomat Pieter Feith 
appointed as Head of Mission.   
Initially (from 15 September to 31 December 2005) there were 125 EU and 93 ASEAN 
monitors deployed, but by the end of the Mission there were only 29 EU and 7 ASEAN monitors 
left on the ground. For the EU, the AMM constituted a civilian mission: personnel were never 
armed. However, this designation is somewhat of a grey area as some personnel were required to 
have military backgrounds in order to undertake the Mission’s technical tasks.   
Impressively, the AMM’s objectives and tasks were largely achieved on schedule. The 
decommissioning of GAM weapons and the redeployment of Indonesian army and police forces 
were completed on 5 January 2006.  GAM surrendered 840 weapons for decommissioning and 
officially disbanded its military wing. The amnesty under the MoU saw some 2,000 GAM 
prisoners released, and this served as an important confidence-building measure. Ultimately, there 
were no unresolved amnesty cases and a decree on the new governance of Aceh was signed by the 
President of Indonesia on 1 August 2006. Overall there was consensus that both the Indonesian 
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Government and GAM fully complied with the MoU leading to a restoration of peace and stability 
in Aceh. Table 6.1 summarises the formal content of the AMM. 
Table 6.2   Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia)3334 
LEGAL BASIS 
• Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005 
MANDATE35 
• To monitor the demobilization of GAM (Free Aceh Movement) and monitor and 
assist the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons;  
• To monitor the redeployment of non-organic Indonesian military (TNI) and police;  
• To monitor the reintegration of active GAM members into society; 
•  To monitor the human rights situation in the context of the tasks above;  
• To monitor the process of legislation change in Aceh;  
• To rule on disputed amnesty cases;  
• To investigate and rule on violations of the MOU;  
• To establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties 
BUDGET 
• €15.3 million (€9.3 million: CFSP budget; €6 million from the Member States) 
DURATION 
•  15 September 2005 – 15 December 2006 (15 months) 
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL 
• 125 EU personnel and 93 ASEAN personnel 
MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION 
•  12 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and 2 third 
countries (Norway and Switzerland) and 5 ASEAN states: (Thailand, Malaysia, 
Brunei, Singapore and the Philippines 
 
The decommissioning of the GAM weapons was in four stages (to be completed by the end 
of December 2005) under the supervision of decommissioning teams led by a Finnish Colonel, 
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Kalle Liesinen. The first round took place in Banda Aceh (in September 2005) where a total of 279 
weapons were surrendered. The last round of decommissioning took place by the December 2005 
deadline with the final weapon cutting ceremony held in Banda Aceh. The redeployment of 
Indonesian troops mirrored this schedule with 25,890 army and 5,791 police withdrawn from Aceh 
over the three-months. 
After the decommissioning and redeployment were completed, the Law on the Governance 
of Aceh (LoGA), comprising of 40 chapters and 278 articles was promulgated and based on Islamic 
or Shariah law (which represents Islamic jurisprudence in relation to all aspects of life). With 
respect to AMM’s mandate to monitor human rights in Aceh, Head of Mission Pieter Feith, 
apparently concluded that “Sharia is the business of the people of Aceh” (Schutz, 2007).  AMM 
was mandated to monitor the issues pertaining to human rights rather than to interrupt the judicial 
administration of Aceh.  
Certainly the EU likes to profile the AMM as a clear success and indeed the transition to 
peace and autonomy was broadly achieved. However, such a conclusion has to be tempered by 
some inadequacies even if these were as much a result of the novelty and untested nature of this 
EU initiative as they were to policy errors. As a Joint Action, it was to be expected that the AMM 
had a dedicated budget and the backing of the Member States. But consensus was not easily 
achieved. Initially only Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden and UK called for an ESDP Joint 
Action, the remaining majority arguing EU foreign policy priorities and budgets should focus 
closer to home, suggesting an early indication of the impact of the 2004 enlargement on future EU 
foreign policy priorities. At this point in its evolution, ESDP funding mechanisms were still a work 
in progress and somewhat unusually the Commission’s External Relations Directorate-General 
proposed using the Rapid Reacting Mechanism (€3 million) and the Asia and Latin America 
programme (although it seemed doubtful that these two programmes could legally finance a CFSP 
operation). It transpired that the CFSP mechanism funded €9 million with the balance covered by 
the participating Member States, Norway and Switzerland (see Table 6.2).  
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Because of such short notice of the mission, training and selection of monitors were 
perfunctory. Typically, the training of monitors in relation to the AMM only lasted for three days 
and consisted of a background briefing of the mission and a summary of the conflict and the 
function of the Indonesian military. Language too posed as a challenge in conducting AMM with 
few speakers of Indonesian Bahasa much less the Acehnese language widely spoken in the field. 
Critics have noted that the selection of monitors did not take into full consideration the importance 
language played in communicating with other monitors.  
However, despite any or all of these shortcomings, Aceh is an important example of EU 
collective foreign policy and uniquely the only one that has involved cooperation with ASEAN. 
Success for whom is a crucial question, so what were the perspectives of the two sides – the EU 
and ASEAN? It is to this that this chapter now turns.  
 
An EU Perspective 
In his May 2006 interview for this doctoral thesis, Andreas List36 noted that the then relations with 
Indonesia were often described in rather modest terms, as simply technical projects related to the 
immediate needs of the tsunami, avian influenza, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission peace process. 
As such, all three represented the concrete results of the EU’s regional cooperation co-operation. 
But this perspective is rather shortsighted, at least from the EU point of view: in all three cases an 
overarching picture is needed to understand and fully appreciate that the three EU programmes 
were the crystalisation of wider interests and contexts. 
According to List, the Aceh case had a “more political angle”. Early Indonesian attempts 
to address the Aceh conflict had predated the actual mission. Initially these were made under the 
Suharto regime which viewed Aceh as an insurgent province, the answer to which was to be 
through military means rather than diplomacy and dialogue. But after Suharto’s downfall the 
                                                          
36 All the information in this section is taken from an interview with Andreas List. 
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Indonesian perspective changed and President Megawati undertook some attempts to resolve the 
conflict. As early as 2001 there was a military pause that failed because the lack of monitoring, 
followed by other attempts in 2002 and 2003 which similarly failed. List stated that there was 
monitoring “but it was not appropriately done because the conflicting parties were not part of 
monitoring”. Only the national Indonesian authorities were engaged in the monitoring which raised 
the question of trust. It was the Yudhoyono Government that was the first to undertake serious 
efforts at conflict resolution and on assuming office he immediately launched a peace process. 
Consequently, the EU was fully aware that the peace process originally had nothing to do with the 
tsunami because it was launched earlier - in November 2004. But, as List observed, of course the 
tsunami facilitated greatly urgency and cooperation. The international community, had become 
suddenly more alert and engaged with Aceh.  
Consequently, the greatest contribution made by the tsunami was not to launch the peace 
process but to lending transparency to it. Again, according to List, any military solution previously 
envisaged by Yudhoyono became not only unpopular but was rendered impossible or at least more 
unlikely by this increased transparency. The Indonesian government then accepted the 
international assistance and almost instantaneously NGOs, the ASEAN community as well as the 
UN were keen to be involved, while the EU – through the personal connection of Ahtisaari - was 
invited to help facilitate the peace process. Through ASEAN, and for similar reasons, Thailand 
was prepared to be involved; the relationship with Indonesia was strategically important. To quote 
List:  
Because Indonesia is a member of ASEAN, we have an overarching strategic interest 
in seeing ASEAN progress, seeing ASEAN develop, flourish and integrate. 
Therefore we thought that Aceh could be a case in point that we could lend a 
constructive support. It was critical because we had no economic interest in Aceh. 
So for Indonesia we were a credible mediator. 
 
For the EU, this perception of neutrality made its involvement both credible and 
trustworthy. It also allowed the EU to put on show the efficacy of its values and norms as well as 
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profile its model of regional integration within the ASEAN context. Thus, it was in part 
international humanitarian concerns, and in part a reflection of its own self-image that saw the EU 
accept the invitation to lend its support to the peace process. In a practical sense, the EU did this 
by supporting the mediator, Finland’s former President Ahtisaari, and by having the democracy 
support package ready, authorized and implemented by a Council cross pillar action involving a 
monitoring mission, support package, and mediation. The local ownership of the process was 
recognized and respected by the EU: the peace process was not a European process. The EU’s role 
was to provide support as needed, mediate and to work in cooperation with ASEAN and Indonesia. 
From the EU perspective, the EU played a constructive, supportive mediating role and did not seek 
to impose a specific solution. A post-conflict reconstruction role was also part of the EU’s 
engagement, including the reintegration of former fighters and preparations for subsequent 
democratic elections. By way of summary, List commented: 
So if you ask me how do we measure the results? Is it positive on the relationship, 
the clear answer is yes. The last president of Indonesia came in January this year to 
Brussels to thank us. We do not have visibility there. We do not need to have a sticker 
on each house that it was financed by the EU. It is enough for us that the political 
leaders of Indonesia are aware of it. And the official visit of the last President 
confirmed it. So for us it was a positive development. 
The EU’s rhetoric on its international identity often uses the AMM as an example of 
efficacy as well as a model for further E/CSDP cooperation with ASEAN. A decade or so ago, 
optimism remained high that this initial joint initiative would be the forerunner to further foreign 
policy coordination and joint missions. That, of course, has been an unfulfilled aspiration to date. 
Nonetheless, the AMM has offered a rare insight into the EU’s own foreign policy motivations 




A Thai Perspective37 
In contrast with the List interview –a relevant EU official but not someone directly involved on 
the ground in Aceh - the interview with Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek, conveys the Thai 
perspective of the most senior military figure who was directly involved in Aceh (in his capacity 
as the Deputy Head of Mission of the Aceh Monitoring Mission). A series of questions were asked 
and the response candid and revealing. The questions were: 
- What was the main role of AMM? 
- What was the role of Thailand?  
- What military branch were the Thai staff recruited from?  
- What was Thonglek’s main role at AMM? 
- What was the Thai government’s policy regarding the operation of AMM? 
- How did AMM affect EU-Thai relations? 
- Did EU-Thai relations intensify after the co-operation in AMM? 
- Were there any problems working with the EU? 
 
What defined the AMM’s role? The term “monitoring” was intentionally chosen on the 
encouragement of the EU and agreement of Indonesia. According to Thonglek, the term 
monitoring was chosen “because it has deeper meaning, not just observing but it means managing 
and administering the process instead of the term observer”. Thus the AMM was intentionally 
proactive. The MoU was established to supervise the ceasefire and launch peace negotiations – a 
process that had a history of failure having been tried on five previous occasions. This time it was 
only made possible thanks to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issuing a statement that a 
peaceful measure would be adopted to solve the Aceh civil war insurgency.  
                                                          
37 The information and quotations in this section are all based on the interview with Lieutenant General Nipat 




Although the AMM is usually described as an EU-ASEAN collaboration, only five 
ASEAN member countries participated with Thailand taking the lead on the Asian side. The choice 
of the EU as the key mediator was unexpected (the UN would have provided a more traditional 
option) – mediators in the previous five failed peace attempts were disregarded in favour of this 
innovation. As the Thai Deputy Head of AMM stated: 
In the end, after considering everything…historical background, the decision was 
the EU. On the EU side, Javier Solana has a lot of experience and decided that it 
was not wise for the EU to act on this alone so the EU invited ASEAN to work 
together. So ASEAN had an urgent meeting to consider the offer made by the EU. 
As a result, only five ASEAN members agreed to participate in this mission. 
Through diplomatic channels Indonesia signaled that Thailand would be its preference as 
the core ASEAN country (although Malaysia also proposed one of its senior military officials as 
the ASEAN Deputy Head). While it was diplomatically difficult and somewhat sensitive it was 
eventually accepted by all participants that the EU would head the AMM with Thailand acting as 
deputy. The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted the name of Lieutenant General Nipat 
Thonglek to the Indonesian government for their approval. Here, personalities and politics may 
have come into play, at least if we accept the validity of the Thai perspective. 
One of the reasons was Peter Feith, Head of Mission of AMM, who looked at my 
rank and my resume and thought we could work together so he recommended me 
for the position of Principal Deputy Head of Mission (PDHoD). The truth is there 
are historical reasons, there is a difference in being a Thai and being a Malaysian 
regarding the role and the operation of this mission. 
A typical misperception of the AMM is that it was a military ESDP mission; while it 
involved the demobilization of GAM fighters and the decommissioning of weapons, from the EU’s 
legal perspective it was classified as a civilian mission. However, as noted above, there was some 
necessary ambiguity, particularly with respect to ASEAN (specifically Thai) involvement. As 
noted by Lieutenant General ThongLek: 
The work at AMM, it is true that everybody said that it is not a military mission, 
but everyone including Peter Feith told me that he discovered that the personnel 
he needed for this mission are those with military background. 
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Consequently, it was not inappropriate for the Thai contribution to the Mission to be in the 
form of military personnel. The Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters had already created a 
Peace Operations Division some three years prior to this mission and had established a track-
record of humanitarian assistance in peacekeeping operations worldwide, both within and outside 
the UN framework. This contribution helped bolster AMM’s operational capacity and relevant 
expertise. 
Once the mission began, administration and management were all related to military issues 
with military officers from the EU and ASEAN handling the core business of AMM. The EU and 
ASEAN agreed to send military officers to AMM, but they were not required to wear military 
uniforms. While civilians were also involved in the AMM they operated under this military 
structured system. And importantly, the AMM had to work effectively with the Indonesian military 
and, according to Thonglek, the mutual respect between the Thai, Indonesian and EU military 
participants was key to the successful conclusion of the mission. For ASEAN, as neighbouring 
countries, it was important to take a long-term perspective based on confidence-building and 
future collaboration. In addition to Thailand, the other four ASEAN countries also sent military 
officers and overall the whole AMM experience had positive repercussions with ASEAN.  
Perhaps surprisingly, for Thailand there was a high degree of local decision-making 
devolution with just a very light policy touch from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (through the 
offices of the Military Attaché) largely for reasons of pragmatism and geography – the Thai 
embassy being 2000 kilometres away in Jakarta. Again, when a purely EU focus is recalibrated to 
consider the role of the AMM from the perspectives of the other participants, new rationales for 
involvement emerge. As the AMM Deputy Head, Thonglek was also aware of his duty to update 
and advise the Thai embassy on any course of action that would be beneficial to Thailand. In this 
regard Aceh was viewed as a pertinent to Thailand’s own domestic conflicts. As Thonglek stated: 
I always informed 20 Thai subordinates that, firstly, we are working for Indonesia 
and the EU. Secondly, we must look at the benefits deriving from Thai-Indonesian 
bilateral relations, especially, the solution to the situation in the three southern 
provinces of Thailand. 
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As a series of EU Perceptions studies in Thailand have all confirmed, the EU was not well-
known in Thailand (or in any other ASEAN member country either) (Holland et. al., 2007; 2009, 
Chaban and Holland, 2008). At best the EU was viewed as exclusively a trading partner with no, 
or very limited, political or foreign policy capacity. It was hoped that this first EU-ASEAN 
collaboration would help to raise Europe’s identity in a positive multifaceted way as well as boost 
the relevance of regional cooperation (using the EU as an example for ASEAN to emulate). 
Consequently, the AMM provided a unique opportunity for the ASEAN public to see the EU acting 
in a peacekeeping role. And it also provided the EU with a learning opportunity through this first 
practical engagement with ASEAN. Both the EU and ASEAN were to benefit. High 
Representative Javier Solana’s post-mission invitation to Lieutenant General Thonglek to address 
the Council in Brussels in January 2006 was both symbolic and strategically nuanced – reputedly 
no Asian official or military personnel had ever been afforded this opportunity before. A 
consequence was – at least in Thailand – an enhanced appreciation and attention towards the EU 
as a potential peacekeeping regional actor. The issue of opening a Thai Defense Attaché Office in 
Brussels was raised for the first time. In addition, a visit at the highest level (Supreme Commander) 
to learn more about the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, structures and missions, was 
mooted. With provocative and perhaps prescient insight, Thonglek commented “We must seize 
this opportunity. In terms of military training, now we only focus on the US. I think we should 
have other alternatives in case the US cannot assist us.” 
More practically, the AMM profiled the EU (for ASEAN) as an effective and efficient 
organization with a high level of experience related to mission financing. Thonglek complimented 
the EU in the following terms:  
Financial support was very efficient, there were no complex regulations which 
facilitated the mission and led to its success. I must praise the EU. When we arrived, 
the EU prepared everything for us…from computers, cameras, other equipment, 
vehicles, and airplanes. Everything was ready for operation. I give full credit to the 
EU, I think the EU is highly efficient. 
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Despite this positive assessment, given this was the first-ever EU-ASEAN collaboration 
some problems and difficulties were to be expected – and these were not just between Thai and 
EU staff but also between the different national ASEAN staff. As the Deputy Head of Mission 
explained:  
Of course there were problems regarding different approaches, concepts, and 
management because we came from different countries, different doctrines. Many 
staff had worked in Africa with many combat experiences. Some had been to 
Kosovo. Sometimes they worked very fast and were not very flexible but after a 
while we learned from each other. 
A mechanism used to bridge these differences in approaches and experiences, EU and 
ASEAN staff were intentionally integrated rather than structured to operate in nationally discreet 
units. The AMM comprised 11 District Offices located throughout Aceh province. It was 
determined that ASEAN would lead 6 of these and the EU the other 5: where an ASEAN staff was 
the head of a District Office, an EU staff would be second in command and vice versa in order to 
create a fully integrated operation requiring everyone to adjust to each other. This approach was a 
key element in the successful execution of AMM. 
For ASEAN, AMM was an unqualified success as born witness by the response of the 
Indonesian Government. Peace was achieved after decades of conflict based on the widespread 
acceptance of the process by the Acehnese. For the EU AMM was also recognised as a success. 
The ceasefire was a historical event. Key actors (Ahtisaari and the Indonesian President) were 
nominated, albeit unsuccessfully, for the Nobel Prize, giving the EU confidence that it could 
handle other future peace-building operations.  
Finally, at the conclusion of the mission, the question of whether the Aceh experience could 
act as a template for other EU interventions was raised in relation to the conflict in southern 
Thailand. With an ironic sense of timing, as peace was restored in Aceh by December 2006, 
conflict heightened in Pattani. The EU’s appetite for such peace-building initiatives had grown 
(thanks largely to the successful outcome and absence of any deaths) and according to Thonglek 
“The EU made a proposal through me that they were ready to shift their operation to the southern 
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part of Thailand. I had to tell them that now is not the right time because of different conditions.” 
This position was subsequently underlined by the Thai Government announcement that the conflict 
in southern Thailand was a domestic matter and would be handled internally (in keeping with 
ASEAN’s norm of non-interference). Consequently, the AMM remains – 12 years later - the only 
example of EU-ASEAN cooperation as well as the EU’s sole foreign policy action in South-East 
Asia.  
The richness provided by these high-level interviews provides this thesis with original 
insights as well as unique empirical evidence. As noted in the methods section, working in both 
Thai and English was essential and interview access  - particularly on the Thai side - was 
unprecedented. While typically lauded as an E/CSDP success, perhaps other considerations offer 
a more sanguine perspective. Any EU third country mission requires the willingness of the host 
country to permit EU involvement, a condition that may severely curtail the scope of such 
initiatives. Additionally, the EU’s  stated multilateral preference may limit such joint 
collaborations and the Aceh ASEAN example might prove to be the exception rather than the rule. 
Undoubtedly, however, the level of cooperation at the senior mission level between EU and Thai 
officers made a positive contribution to closer bilateral ties and this early experience of cooperation 
helped to balance the disequilibrium created in the relationship by the successive coups that were 
soon to follow in Thailand.  Lastly, a sense of scale is also warranted: for the EU, the Aceh 
deployment was quite modest and  (at least formally) underlined the preference for civilian over 
military intitatives. For Thailand involvement was more demanding politically given the non-
interference norms within ASEAN, but it also indicated Thailand’s aspiration for a leadership role 





Chapter 7: The EU’s Asian Mosaic – fragmented or coherent? 
 
As noted in the Introduction, the period of analysis, as well as the gestation period needed to 
produce the thesis – present important limitations. The empirical analysis focuses on the 1998-
2006 period (although subsequent references to events up until the 2018 ASEM meeting are 
occasionally made). Consequently, the Aceh case-study and broader EU military relations are 
discussed within that zeitgeist. Again, it is necessary to underline the energetic policy environment 
and initial optimism of that time. The first handful of E/CSDP missions were launched with great 
expectations, the 2004 enlargement was viewed as a significant and progressive steps towards 
deeper integration and the wave of challenges that were to characterise the following decade 
(Treaty referendum defeats, Brexit, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis) remained unanticipated.  
The decade long gestation from a thesis idea into a finished product unavoidably causes certain 
historical complications, not least the successive military coups in Thailand. While unavoidable, 
it is argued that the analysis remains valid and an insightful examination of what still constitutes a 
unique EU role and relationship with Asia. 
 
This thesis has presented a mosaic of policy realms, both political and military in nature - 
EU-Asia, EU-Thai, and EU-ASEAN relations - all interlinked under the umbrella of the theme of 
the EU’s growing actorness (despite the comparatively modest EU Asian policy coherence). 
During this period the fragmented nature of the EU’s engagement with Asia was in striking contrast 
with its much more comprehensive and historically consistent approach to the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific states, for example. The thesis raises the question of whether such a policy mosaic can 
be coherent or is it inevitably flawed by such fragmentation?  
 
This concluding chapter seeks to achieve several objectives. First, the conceptual link 
between EU relations with ASEAN and the experience of the E/CSDP AMM and the process of 
European integration raised in Chapter 1, is revisited. Second, the AMM’s contribution to the EU’s 
foreign policy profile is explored. Was it a typical intervention or more sui generis? Third, and 
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irrespective of any such conclusion, does this experience shed any light on the possible future 
directions of EU-ASEAN or EU-Thai relations? Fourth, the underreported but strategically 
important military connectivity between key EU member States and Thailand is considered. And 
fifth, reflections on the methodology of the thesis are considered. 
 
 The extensive explication of Integration theory undertaken in Chapter 2 set the necessary 
theoretical basis for understanding EU foreign policy. How the integration process is conceived, 
what motivates the diverse actors and how this is then reflected in a common policy is the starting 
point for empirical case-study analysis. Only within such a context could the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission and the nature of EU-ASEAN Thai relations be properly understood. This linkage of 
integration theory to external policies follows the work of Holland and Doidge (2012) who were 
the first to explicitly advocate this theoretical approach (in their case, in relation specifically to EU 
Development Policy). They argued that “while atheoretical examinations of EU politics can still 
be found, increasingly the importance of integration theory has come to be recognized as the 
essential starting point for discussions of any EU activity” (p.27). To understand motivations and 
rationales as well as the chosen policy mechanisms – a theoretical framework is necessitated. For 
Holland and Doidge this is best found “in the wider debates concerning the kind of integration 
process envisaged” and “simply, which of the competing approaches to integration can best explain 
EU… policy?” (p.28). Again mirroring Holland and Doidge, it was suggested that a range of 
concepts rather than a single theoretical framework offers the more insightful perspective. In the 
EU’s broad relations with Asia there has been intergovernmental evidence on display (with key 
Member States driving policy preferences), neo-functional spill-over occurring (connecting 
political, economic and military spheres) as well as multilevel governance players helping to shape 
different levels of decision-making underpinned by values and norms – all of which combined to 
shape the nature of the early phase of EU E/CSDP policy coordination and implementation.  
Consequently, this thesis agrees that “Such policy diversity demands conceptual complementarity 




Considering the second objective, what has been the AMM’s contribution to the EU’s 
foreign policy profile? Was Aceh a typical intervention or a one-off flirtation with peace-keeping? 
A basic examination of the subsequent E/CSDP missions would seem to suggest that Aceh was 
indeed sui generis. However, this may well be a rather narrow definition as the mandates of other 
missions have broached peace-keeping processes although none have been actively involved in 
disarmament. State sector reform can often involve the integration of organic and non-organic 
troops, for example, and border missions typically are designed to bolster mutual confidence and 
security. Clearly, EU missions can only respond to the on-the-ground situations that are presented 
and the tsunami and ethnic-religious conflict that characterised Aceh was temporally unique. 
However, Aceh while perhaps somewhat of an outlier, could be seen as not untypical of the EU’s 
peace-making interventions undertaken in different formats elsewhere. The AMM – at a minimum 
– presents an evidence-based analysis of where E/CSDP offers added value beyond bilateral or 
UN orchestrated initiatives.  
 
Undoubtedly Aceh has been seen – and promoted as such by the EEAS – as an unqualified 
success in EU foreign policy. It had a defined mandate, budget and duration, it brought together a 
previously untried collaboration effectively, and participants from all sides concluded the mission 
was effective and an essential contribution to resolving an 18-year conflict. As one of the earliest 
E/CSDP missions, the AMM enhanced the perception of the capacity for the EU to be an 
international actor in civilian/ military realms. The EU’s foreign policy “presence” was enhanced. 
Furthermore, Aceh has provided a good empirical test of the actorness capability-expectation gap 
as articulated by Hill. The AMM offers a rare example of where this gap can indeed be adequately 
bridged. It is therefore somewhat paradoxical – and for other theses to consider – why Aceh is 
perhaps a high point in E/CSDP engagement particularly given the Lisbon Treaty reforms that 
were in part designed to give the EU a clearer and more authoritative foreign policy voice through 
a more robust High Representative role. The lesson here seems to be that treaties matter less than 




Turning to the third objective of this conclusion, can this study of the AMM tell us anything 
about the future of the EU’s Asian policy? Mimicking the words used by Holland and Doidge to 
describe EU Development Policy, will future EU-ASEAN relations witness “more” Europe, “less” 
Europe, or perhaps a more effective Europe? If we fast forward to the October 2018 ASEM summit 
in Brussels it would seem that aspiration still remains the defining characteristic of the relationship. 
This 12th Asia-Europe Meeting was chaired by the European Council President, Donald Tusk, and 
brought together the leaders, or their representatives, from 51 Asian and European countries, the 
President of the European Commission and the ASEAN Secretary-General. The theme “Global 
Partners for Global Challenges” set expectations high at a time of global disruption and an erosion 
of international norms with the concluding Chairman’s statement calling for ASEM to become the 
“building  block  for  effective  multilateralism  and  the  rules-based  international  order” 
(ASEM12, para 3.). The joint communique commented on contemporary security questions – 
ranging from the Korean peninsula to Iran to Syria and beyond – as well as called for greater 
European engagement with “the region through all ASEAN-led processes” (para. 14). But no 
specific cooperation mechanisms were outlined illustrating the continuing gap between rhetoric 
and action that – Aceh notwithstanding – has consistently characterised EU-Asia relations. As 
noted earlier in this thesis, and despite the fact that the bilateral treaty with ASEAN was the first 
such regional agreement ever to be signed by the EU, Europe seems only belatedly to have 
comprehended the importance of Asia and sought to build a series of complementary policy 
platforms to enhance relations. In that regard, the policy mosaic described in this thesis is more 
consistent with the perception of flawed fragmentation than coherence. The striking absence of 
innovative policy initiatives tends to suggest that these two mega-regions lack a prime motivation 
for deeper cooperation beyond the informality characterised best by the ASEM process.  
 
Fourth, the under-researched but strategically important military connectivity between key 
EU Member States and Thailand has been explored using both sensitive intelligence as well as 
informative interview data from key military players. With specific respect to Thailand, the two 
coups in the past 15 years has slowed any deeper military cooperation, although this informal 
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freeze has begun to thaw more recently.  In this regard the Member States have largely been in 
step with the US, deferring new commitments until the restoration of democracy is achieved rather 
than just promised. Intriguingly, one of the myriad of unknown Brexit outcomes will be how the 
UK wishes to redefine its global military linkages – including arms sales – once it is no longer 
bound by any common EU policies. Intra-European competition over arms exports may provide 
Thailand and ASEAN with new opportunities to diversify from the current American and 
increasingly Chinese reliance.  
 
And fifth, how successful was the chosen methodology for examining the thesis question? 
A mixed-methods approach was adopted. Primary documents served as the bedrock in defining 
the scope and nature of the various EU-Asian relationships. This underlined the importance of a 
rule-based approach favoured by the EU when circumscribing relations with other international 
actors.  Such documentation, of course, has its limitations but they do give an accurate 
representation of the level of coordination and agreement that existed at a specific time. To 
complement this, the thesis is rich with interview data. Key participants drawn from the most 
senior levels cooperated and provided frank and revealing information that is nowhere else 
available. This often sensitive commentary has, however, necessitated a brief embargo. 
Nonetheless, this thesis meets the “new knowledge” empirical measure for a doctoral thesis. The 
interview data is strengthened by the use of original language (for Thai), subsequently translated 
into English for comparative purposes. The final methodological element was the use of a case-
study approach: secondary literature was used for the descriptive aspects of the AMM, 
supplemented as noted above by interview commentary. These three elements – primary sources, 
interviews and case-study – were informed by the theoretical framework outlined in Chapters 1 
and 2. 
 
To conclude, some broader themes deserve recognition and comment. First, EU-Asian 
relations remain an under-researched aspect of EU political, foreign or military policy. Similar to 
the plight of EU Development Policy as described by Holland and Doidge (2012), academic 
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fashion has only given spasmodic attention to Asia in general: the contrast with many other EU 
policy areas is striking and perhaps best explained by the fragmented and fluid nature of the EU’s 
interaction with Asia in a policy sense. What framework takes precedence - with ASEAN? 
Through ASEM? With the four Asian EU Strategic Partners (India, China, Japan and Korea)? Or 
via bilateral FTAs (as with Singapore, Japan, Korea and potentially Australasia)? Such structural 
diversity is not a substitute for focus or coherence.  
 
A second broad observation is that the EU’s Asian engagement “should be understood 
within the broader intention to establish a single foreign policy international “presence” (Holland 
and Doidge, 2012, p.38)  Since the 2004 enlargement, the EU has armed itself with sufficient 
institutional decision-making authority but seems reluctant to apply these post-Lisbon tools to its 
approach towards Asia. Some twenty-five years since first being proposed, it still seems to be the 
case of an expectations-capabilities gap (Hill, 1993), where the missing capacity is political will 
and strategic interest.  As the analysis of the EU arms trade highlighted, this was a policy area that 
remained exclusively bilateral (and indeed competitive between the Member States) rather than 
common. – a situation that remains unchanged despite the best efforts of the European Defence 
Agency over the last 15 years. 
 
Similarly, a third observation has been the limited impact of the 2004 enlargement at least 
on the immediate implementation of the 2005 AMM. This conclusion is consistent with the multi-
level governance perspective as outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Despite a seeming disinterest in a 
distant continent, the newer Member States – at this time – did not use the opportunity to prevent 
a foreign policy consensus from emerging among the EU15. Indeed one (Lithuania), was a 
contributing Member State to the mission. The AMM appears to contradict Ginsberg’s early 
conclusion that “new members adjust to, and mould, the EU’s international relation” (Ginsberg, 
1998, p. 198). However, the case-study does support his assertion that the 2004 new Member 
States did not add any geographically different global connections to the EU unlike previous 
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enlargements. This thesis does not confirm Allen’s (1998) argument that institutional reform 
related to CSFP decision-making and procedures would be necessitated by the 2004 enlargement. 
The findings from this study are more compatible with Nugent’s recognition that “attitudinal 
changes amongst decision-makers have also been important … decision-making flexibility is vital 
if the EU is to be able to function in a reasonably efficient manner” (2016, p.439). Behavioural 
adaptation trumps institutional reform. The mandate for AMM was determined according to pre-
existing foreign policy mechanisms and procedures. However, this lack of involvement or 
indifference of the newer Member States resulted in leaving the mission’s implementation to those 
Member States with a stronger foreign policy perspective. Only one of the EU10 committed 
personnel to the AMM. Finally, the expectations raised by Cremona (2003) of a rebalancing of 
foreign policy concerns to the immediate EU neighbourhood can be considered as consistent with 
the evidence of the AMM. After this out-of-area intervention, subsequent E/CSDP missions have 
never gone beyond Africa, the Middle- East or the Eastern neighbourhood.  
 
Prediction through hindsight is usually an easier task. Looking forward, it remains to be 
seen whether the EU will regain its appetite for engaging in foreign policy initiatives in Asia. 
Potential issues abound – in Myanmar, Korea and even Thailand – where an EU role could be 
explored based on the experience of 35 past or present E/CSDP missions. And the 2016 EU Global 
Strategy provides a policy base to move beyond Europe’s near abroad. However, at this stage some 
25-years after the Maastricht Treaty created CFSP, there seems to be no clear EU-Asian foreign 
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19. EUNAVFOR Atalanta Somalia 

















EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSIONS (EUPM/EUPOL) 
 
EUPM BiH (BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA)3738 
 
LEGAL BASIS 
• Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002 
 
MANDATE 
• Mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, to establish in BiH a sustainable, professional and 
multiethnic police service operating in accordance with European and international 
standards; Assisting local authorities in planning and conducting major and organized 
crime investigations, overall improving the whole criminal justice system in general and 
enhancing police-prosecutor relations in particular; Together with the EC (European 
Commission) in assisting BiH authorities to identify remaining police development needs 
where EC is able to address 
 
BUDGET39 
• €32.94 million in total from 2002 until 2012 
 
DURATION 
• 1 January 2003 – 30 June 2012 (9 years and 6 months) 
 
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL 
• 34 international staff and 47 national staff nearing the end of mission 
 
MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION 
• 27 Member States and 6 third states (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and 
Ukraine) 
 
                                                          
38 Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-
2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf 
39 European Union External Action (2012). Common Security and Defence Policy: European Union Police Mission 





EUPOL PROXIMA FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)3940 
 
LEGAL BASIS 
• Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 23 September 2003 
 
MANDATE 
• Monitoring, mentoring and advising on the consolidation of law and order, including the 
fight against organised crime; Practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of 
the Ministry of Interior; Operational transition and creation of a border police; Building 
confidence between the local police and the population; Enhanced cooperation with 
neighbouring states in policing 
 
BUDGET 
• Proxima I: €15 million; Proxima II: €15.95 million 
 
DURATION 
• Proxima I: 15 Dec 2003 – 15 Dec 2004; Proxima II: 15 Dec 2004 – 15 Dec 2005 (Total 
of 2 years) 
 
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL 
• Proxima I: 186 international police officers; Proxima II: 169 international staff (138 
international police officers, three civilian seconded personnel and 28 international 
experts) 
 
MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION 
• Proxima I: 22 Member States and 4 third countries (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, 




EUPOL KINSHASA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO41 
 
LEGAL BASIS 
• Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 
                                                          
40 Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-
2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf 
41 Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-





• To monitor, mentor and advise the setting up and initial running of Integrated Police Unit 
(IPU). Supporting IPU covering activities on monitoring, supervision and role as advisor; 
Training activity in Kasangulu centre with partnership of International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC); Reform and reorganization of the Congolese National Police (CNP); 
Establishment of an element of coordination of the Congolese forces maintaining order 
during the election period 
 
BUDGET42 
• €4.3 million in total 
 
DURATION 
• 12 April 2005 – June 2007 (26 months) 
 
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL43 
• 23 international staff, headed by Superintendant Adilio Custodio 
 
MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION 
• Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden 
 
 




• Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 
 
MANDATE 
• To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under 
Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with 
the Community’s institution building programmes and other international efforts in the 
wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform.  
                                                          
42 Pauwels, N. (2005). EUPOL’Kinshasa’: Testing EU co-ordination, coherence and commitment to Africe. 
European Security Review. ISIS Europe 
43 EUPOL Kinshasa. (2006). EUPOL-KINSHASA: The First European Police Mission in Africa [Factsheet]. 
Retrieved from: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-
kinshasa/pdf/01102006_factsheet_eupol-kinshasa_en.pdf   
44 Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-




Assist Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) in implementation of the Police Development 
Programme by advising and closely mentoring PCP senior officials at District, 
Headquarters and Ministerial level; Coordinate and facilitate EU and Member State 
assistance, and where requested, international assistance to PCP; Advice, programme 
planning and project facilitation for the Palestinian Criminal Justice elements 
 
BUDGET45 
• 2005 until 2014: Annually €8.97 million; 1 July – 30 June 2017: €10.32 million 
 
DURATION 
• 1 January 2006 – 30 June 2017* (latest extension) 
 
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL 
• 69 international staff and 45 local staff led by Rodolphe Mauget 
 
MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION 
• 21 Member States and 3 third countries (Canada, Norway and Turkey) 
 
 
EUPOL RD CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO)4546 
 
Mission succeeded from EUPOL-KINSHASA 
 
LEGAL BASIS 
• Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP of 12 June 2007 
 
MANDATE 
• To provide assistance and advice on police reform; To improve coordination between the 
police and criminal justice system;  
To ensure consistency of all Security Sector Reform efforts; Creation of General 
Directorate of Schools and Training within the Congolese Police and the construction of 
                                                          
45 European Union External Action (2016). EUPOL COPPS – Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian 
Terrories. Retrieved from 
http://eupolcopps.eu/sites/default/files/newsletters/20160711%20EUPOL%20COPPS_en.pdf  
46 Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-
2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf 
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a national Police Academy, with the plan of restructuring and modernizing the national 
police training system.4647 
 
BUDGET 




• 1 July 2007 – 30 September 2014 (7 years and 2 months) 
 
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL 
• 31 international staff led by Commissaire Divisionnaire Jean-Paul RIKIR 
 
MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION 






• Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007 
 
MANDATE 
• To contribute significantly to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and 
effective policing arrangements, ensuring appropriate interaction with wider criminal 
justice system; To support reformation process towards a trusted and efficient police 
service, which works in accordance with international standards, within the framework of 
the rule of law and respects human rights. 
Advancing the Ministry of Interior (MoI) institutional capacity; further professionalization 
and efficiency of the Afghan National Police (ANP) as a civilian police service.4849 
 
BUDGET 
• Annual budget 2016: €43.7 million 
                                                          
47 European Union External Action. (2014). EU Police Mission for the DRC (EUPOL RD CONGO). Retrieved from: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-rd-
congo/pdf/factsheet_eupol_rd_congo_en.pdf  
48 Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-
2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf 





• 15 June 2007 to date (Extended mandate until 31 December 2016) 
 
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL 
• 127 international and 142 local staff (March 2016) headed by Pia Stjernvall 
 
MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION 





















Timeline of ASEAN Political and Security Developments 
 
i) Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 1971 
In 1971, the members of ASEAN decided to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN). The action was an attempt to isolate Southeast Asia from outside influences – both 
from the West and Communism – in order to create peace and economic prosperity in the region 
(Gilson, 2002). Chalermpalanupap has argued that “one underlying belief in ASEAN then – which 
remains valid until now - was that security of each ASEAN member could best be maintained 
through national resilience and national development efforts free from external interference in any 
form or manifestation” (2002, p.195). The aims and objectives of ZOPFAN were drawn from the 
United Nations’ principles “of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, 
abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights 
and self-determination and non-interference in affairs of states” (ZOPFAN Declaration, 1971, p.1). 
The ZOPFAN Declaration stresses that “the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable 
objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization” (p.1). 
Article 1 of the Declaration states that ASEAN members will co-operate to “secure the recognition 
of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any 
form or manner of interference by outside Powers”. Article 2 simply states that ASEAN members 
will enhance their co-operation in order to improve their “strength, solidarity, and closer 
relationship”.  
 
ii) Bali Summit: Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Treaty of Amity and Concord 1976 
Khoman has identified three developments in the Southeast Asian region caused by the Cold War 
that forced ASEAN members to enhance their co-operation in the area of security: “the defeat and 
withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam and even from the mainland of Asia; the growing 
Vietnamese ambitions nurtured by the heady wine of victory; and the threat of Ho Chi Minh’s 
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testament enjoining generations of Vietnamese to take over the rest of French Indochina in addition 
to the northern provinces of Thailand” (1992, p.3). After 1975 and the American withdrawal, 
Communism began to spread from Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, to Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand, and Malaysia. It is important to note that the break between China and the Soviet Union 
in 1956 over different paths of Communism had a major impact on politics and security in the 
region throughout the Cold War. The triumph of the Khmer Rouge, backed by China, over Prince 
Sihanouk’s regime in Cambodia increased instability in the already shaky Southeast Asian region. 
 
Gilson has argued that the “fears of Communism uprisings in Malaysia and Thailand led 
to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and Treaty of Amity and Concord at the Bali summit in 
1976” (2002, p.42). The Bali Summit marked an historical event as it was the first ASEAN Summit 
since its conception in 1967. Not only did ASEAN leaders sign the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Concord, they also agreed to the establishment of an ASEAN 
Secretariat.  
 
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord was signed on 24 February 1976 by the leaders of 
five ASEAN member countries. The Declaration built on the earlier 1967 Bangkok Declaration to 
enhance “the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, 
and political fields” (ASEAN Concord, 1976, p.1). The following objectives and principles to 
establish political stability in the region were adopted in the Declaration: it was agreed that member 
countries shall: 
- increase their effort to realise the early creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality; 
- enhance their cooperation in economic and social development to eradicate poverty, 
disease, and illiteracy and improve the living standard of their people; 
- aid one another should natural disaster occurred; 
- resolve intra-regional disputes peacefully; and, 
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- establish regional awareness and create a strong ASEAN community “in accordance with 
the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of nations” (p.2). 
 
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord represented a framework of regional cooperation 
among ASEAN member countries in six areas – political, economic, social, cultural and 
information, security, and an improvement of ASEAN instruments. Only EU-ASEAN political 
and security relations are not discussed here. The important elements of the political cooperation 
between ASEAN members included the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the 
improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation by creating the ASEAN 
Secretariat, and “strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, 
coordinating position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions” (p.2). In terms 
of security cooperation, the Declaration failed to produce any substantial element and opted instead 
for a “continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security 
matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests” (p.4).  
 
The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) declared its purpose 
to be “to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which 
would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship” (Article 1, TAC, 1976, p.1). 
Article 2 stipulated that member countries should “respect the independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity and national identity of all nations” and stressed the principle of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of one another. It also called for peaceful resolution to disputes 
between member countries by refraining from the use of force and encouraging effective 
cooperation between the members. The Treaty also promotes cooperation in economic, social, 
technical, scientific and administrative fields and in issues that constitute regional stability and 
security. It established a High Council comprising ministers from member countries to mediate 
and find common solutions to any disputes between members which might otherwise lead to 
329 
 
regional conflict. Article 18 mentioned that the TAC is open for accession by other countries in 
Southeast Asia. 
 
iii) ASEAN-Indochinese Conflict (Post Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia) 1978-1991 
When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, tensions in Southeast Asia intensified enormously. The 
region was divided into two rival blocs – ASEAN and Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) 
– representing the on-going hostilities between China and Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union, 
and between the USA and the Soviet Union (Archaya, 1993). ASEAN member countries, 
especially Thailand, viewed the Indochinese countries led by Vietnam as the imminent threat to 
their security and stability in the region, while Vietnam viewed ASEAN as a defence organisation 
representing American influence in Southeast Asia.  
 
Archaya has argued that “the ASEAN-Indochinese divide was unquestionably the chief 
obstacle to ASEAN’s concept of regional order based on its professed norms of non-intervention… 
and non-interference” (1993, p.8). The fear of domestic Communist insurgencies in ASEAN 
member countries after the victory of Vietnam in 1978 had led to an increase in ASEAN 
cooperation, but at the same time contributed to the polarisation of the region. For ASEAN member 
countries, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia represented a violation of the core principle of its 
1976 TAC – non-interference. They asserted that the Cambodian Conflict was a result of 
Vietnamese expansionism and could only be resolved by the withdrawal of the Vietnamese from 
Cambodia. ASEAN members also feared that Vietnam wanted to dominate the whole region and 
overthrow the current regimes.  
 
One important factor that led to the end of ASEAN-Indochinese conflict was the 
improvement in the relationship between Thailand and Vietnam due to changes in the domestic 
politics of both countries (Archya, 1993). The situation began to improve in the late 1980s when 
Vietnam adopted a doi moi or “renovation” policy with the goal of reforming the Vietnamese 
economy. The Vietnamese leaders by this stage had realised that the cost of occupying Cambodia 
330 
 
was very high and they could no longer sustain the costs. The leaders wanted to improve the 
Vietnamese economy by creating a market mechanism economy which could only be achieved 
through foreign investment and trade, and therefore they needed to improve Vietnam’s relations 
with ASEAN and the rest of the world. Thailand, under the new Chatchai government in 1988, 
saw the doi moi policy as an economic and political opportunity for Thailand and seized on it by 
improving ties with Vietnam despite the concerns of other ASEAN members that this could 
undermine ASEAN’s common position towards Vietnam. The other ASEAN members felt that 
this action would ease pressure on Vietnam to leave Cambodia and would therefore result in an 
increase in Vietnamese aggression. However, the end of the Cambodian conflict began when, on 
5 April 1989, Vietnam announced that it would withdraw its troops from Cambodia by September 
that year. This announcement caused differing reactions within ASEAN. Malaysia and Indonesia 
wanted to accept Vietnam into the association immediately, regardless of the Vietnamese political 
system, while Singapore argued that Vietnam should change its political and economic system 
before entering ASEAN. This division was visible throughout the 1990s with Singapore being the 
main opposition.  
 
Another factor that promoted a change in Vietnamese foreign policy was the 
transformation of relations between the Soviet Union and China. The reconciliation between the 
two superpowers left Vietnam isolated in its territorial disputes with China. Only through ASEAN 
could it find allies in the international arena against the major players, especially China. ASEAN 
could also serve as a connection to the West. With the Soviet Union now out of the picture, 
Vietnam had to find ways of improving its relations with the rest of the world. Finally, in 
September 1991, Vietnam expressed its intention to sign the TAC, thus formally demonstrating its 
commitment to regional cooperation and stability. 
 
Archya has argued that “in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, ASEAN 
needed, and had the opportunity, to extend its role to extramural conflicts” (1993, p.11). ASEAN 
tried to resolve the conflict by organising a UN-sponsored International Conference on 
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Kampuchea in 1981 and Indonesia was involved in facilitating talks between the Khmer factions 
in two Jakarta Informal Meetings (1988 and 1989). The efforts by ASEAN to sustain the peace 
process eventually led to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia on 23 October 
1991. The Agreement could arguably be seen as an ASEAN success in bringing an end to the 
Cambodian Conflict. Although the Paris Agreement marked the end of external influences in 
Cambodia – Vietnam (backed by the Soviet Union) and China – internal conflicts between the 
Khmer factions persisted in the country until 1993. Perhaps, the most influential action that 
ASEAN took during this time was always presenting Vietnam and the Indochina states with the 
opportunity part of becoming ASEAN members and forming part of the regional order of 
Southeast Asia.  
 
During the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore (1992), ASEAN members declared that 
“ASEAN shall forge a closer relationship based on friendship and cooperation with the 
Indochinese countries, following the settlement on Cambodia” (Singapore Declaration, 1992, p.1). 
The Singapore Declaration also welcomed all countries in Southeast Asia to accede to the TAC 
and announced its support for the Cambodian National Council in sustaining the peace process 
with the assistance of the UN. In addition, ASEAN promised to provide international programmes 
for the reconstruction of the Indochinese countries. This declaration, led by Vietnam and ASEAN, 
marked the end of the rivalry between the Indochinese countries and the relations between the two 
groups improved significantly after the summit. Later that year, during the Manila ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting, Laos and Vietnam signed the TAC, thus marking a new chapter in ASEAN-
Indochinese relations.  
 
iv) 1990s: ASEAN Regional Forum, Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone, and ASEAN Enlargement  
 
In the 1990s, ASEAN adopted three initiatives which had a significant impact on regional peace 
and security: the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, the signing of the Treaty 
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on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1995, and the enlargement of 
ASEAN to include Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). 
 
As one of the initiatives of the Singapore Declaration in 1992 which states that “ASEAN 
shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace 
and prosperity” (p.1), the ARF was created during the 1994 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM) “to serve as a vehicle for promoting political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
region” (ASEAN Annual Report, 1993-1994, p.1). The ARF was composed of the six ASEAN 
members, seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, 
and the USA), two Consultative Partners (China and Russia), and three Observers (Laos, Papua 
New Guinea, and Vietnam). The first ARF meeting took place in July 1994 in Bangkok, Thailand 
(the developments of the ARF are discussed further below). 
 
During the 5th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in 1995, the leaders of ten Southeast Asian 
countries signed the Treaty on the SEANWFZ. The Treaty determines “to take concrete action 
which will contribute to the progress towards general and complete disarmament of nuclear 
weapons, and to the promotion of international peace and security” and “to protect the region from 
environmental pollution and the hazards posed by radioactive wastes and other radioactive 
material” (SEANWFZ, 1995, p.1) As an essential element for the realisation of the ZOPFAN, the 
Treaty calls for the prohibition of the development or possession of nuclear weapons, their 
stationing, transportation, testing or use of nuclear weapons, and the disposal of nuclear waste in 
the nuclear free zone (which covered the whole of Southeast Asia) by the Treaty signatories. 
Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of this Treaty was the participation of ASEAN’s long 
standing rivals – Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia – something which helped pave the way for the 
future membership of these Indochinese countries. 
 
The resolution of the Cambodian Conflict in the early 1990s led to the improvement in 
relations between ASEAN and Indochinese countries, headed by Vietnam which had already 
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shown interest in joining ASEAN both to improve its relations with ASEAN members and the 
West, and in order to fend off the involvement of China. Thus at the 1995 5th ASEAN Summit, it 
was announced that Vietnam had obtained membership status while Laos and Cambodia had been 
offered observer status. At the end of the summit, ASEAN leaders declared that:  
ASEAN is committed to the establishment of an ASEAN comprising all countries in 
Southeast Asia which will be guided by the spirit and principles underlying the TAC and 
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. Co-operative peace and shared prosperity shall be the 
fundamental goals of ASEAN (Bangkok Summit Declaration, 1995, p.2).  
 
From the Declaration, it is clearly apparent that even at this stage the goal of ASEAN was 
expansive. During the 1st Informal ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting (held in Jakarta in 
1996) ASEAN agreed that Cambodia and Laos, as well as Myanmar be admitted into ASEAN 
simultaneously. While this symmetry was not fully achieved, Laos and Myanmar were admitted 
into ASEAN in July 1997, with Cambodia’s admission delayed until 1999 because of the on-going 
political turmoil in the country during that period.   
 
 
v) Two Decades: ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997) to the ASEAN Charter (2007) 
 
ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997) 
During the 2nd ASEAN Informal Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, ASEAN leaders agreed 
to adopt the ASEAN Vision 2020 and established an ASEAN Foundation to promote cooperation 
between member countries. ASEAN Vision 2020 advocates that ASEAN in 2020 to be “a concert 
of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded 
together in partnership in dynamic development and in community of caring societies”, a zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality (p.1, ASEAN Vision 2020). In this Vision, conflicts in the region 
would be resolved through the justice system and the rule of law, and the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation becomes the governing code of conduct among governments and their people. The 
leaders also envisioned ASEAN as a nuclear weapons free zone and free of other weapons of mass 
destruction. According to the Vision, the ARF will serve as the key mechanism in preventive 
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diplomacy and conflict resolution, with ASEAN playing an international role in promoting peace, 
justice and moderation.  
 
Through the Vision, ASEAN leaders saw a “Partnership in Dynamic Development” among 
members. The objective of this was to achieve economic integration and sustainable and equitable 
growth by enhancing economic cooperation within ASEAN. The members pledged to create an 
“ASEAN Economic Region” where “there is a free flow of goods, services and investments, a freer 
flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic 
disparities” (p.2, ASEAN Vision 2020). By 2010, the leaders planned to achieve and fully 
implement the ASEAN Free Trade Area, including the liberalisation of trade in services, the 
establishment of an ASEAN Investment Area, the liberalisation of the financial sector, accelerated 
development of science and technology, increased cooperation in the energy sector, improved 
communication systems (transportation and IT), and enhanced human resource development 
through better education and training., 
 
 
Hanoi Plan of Action (1998) 
After the economic crisis that hit Asia in 1998, ASEAN leaders held a 6th ASEAN Summit in 
Hanoi (December 1998) and adopted the Hanoi Action Plan (HPA) to support the goals of ASEAN 
Vision 2020 for the period 1999-2004. The main objectives of the plan were to “hasten economic 
recovery and address the social impact of the global economic and financial crisis” (HPA, 1998, 
p.1) and to promote regional integration while strengthening the economies of member countries. 
The HPA outlined the following measures to achieve this: to 
- strengthen macroeconomic and financial cooperation; 
- enhance greater economic integration; 
- promote science and technology development and develop information technology 
infrastructure; 
- promote social development and address the social impact of the financial and economic 
crisis; 
- promote human resource development; 
- protect the environment and promote sustainable development; 
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- strengthen regional peace and security; 
- enhance ASEAN’s role as an effective force for peace, justice, and moderation in the Asia-
Pacific and in the world; 
- promote ASEAN awareness and its standing in the international community; and,  
- improve ASEAN’s structures and mechanisms. 
 
Drawing from these, four objectives focused specifically on the political and security fields: to 
- strengthen regional peace and security; 
- enhance ASEAN’s role as an effective force for peace, justice, and moderation in the Asia-
Pacific and in the world; 
- promote ASEAN awareness and its standing in the international community; and,  
- improve ASEAN’s structures and mechanisms. 
 
The HPA aimed to strengthen regional peace and security by increasing cooperation and 
regional assistance to establish ASEAN as a ZOPFAN. Bilateral and regional cooperation 
programmes and technical assistance were encouraged to assist member countries to integrate into 
the organisation. The HPA called for the ratification of the Second Protocol of the TAC and 
encouraged the accession of non-member countries to the TAC. ASEAN leaders wanted to 
promote the TAC as the standard governing principles of ASEAN’s relations with other countries 
and there was also support for drafting the rules of procedure for the operations of the High Council 
as described in the TAC. The HPA called for disputes between members to be settled through 
negotiations, not by force. It also sought to enhance cooperation on border-related issues. The 
SEANWFZ was further promoted in the HPA in order to achieve a nuclear weapon free zone in 
the region and the plan called for the SEANWFZ Commission to supervise the implementation of 
the treaty. In addition, the HPA called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the South China 
Sea as stated in the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, and ASEAN leaders agreed to 
enhance intra-ASEAN security cooperation. 
 
The HPA sought to enhance ASEAN’s role as “an effective force for peace, justice, and 
moderation in the Asia-Pacific and in the world” (p.14). The plan stressed the key function of the 
ARF process and the leading role of ASEAN in conducting ARF activities. The HPA called for 
the ARF process to evolve its focus from confidence building to promoting preventive diplomacy. 
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ASEAN leaders intended to strengthen the ARF process by promoting cooperation between 
defence and foreign affairs officials in ARF activities and by promoting public awareness of the 
importance of the ARF process. They also called for the creation of basic governing principles 
based on TAC to enhance cooperation in promoting peace in the Asia-Pacific region: the ASEAN 
leaders also decided to increase consultation and coordination on ASEAN common positions at 
international fora and the HPA sought to strengthen ASEAN relations with its dialogue partners 
based on equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit.  
 
To achieve the HPA aims to “promote ASEAN awareness and its standing in the 
international community” (p.14), the ASEAN leadership have sought to promote the awareness of 
ASEAN among its citizens. The HPA also sought to enhance cooperation with mass media and 
foster the release of information on ASEAN and to develop an ASEAN Multi-Media Centre (by 
2001). Furthermore, it aims to “improve ASEAN’s structures and mechanisms” (p.15, HPA) by 
enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. It also seeks to improve ASEAN’s external relations 
mechanisms with its dialogue partners and other regional and international organisations. The 
leaders planned to improve the role, functions and capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat in order to 
carry out the implementation of the HPA.  
 
During the 3rd ASEAN Informal Summit (Manila, November 1999), ASEAN leaders 
agreed to adopt the proposal made by Thai Prime Minister, Chuan Leekpai, to establish the 
ASEAN Troika which would constitute an ad hoc ministerial level body. The purpose of the 
ASEAN Troika is “to enable ASEAN to address in a timely manner urgent and important regional 
political and security issues and situations of common concern likely to disturb regional peace and 
harmony” (Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Troika, p.1). The Troika would only be established 
when the situation demanded and would operate in accordance with ASEAN treaties and 
agreements founding principles of consensus and non-interference. The ASEAN Troika was to be 
comprised of the Foreign Ministers of the past, present, and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing 
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Committee (ASC) and its function was to assist the ASEAN foreign ministers by making 
recommendations and mandates. The Troika did not, however, have any decision making power.  
 
As a regional response to the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11th September 2001, ASEAN 
leaders issued the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism during the 7th 
ASEAN Summit (held in Bandar Seri Begawan in November 2001). The leaders agreed that 
ASEAN 
faces its biggest, if not the biggest, challenge since ASEAN was founded in 
1967… the two fold challenge of addressing a severe world economic slowdown 
while contributing to international effort to combat terrorism is without 
precedent. (p.1)  
 
They declared that “ASEAN is committed to countering, preventing and suppressing all 
terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, especially taking into account 
all relevant UN resolutions” (p.1). In response, the ASEAN leaders created a regional framework 
to handle transnational crime and adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action. They also approved the 
initiatives of the 3rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) that focused 
on dealing with terrorism. The ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the following measures: to  
- strengthen national mechanisms to fight terrorism; 
- support early accession to the anti-terrorist conventions; 
- enhance cooperation between ASEAN members’ law enforcement agencies; 
- integrate international conventions on terrorism to ASEAN mechanisms; 
- enhance cooperation on information and intelligence exchange between ASEAN members; 
- enhance cooperation between AMMTC and relevant ASEAN agencies; 
- establish regional programme to improve the efficiency of member countries in fighting 
terrorism; and,  
- increase ASEAN’s cooperation with other countries in combating terrorism through 
bilateral, regional and international cooperation. 
 
 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (2003) 
In October 2003, ASEAN leaders held the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali and adopted the Declaration 
of ASEAN Concord II (also known as the Bali Concord II). ASEAN pledged to “continue its efforts 
to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration among its member states and among their 
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peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity” (Bali 
Concord II, 2003, p.2). It can be argued that this declaration was a by-product of the ASEAN 
Vision 2020 which had as one of its main objectives, the creation of an ASEAN Community by 
2020. According to the Declaration, the ASEAN Community would have three pillars – an 
ASEAN Security Community (ASC), an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and an ASEAN 
Socio-cultural Community (ASCC).  
 
The objective of the ASC is to enhance political and security cooperation between member 
countries to ensure peaceful resolutions to intra-regional conflicts. The Bali Concord II states that:  
the ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of 
international law and uphold ASEAN’s principles of non-interference, consensus-based 
decision making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the 
renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and 
disputes (p.3).  
 
The ASC was also to be guided by the principles of ASEAN treaties and declarations such as the 
TAC, the ZOPFAN, and the SEANWFZ. The High Council of the TAC was to play a central role 
in the ASC. The new security community was to enhance the national and regional capabilities to 
combat transnational crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The ASC would also be 
involved in promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN leaders agreed that 
the ARF should remain the central forum in discussing security issues and that it remained open 
to ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners and other countries to cooperate in preserving peace and security.  
 
The objective of the second pillar of the ASEAN Community, the AEC, was to establish 
an economic community in the region through economic integration involving the free flow of 
goods, services, investment and more liberalised capital markets to promote ASEAN 
competitiveness and a better investment environment. It was also committed to achieving equitable 
economic development and a reduction in poverty as envisioned in ASEAN Vision 2020. The 
leaders agreed to adopt new measures which included an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), an 




The third pillar, the ASCC, had the goal of creating a community of “caring” societies as 
described in the ASEAN Vision 2020. The adopted measures were designed to enhance 
cooperation in social development with the goal of improving the standard of living and reducing 
poverty. The Community was to be committed to enhancing human resource development through 
more investment in education, training, science and technology and the leaders agreed to enhance 
cooperation in public health to reduce diseases and provide adequate health services. Other areas 
of cooperation included academia, culture, disaster management, whilst at the same time (and 
somewhat ambitiously) addressing problems caused by pollution, unemployment, and population 
growth. 
 
Vientiane Action Programme (2004) 
During the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane in November 2004, the Vientiane Action Programme 
(VAP) was adopted and built on the earlier Hanoi Plan of Action to achieve the goals of ASEAN 
Vision 2020 and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II. The VAP covered the 2004-2010 period 
and has two dimensions – “the broader integration of the ten Member Countries into one cohesive 
ASEAN Community” and “the identification of new strategies for narrowing the development gap 
to quicken the pace of integration …” (VAP, 2004, p.5). Three main themes were covered: goals 
and strategies towards achieving the ASEAN Community; goals and strategies for narrowing the 
development gap; and, the implementation mechanism.  
 
 The leading theme of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) is “[e]nhancing peace, 
stability, democracy and prosperity in the region through comprehensive political and security 
cooperation” (p.6). The VAP stresses that the main concept of ASEAN security is “comprehensive 
security”; that is, the notion that politics, economics, and social life are interconnected in the 
region. Externally, ASC will serve as an actor that promotes peace and security in the Asia-Pacific 
region and will promote ASEAN’s leading role in the ARF. The VAP adopted strategies in five 
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areas to realise the ASC: political development; the shaping and sharing of norms; conflict 
prevention; conflict resolution; and post-conflict peace-building.  
 
The following year’s 11th ASEAN Summit in December 2005, ASEAN leaders signed the 
Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter. They established the 
Eminent Person Group (EPG) which was composed of elites from different fields of the society to 
study and provide recommendations on elements of the ASEAN Charter and on the future of 
ASEAN. The leaders also created a High Level Task Force to draft the ASEAN Charter following 
the recommendations of the EPG. The progress of the ASC was furthered through the 
establishment of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building and Preventive 
Diplomacy and the reactivation of the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief under the ARF. 
In addition, ASEAN created the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Specifically relevant to this thesis, the leaders 
praised the accomplishments of the joint ASEAN-EU Aceh Monitoring Mission and viewed this 
operation to be the model for ASEAN regional conflict resolution efforts and an instructive 
example for inter-regional cooperation for future conflict resolution missions. It is this aspiration 
and assumption that this thesis examines in great detail in the context of the EU’s innovative use 
of CSDP missions since 2003. 
 
During the 12th ASEAN Summit convened in Cebu in January 2007, ASEAN leaders 
focused on the drafting process of ASEAN Charter and the realisation of the objectives of ASEAN 
Vision 2020. They adopted the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter after 
receiving a report from the EPG. The leaders agreed to fast-track the establishment of the ASEAN 
Community to 2015 and signed the Cebu Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN 
Community by 2015 – targets that at least were formally met on schedule. In terms of the progress 
in establishing the ASC, the First ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting was convened and there 
was progress in the activities of the ARF and the Joint Working Group on the Implementation of 




ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting (2006) 
In the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action adopted in the 10th ASEAN Summit, the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) was established as recommended by the Working 
Group on Security Cooperation of the ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting (Special SOM). 
The 1st ADMM was convened in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006 where the Concept Paper for the 
Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting was adopted. ADMM is “the highest 
ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN” (Concept 
Paper, 2006, p.2). The objectives of ADMM include: to promote regional peace and security 
through defence and dialogue and cooperation; to give guidance in the area of security and defence; 
to promote mutual trust and confidence; and to contribute to and promote the creation of ASC. The 
agenda of the ADMM includes: discussion on regional and international defence and security 
issues; voluntary briefings on defence and security policies; discussion on related activities outside 
ASEAN process; promotion of security and defence cooperation with Dialogue Partners; and the 
review of ASEAN defence cooperation. The ADMM has a rotating chairmanship and host that 
corresponds to the chairmanship of ASEAN Standing Committee. The leaders also established the 
ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM) and the ADSOM Working Group to assist 
the ADMM and implement its directives.  
 
During the 2nd ADMM in Singapore (14 November 2007), ASEAN leaders adopted the 
Protocol to the Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ADMM, a Three-Year ADMM Work 
Programme, and the ADMM-Plus Concept Paper. The Protocol to the Concept Paper for the 
Establishment of an ADMM defines the institutional framework: the ADMM is under the ASEAN 
Summit framework and its main coordinating mechanism in defence and military activities is the 
ADSOM. ADSOM supervises the ADSOM Working Group and the Task Groups and has to 
prepare an ADMM Annual Indicative Calendar of Activities for the ADMM and an ADMM 
Three-Year Work Programme. The Protocol stresses the importance of incorporating the principle 
of “comprehensive security” into defence and military cooperation in ADMM. In addition, ADMM 
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is tasked with organising Track Two activities (academic conferences, workshops, and seminars 
on defence and military issues) to enhance cooperation between the public sector and other 
stakeholders in ASEAN societies. ADMM is also responsible for promoting defence and military 
cooperation between ASEAN’s Friends and Dialogue Partners through ADMM-Plus process.  
 
ADSOM drafted an ADMM Three-Year Work Programme with the theme of “Building 
the foundation and setting the direction for defence dialogues and cooperation”. The Programme 
outlines five areas of ADMM initiatives:  
- promoting regional defence and security cooperation 
- shaping and sharing of norms 
- conflict prevention 
- conflict resolution 
- post-conflict peace building 
 
Promoting regional defence and security cooperation: The ADMM aims to develop an 
understanding of defence and security policies, structures, systems and developments by 
enhancing transparency through voluntary disclosure of these elements between ASEAN members 
including their defence institutions, universities, and think tanks. In addition, Track Two activities 
will be encouraged by ADMM through conferences and seminars on defence and security issues. 
The ADMM will promote existing and future defence and military dialogue and cooperation 
between ASEAN members and enhance defence and security cooperation with ASEAN friends 
and Dialogue Partners through the ADMM Plus process. 
 
Shaping and Sharing of Norms: The ADMM aims to support the development, 
implementation, and adoption of ASEAN security agreements (ASEAN Charter, TAC, Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea Declaration, the South East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
Treaty, ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism) to promote peace and security. In addition, 
ADMM will establish norms to promote cooperation on non-traditional security issues and 




Conflict Prevention: The ADMM aims to promote mutual trust and confidence between 
ASEAN members through an exchange of views and the sharing of information on regional and 
international defence and security issues. It also aims to provide input on the development of an 
ASEAN early warning system to prevent the occurrence and escalation of conflict in the region. 
The ADMM aims to strengthen confidence-building measures by promoting transparency through 
regional exchanges between ASEAN military officials, observers in military exercises and by 
sharing information of the UN Arms Register. In addition, ADMM will promote cooperation on 
disaster relief and emergency operations for humanitarian purposes including the development of 
a coordinating mechanism for military cooperation and joint training on disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance operation. It also aims to enhance cooperation on non-traditional security 
issues.  
 
Conflict Resolution: The ADMM aims to promote the development of mechanisms for 
peaceful settlement of disputes and to develop regional cooperation for maintenance of peace and 
stability by establishing a network between peacekeeping centres in the region in order to enhance 
cooperation in peacekeeping operations between ASEAN members and to establish an ASEAN 
Arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability. 
 
Post-Conflict Peace Building: The ADMM aims to enhance cooperation in military 
participation in humanitarian crisis management and assistance and post-conflict resolution and 
rehabilitation.  
 
ASEAN Charter (2007)  
On the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN and the 20th of the ASEAN Vision 2020, the 
leaders held their 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November 2007 and signed the ASEAN 
Charter: “a historic milestone for ASEAN, representing our common vision and commitment to 
the development of an ASEAN Community as a region of lasting peace, stability, sustained 
economic growth, shared prosperity and progress” (Chairman’s Statement of the 13th ASEAN 
Summit, 2007, p.1). The Charter outlines anew the purposes and principles of ASEAN. Article 3 
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of the ASEAN Charter provides ASEAN with a legal personality as an intergovernmental 
organisation. It also established the ASEAN Coordinating Council, comprised of ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers, to prepare the meetings of the ASEAN Summit and coordinate the implementation of 
the policies adopted at the Summit.  
 
In addition, the Charter created the ASEAN Community Council which is composed of the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, the ASEAN Economic Community Council, and 
the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council. The tasks of the ASEAN Community Council 
include: ensuring the implementation of the decisions taken at the ASEAN Summit; coordinating 
different sectors of the Community; and making reports and recommendations to the ASEAN 
Summit. The Charter instituted the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (to be 
based in Jakarta) comprised of one representative from every ASEAN member country. The 
function of the Committee is to support and cooperate with ASEAN bodies and external partners. 
ASEAN members agreed to create ASEAN National Secretariats in their respective countries to 
coordinate and promote ASEAN decisions at national level and they also decided to establish the 
ASEAN Human Rights Body to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
The Charter stipulates that decision-making in ASEAN is to be based on consultation and 
consensus and in a case where consensus cannot be reached, the ASEAN Summit will decide. On 
the issue of ASEAN identity, the Charter states the ASEAN motto is to be, “One Vision, One 
Identity, One Community” and introduced the ASEAN flag and emblem. ASEAN will also have 
an anthem and celebrate the 8th of August as ASEAN Day, reflecting for some a series of symbols 
that mimic those of the European Union’s earlier attempts at identity-building.  
 
During the Summit, ASEAN leaders also adopted the Singaporean Declaration on the 
ASEAN Charter and commended the cooperation in defence and security by Defence Ministers 
and military officials in ASEAN forums such as AMM, AMMTC, and the ARF. The leaders also 
assigned the task of drafting a Blueprint for the APSC. 
 
